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Abstract
Abstract
Labour hire has been described as a unique phenomenon of our times. As a response to
a changing economic, managerial and regulatory environment, it represents a
controversial area of great legal, industrial and social significance. It now represents an
emerging and established part of the employment scene in Australia and internationally.
It is thus timely and relevant to investigate its operation and the rules that apply to it.
As a work form labour hire is a tripartite arrangement between a labour hire agency,
client organisation and worker, whereby the agency hires out for fee a worker to
perform work for a client, mostly on a casual basis.
This thesis develops a theory for the rapid growth of labour hire both here in Australia
and overseas, and seeks to explain the increasing attraction of labour hire for business
organisations. The thesis also draws out the tensions that exist between labour hire and
the traditional common law employment tests that are supposed to govern it. At present
there is little information on how labour hire agencies operate and are regulated. This
project addresses this shortfall to fill this gap in the legal literature.
Research into the growth of the labour hire market is important, because of the marked
rise in the use of labour hire compared with previous employment patterns in Australia.
In particular the use of labour hire agencies for the engagement of labour has enjoyed a
growth in the last decade in Australia. In the last five years too there has been a
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dramatic interest in labour hire for governments in Australia, with major inquiries
undertaken by Commonwealth and State governments as 10 the general effects of labour
hire. The general findings in those inquiries have been tied in to the more specific
findings ofthis study.
This thesis has three objectives. Firstly to show that because of its unique tripartite
nature, a labour hire situation is counter to or is antithetical to the notions and concepts
of the traditional common law employment situation, and that the standard common law
employment tests (even allowing for judicial flexibility) are under strain when applied
to it.
Secondly to explain the growth of labour hire as a reaction to the impact of regulation,
of adding further costs and obligations on employers. As a consequence of this, there
are incentives for employers to go to less or largely unregulated labour markets such as
labour hire, which offer the prospect of potentially cheaper labour costs overall, and
more importantly immunity from the legal obligations of an employer, such as unfair
dismissal and workers' compensation obligations. Such a trend has led to the situation
of a primary core market of employees, and a secondary market of employees with
fewer privileges.
Thirdly to obtain empirical information about labour hire in Queensland using extensive
exploratory field work interviews with labour hire agencies, peak business groups,
unions and some labour hire workers. The results from this research support the above
propositions.
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In the empirical study the author paid particular attention to obtaining information on
the following issues -to what extent labour hire arrangements are used; what types of
labour hire arrangements are entered into; when labour hire arrangements are used;
why labour hire arrangements are used; the impact of labour hire on occupational
health and safety and other issues; what are the problems associated with labour hire;
and what legal instruments are used in relation to labour hire.
It is shown in the thesis that the application of common law employment principles to
labour hire is problematic in a number of areas such as unfair dismissal of a worker,
vicarious liability and anti-discrimination legislation.
In addition the research fieldwork conducted backs up American and Australian theories
and evidence, that a prime factor in the expansion of labour hire is the increasing
regulatory impact on standard employment. The work supports American studies which
contend that a major reason for the use of flexible (labour hire) staffmg is to avoid the
mandated costs associated with standard labour. The thesis also promotes greater
recognition of the possible unintended consequences of regulation of employment. The
imposition of perceived increasing regulatory burdens has had the effect of forcing
employing organisations into less onerous alternative labour markets such as labour
hire, where an increasing number ofworkers enjoy less security oftenure.
The preceding findings show that common assumptions that labour hire is just a
creature of economic and managerial concerns are incomplete. The results therefore
make an important contribution to the understanding ofthe concept of labour hire.
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hnplications about the nature of labour hire will be drawn in the concluding chapter,
including the need for correction of anomalies and the need for regulation of labour
hire.
vii
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Abstract IV
Chapter 1 Overview 1
1.1 Objectives 6
1.2 Structure 8
Chapter 2 History of industrial relations in Australia 12
Unfair Dismissal
Redundancy ...
Workers Compensation
Occupational Health & Safety
13
13
16
19
19
20
22
23
27
28
31
32
32
34
54
68
77
V1ll
General Theoretical Difficulties with labour hire
Tensions with Traditional Legal Principles...
Unlawful Discrimination
Unfair Dismissal Legislation and Labour Hire
Summary
Identification of the Employer for the purposes of liability
Risk Apportionment in OHS .. ,
"Joint Employer" Concept
The Conciliation and Arbitration System
3.2
3.4
3.3
2.5
2.2 Enterprise Bargaining
2.4 Legislative Regulation
2.1 Growth of employment "mandate" regulation as a link
to the theory of labour hire as a reaction to regulation
2.3 Australian Workplace Agreements
3.5
3.1
Chapter 3
3.6
3.7
3.8
Chapter 4
4.1
4.2
4.3
Vicarious Liability
Anti-Discrimination Legislation and Labour Hire
Labour Hire and Coverage by Industrial Instruments
Regulatory impact on the standard employment
relationship
Introduction
Spillover effects ofregulation
The effects of labour regulation
4.3.1 Development ofdual labour markets
4.3.2 Development of implied contract theory by
U.S. courts
4.3.3 Redistribution oflabour costs because ofregulation
4.3.4 Effect ofregulation on the US temporary help
(labour hire) market ...
82
87
90
98
98
99
103
103
105
106
110
4.4 Contractualisation ofemployment arrangements as a
reaction to regulation
4.4.1 Theory ofcontractualisation ofemployment
arrangements ...
4.4.2 Regulation of labour law in North America
4.4.3 Indirect or "passive" contractualisation of labour law
4.4.4 Director or"active" contractualisation oflabour law
4.5 Empirical studies on the effects ofregulation on US labour
markets
4.5.1 Houseman study
4.5.2 Houseman, Kalleberg & Erickcekstudy
4.5.3 Kalleberg, Reynolds & Marsden study
4.5.4 Similarities in the findings of the studies
4.5.5 Differences in the findings of the studies
Chapter 5 Methodology
5.1 Introduction ...
5.2 Qualitative research through the interview process
5.3 Confidentiality in the interview process
5.4 Ethical clearance and considerations
5.5 Contacting potential interview subjects
5.6 Representativeness
112
112
115
116
117
121
121
122
124
124
129
131
131
132
132
133
134
137
IX
Chapter 6 Research 139
6.1 Introduction 139
6.2 Profile ofparticipants 140
6.3 Survey response 140
6.4 Quantitative Responses 143
6.4.1 Clients/industries accounted for by agencies 143
6.4.2 Typical labour hire arrangements 147
6.4.3 Nature ofdisputes between agencies and clients 157
6.4.4 Nature of disputes between an agency and a worker 166
6.4.5 Whether occupational health and safety issues arise
in labour hire 168
6.4.6 Opinion of a peak business body on occupational
health and safety and labour hire 181
6.4.7 Opinions ofunions on the impact oflabour hire on
occupational health and safety 182
6.4.8 The views oflabour hire workers on the relationship
between labour hire and workplace health and safety 186
6.4.9 Whether anti-discrimination issues arise in labour hire 188
6.5 Qualitative Responses 196
6.5.1 Benefits of labour hire - the client view 196
6.5.2 Benefits of labour hire - the worker view 209
6.5.2.1 Worker view according to the agencies 209
6.5.2.2 Direct views oflabour hire workers on the
benefits oflabour hire ... 218
6.5.2.3 Views ofwhite collar worker 218
6.5.2.4 Views of industrial workers 220
6.5.3 Reasons for the expansion oflabour hire 224
6.5.3.1 Positive factors in the expansion oflabour hire 225
6.5.3.2 Negative factors in the expansion oflabour hire 234
Chapter 7 Conclusions
7.1 Review
7.2 Contributions
7.3 Limitations and future research
7.4 Implications/Conclusions
References
245
245
248
250
252
257
x

Chapter One
Overview
Chapter One
Overview
Labour hire as a foon of employment is not a new phenomenon but has experienced
rapid growth in the last decade in Australia and overseas. As a work foon labour hire
represents a distinct departure from the longstanding notion in Australia of a largely
peqnanent and stable workforce, and is an alternative foon of employment to the direct
employer/employee relationship. At the present time there is little infoonation on how
labour hire agencies actually operate and are regulated. Research on labour hire
employment is largely undeveloped, though in recent times a marked interest has been
shown by governments in Australia through major general inquiries. This thesis
addresses this shortfall to help fill this gap in the literature, with a particular emphasis
on Queensland. It has been noted that there is an important gap in understanding why
finns use labour hire because present information is essentially anecdotal or from case
studies (Laplagne, Glover and Fry, 2005:3). Labour hire is a burgeoning area. It is thus
timely and relevant to investigate the reasons for its rapid increase and its implications
from a legal perspective.
While labour hire arrangements have been a part of the Australian labour market for
decades, recent data confinns that in recent years there has been substantial growth in
the labour hire industry, with many organisations increasing their use of labour hire
arrangements in preference to direct employment. Labour hire has now emerged as a
substantial component of the Australian labour market.
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In its infancy labour hire was used essentially to fill temporary positions created by staff
absences or brief spurts in demand, mainly in clerical areas. Now labour hire is used
across a broad spectrum of industries, and is prevalent in manufacturing to computer
programming, and from fmance to construction.
Statistics show that labour hire has grown substantially between 1990 and 2002 in
Australia. The number oflabour hire workers at workplaces with 20 or more employees
rose from 33,000 in 1990 to 190,000 in 2002, which was an increase of 15.7 per cent a
year. The rise in the proportion of labour hire workers among all employees at those
workplaces has been quite significant, increasing almost fivefold, from 0.8 per cent in
1990 to 3.9 per cent in 2002. Overall labour hire workers numbered about 270,000 to
290,000 in 2002, around 3 per cent of all employees (Commonwealth House of
Representatives Inquiry, 2005: 7,41,42).
The above figures support claims (such as by Hall, 2002) of a rapid rise in labour hire
employment. They also give validity to estimates by the Australian Council of Trade
Unions (ACTU), that labour hire is used at one in five workplaces, and is used by more
than halfofthe largest workplaces (O'Neill, 2004:1).
The distinctive feature of labour hire is that it involves a triangular employment
relationship between three parties consisting of a labour hire company or firm (referred
to as a labour hire agency), the worker and the client organisation. A simple definition
of labour hire is a tripartite arrangement between a labour hire agency, client
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organisation and worker, whereby an agency hires out a worker to perform work for the
client, mostly on a casual basis.
A more expanded definition oflabour hire is as follows:
Labour hire is a form of indirect employment relationship in which the employer
(the agency) supplies its employees to work at a workplace controlled by a third
party (the client) in return for a fee from the client. A typical agency will direct
an employee to work for a client for a period (assignment) ranging from a single
day to a number ofyears (power, 2002:64).
As noted by Hall (2002:4) the distinctive characteristic of a labour relationship is the
splitting of the contractual and control aspects of an employment arrangement. Unlike
the traditional employment situation labour hire or "on-hired" workers spend their
working time on the client's premises performing tasks laid down by the client, and
under the day to day direction and supervision of the client. However the client
organisation has no contractual relationship with the worker, and is not the legal
employer ofthe worker.
It is the labour hire agency that has a direct contractual relationship as employer with
the worker, and is responsible for the worker's payment. The agency at the same time
has a contractual relationship with the client for the provision of the worker's services.
Paradoxically then, though a labour hire agency has no day to day control over its
worker (though it may perform checks on the worker), yet it is the legal employer.
In some situations there is no employment relationship between worker and agency,
where the worker is regarded as an independent contractor. Unlike the traditional
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employment relationship where the work is done directly for the benefit of the
employer, in labour hire the agency as legal employer aims to profit by hiring out its
employees to work for others.
Significant features of labour hire that follow from the nature of a labour hire
arrangement is that a labour hire agency is not under an obligation to provide ongoing
work to a labour hire worker, nor is the worker obliged to accept offered work. Also,
importantly, it is generally understood or stipulated that a client organisation can
dispense with a worker's services at its discretion, or in agreed circumstance. During an
assignment an agency pays the employee a casual rate of pay, which includes a loading
as some recompense for missing out on the benefits that permanent workers receive
(which include penalty rates for overtime, annual leave, sick leave and long service
leave).
A standard labour hire arrangement can be represented as follows:-
Client/host organisation
(Agreement to
supply labour
for fee)
(Client has right to
direct and control
worker)
4
Provider Agency - Worker
(Agreement to work for
client for wage)
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Labour hire differs from other employment services that are provided to organisations,
such as outsourcing and placement services. While labour hire and outsourcing both
entail the absence of a direct employment relationship between the worker and client,
labour hire differs from outsourcing in that under labour hire only labour is provided to
the client, and the worker provided carries out work under the day to day direction of
the client. With outsourcing a party supplies a service or goods, and the workers
involved with that undertaking work under the direction ofthat party.
Placement or recruitment agencies, m contrast to labour hire agencIes, provide a
placement service to clients for a one off fee, whereby they introduce workers to
potential employer organisations, leaving the parties to come to their own employment
arrangements. In Queensland they are registered under the Private Employment Agents
Act 2005 (Qld). Labour hire agencies differ from placement services in that they have
ongoing contractual obligations with a client for the length of the labour hire
engagement, and continue to be paid by the client during its duration.
Labour hire agencies are only required to register as placement or recruitment service
providers, where they are operating as such. It would seem from the New South Wales
Labour Hire Taskforce Report (2001, p.49), that there are not many employment
businesses that specialise only in recruitment ofpermanent staff.
Presently only two Australian States, Queensland and Western Australia, have
legislative provisions that specifically recognise a labour hire agency as the employer of
a labour hire employee. In so doing the labour hire provisions in effect restate the
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common law position, that generally a labour hire agency, not the client or host
business, will be found to be the employer of a labour hire worker, where the worker is
working for the client under a labour hire arrangement.
Under the Queensland Industrial Relations Act 19991 labour hire agencies are included
in the definition of"employer". Section 6(2) of the Act defines "employer" in part as:
..... a group training organisation or labour hire agency that arranges for an
employee (who is party to a contract of service with the organisation or agency)
to do work for someone else,even though the employee is working for the .other
person under an arrangement between the organisation or agency and the other
person.
"labour hire agency" is defined under section 6(3) as "an entity that conducts a
business that includes the supply ofservices ofworkers to others".
At present there are no licensing systems for labour hire agencies in the Australian
states. The Recruitment and Consulting Services Association (RCSA), a peak body
representing labour hire agencies, has instituted a system of self-regulation for agencies
that voluntarily join as members. It has set up a code of professional practice to be
followed by members.
1.1 Objectives
There are three principal objectives. The first is to demonstrate that the labour hire
situation runs counter to or is antithetical to the common law employment principles,
I It should be noted that this law will no longer have any effect on any employer now regulated by the
Workplace Relations Act 1996 (Cth), as a consequence of the enactment by the ''Work Choices"
legilsation ofa new s.16 in the federal Act. This includes all incorporated private sector employers.
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which are used to govern it. It is argued that labour hire is a unique work form which is
fundamentally different from the traditional common law employment situation.
Labour hire has a special tripartite nature~ which involves the interposing of an entity
between the worker and the party for whom the work is done~ and the splitting of the
standard employer responsibilities between an agency and client. It is contended that,
because of this splitting of the traditional functions of an employer, the use of labour
hire is problematic from a legal (and practical) point of view as regards allocation of
risk and responsibility. Traditional common law employment principles, that are
applied by the courts to labour hire situations, sit uneasily with the concept of labour
hire. Tensions thus exist in the concept of labour hire and present legal principles,
which were designed for application to the standard employment situation, predicated
on the existence of only two parties. One result is that courts have had difficulty in
determining whether liabilities should lie in various cases involving labour hire. At
issue is whether the present legal principles adequately cover the labour hire
relationship.
The second objective is to demonstrate that the regulatory impact on the standard
employment relationship~ with its attendant consequences of added costs and
obligations on employers, has had the effect of greatly creating incentives for
organisations to utilise less regulated or largely unregulated labour markets such as
labour hire. The aim is to explain the growth of labour hire as a reaction to the impact
of employment regulation.
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The theory of the effect of regulation in this study has special value in light ofcommon
assumptions about the reasons for the rise of labour hire, which are incomplete. For
instance, it has been concluded that (apart from economic factors such as globalisation)
labour hire is largely a creature of behavioural managerial attitudes (Laplagne, Glover
and Fry, 2005:31).
The third objective is to undertake an empirical examination of labour hire m
Queensland to test the first two objectives.
This study promotes a greater analysis and recognition of the consequences (intended or
otherwise) of regulation of the standard employment situation. It will be demonstrated
from US and Australian literature and studies, and by fieldwork research of the writer,
that regulation of the standard employment relationship has had the effect of strongly
encouraging organisations into using alternative less regulated labour markets such as
labour hire. This move is to escape the regulatory burdens imposed on standard
employers, via the common law, legislation and industrial instruments. The rise in the
use of labour hire further exacerbates the existing tensions between the concept of
labour hire and common law principles.
1.2 Structure
Chapter Two sets out a summary ofthe history of industrial relations in Australia up to
the present time. It describes the establishment of a conciliation and arbitration system
at federal and state level. A result of this system has been the growth of national
8
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standards and principles with respect to employment relations, and the development of
minimum standards for wages and employment conditions via the creation of awards
issued by industrial commissions. A modem development however has been the
introduction ofworkplace or enterprise bargaining between employers and unions for a
particular worksite, which has been superimposed on the award system, reducing
awards to a safety net ofbasic conditions.
In addition to general industrial regulation, it is shown that there has been created in
Australia specific regulation of the standard employment relationships, in the form of
various employer obligations created by legislation, courts and tribunals. Recent
developments have involved prohibitions against unfair dismissal of employees, and
anti-discrimination.
Chapter Three provides an analysis of legal issues and anomalies, which have been
dealt with in Australian case law and legislation. It also examines the input of recent
government reports in Australia on labour hire. This analysis gives support to the
writer's contentions about the uneasy fit of common law employment principles to
labour hire, and the relationship between the rise of labour hire and increased regulation
of standard employment. The Australian cases show that there is a blurring of legal
obligations on issues such as the identity of the employer, and liability for workplace
safety and unfair dismissal of a worker. The disputation as to liability between agency
and client as to liability highlights the attraction of labour hire to organisations, of
allowing the devolving of the risks associated with direct employment. The results of
9
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the analysis that point to the problematic nature of labour hire, and the effect of
employment regulation, is consistent with the theoretical expectations.
Chapter Four critically reviews American and Canadian literature that deals with the
regulatory impact on the standard employment relationship, with its attendant
consequences of added costs and obligations on employers. The theoretical and
empirical literature from North America develop a coherent approach to the prime
reasons for the significant increase in alternative work forms such as labour hire. The
conclusion drawn by the commentators is that regulation of standard employment has
had the effect from an employer point ofview of adding further costs .and obligations on
employers. As a consequence employers in the USA have incentives to go to less
regulated or largely unregulated labour markets such as labour hire, which offer the
prospect of potentially cheaper labour costs overall, and more importantly immunity
from the health and safety, workers' compensation and unfair dismissal obligations on
an employer.
Chapter Five describes the research methodology ofthe project. It sets out the method
adopted for the empirical research for the thesis, which was in the form of a qualitative
study. An extensive fieldwork system of planned taped interviews were conducted of
numerous labour hire agencies, peak business bodies, unions and workers. The
interviews followed a standard question format with the opportunity to provide
additional information, and the information obtained was subject to strict confidentiality
guidelines. The data obtained was grouped for analysis.
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Chapter Six sets out the findings of the study. The empirical research consisted of in-
depth fieldwork interviews of thirty-four agencies, two peak business bodies, twelve
unions and three labour hire workers. There appears to be no similar study undertaken
in Australia, into how labour hire agencies operate and the reasons for labour hire.
The data obtained was very substantial and covered a number of issues. In particular all
questions asked were designed to obtain information, which could be related back to the
key research propositions. In particular, the writer was interested in knowing whether
the labour market changes in the form of labour hire in Queensland were due to similar
reasons to those outlined in North American research.
The result of the fieldwork research provided clear evidence that increasing labour costs
and obligations through regulation, in addition to general economic and managerial
factors such as labour flexibility, were prime movers in the increasing use by
organisations of labour hire, which was largely unregulated. Fear of the unfair
dismissal legislation in particular was specifically exposed as a factor for this trend.
The research evidence further reinforced the view about the anomaly of applying
standard common law employment principles to labour hire.
Chapter Seven concludes the thesis by reviewing its content, identifying the significant
contributions, and by including some recommendations on legal approaches to labour
hire in the future.
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History of industrial relations
in Australia
In this chapter, a description will be given of the general background to employment
law in Australia. First, an overview will be made of the history and development of
industrial relations in Australia in the last century. Second, there will be a review of the
history and development of the various types of regulation concemingemployment
relations in Australia.
At the outset attention needs to be drawn to the fact that federal legislation has now
changed much of the landscape affecting this field. Not only has the federal Work
Choices legislation released many businesses from unfair dismissal laws (as discussed
below), but also the recently enacted Independent Contractors Act 2006 (Cth) released
many employers from the effect of deeming provisions in Sate industrial laws. These
changes need to be borne in mind whilst reading the following historical review of
Australian industrial relations legislation which describes the laws in force prior to 27
March 2006, these being the laws which influenced the attitude of the labour hire
participants surveyed in the study.
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2.1 Growth of employment "mandates" regulation as a link to the theory of
labour hire as a reaction to legislation
The Conciliation and Arbitration System
The history of Australian industrial relations has been largely influenced by the
distinctive system of conciliation and arbitration adopted in Australia a century ago.
This system set in place general institutional arrangements controlling the circumstances
of employment that existed, at least in part, right up to the present (Gardner, 1997:13).
A system of arbitration, or state intervention through industrial tribunals to determine
industrial disputes, arose in Australia, due to various factors. These factors included
widespread industrial disputation in the form of strikes, the growing strength of the
labour movement in Australia, liberal ideas favouring state interaction to uphold the
public interest and dissatisfaction with existing bargaining processes (Macintyre and
Mitchell, 1989:18). Compulsory arbitration has been described as a 'justice system"
that lays down a way of resolving industrial disputation, by establishing bodies and
prescribed steps to resolve industrial disputes between employers and unions
representing employees (Strauss 1990:86). In the view ofone ofthe initial judges of the
Federal Conciliation and Arbitration Court, Higgins, J., arbitration represented a "new
province for law and order" (Higgins 1922:2).
The Australian States initiated compulsory arbitration legislation towards the end of the
nineteenth century. Victoria did so in 1896. South Australia and Western Australia
followed in 1900, and New South Wales in 1901. At the national level, the
13
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Commonwealth government introduced national legislation (the Conciliation and
Arbitration Act) in 1904.
A distinctive characteristic of the industrial tribunals or commissions established at the
federal level and in New South Wales, South Australia and Queensland was the
authority of the tribunals to act in the public interest. The arbitration system was
envisaged to be an equitable way of protecting the public interest through the
maintenance of industrial peace (Gardner 1997: 16, 163).
The system of compulsory (as opposed to voluntary) arbitration legislation set up in
Australia had the following features (Gardner 1997:17,162):
• Permanent tribunals and procedures to resolve disputes where conciliation has
failed.
• These tribunals to deal with an industrial dispute at the behest of one party. The
consent of all parties to the dispute is not required.
• Regulation and registration of representative bodies for employees (unions) and
for employers.
• Resolution of industrial disputes (where conciliation between the parties has
failed) by compulsory hearings by tribunals, whereby the awards or settlements
made by the tribunals are legally binding upon the parties and can be legally
enforced.
• Limiting of industrial action during the disputes (strikes and lock-outs prohibited
during the arbitration process).
14
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In the determination of industrial disputes awards and agreements were made that
prescribed employment conditions. Any awards created were legally enforceable
because they were regarded as having the effect of legislation. For example, a federal
award or registered agreement was enforceable as a matter of federal law and would
prevail over any inconsistent law of a State or Territory.!
The arbitration systems at federal and state level have controlled to a large degree
employment relations in Australia. Only in the 1990s has there been any significant
change to this situation in the form of enterprise or workplace bargaining.
State tribunals or COmmISSIOnS have wide rangmg authority to take action about
industrial issues, and are not limited by having to find a special dispute to claim
jurisdiction. The State tribunals can make general or common rules, which are
decisions that have application to all employees in a certain industry or within a state
(Creighton and Stewart 2005:172).
A result of the arbitration system at federal level has been the growth of national
standards .and principles with respect to employment relations, and the development of
minimum standards for wages and employment conditions.
The concept of a minimum or basic wage was developed by the Federal tribunal
(originally the Commonwealth Arbitration Court) in the early twentieth century,
1 It should be noted that now no new federal awards can be made, and any new state awards will not bind
private sector employers.
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(Creighton and Stewart, 2005). The idea of a basic wage, tied to calculations of a living
wage, was developed during this period. The basic wage was intended to represent the
minimum or base amount that could be paid as wages, being the minimum rate for
unskilled work, (Creighton and Stewart 2005:51,52).
From this basic wage the wages for skilled employees have been worked out by adding
an increment for the possession of the skill. Further, as the basic wage has been
regarded as a living wage it has been changed according to cost of living increases.
Circumstances, such as the decision in 1931 to reduce the basic wage by 10% during
depressed economic times, caused a change in thinking as to the idea of the basic wage
being a minimum standard. General notions such as the capacity for the economy (in
light of inflation and productivity rates) to pay came into consideration when
considering wage increases, along with the idea of a basic or living wage. According to
Nyland (1989), the other significant issue dealt with at the federal level has been
standard hours ofworking for employees.
The arbitration system in Australia has influenced greatly wage policy in Australia.
Overall, the system has supported centralised wage determination rather than a
decentralised process. This system has been under serious threat by developments in
recent times.
2.2 Enterprise bargaining
A fundamental change to the industrial relations system in Australia happened in the
late 1980s and 1990s. During that period employer groups and conservative political
16
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parties began to press for emphasis to be placed on workplace or enterprise bargaining
and a whittling down ofthe arbitration system (O'Brien, 1994: 468-90).
Enterprise bargaining is a negotiating process which is said to enable individual
workplaces to arrive at wages and work conditions mote suitable for those enterprises.
Such flexibility supposedly creates mote flexibility and efficiency at the workplace
which in turn will promote greater productivity and international competitiveness.
Enterprise bargaining in essence is concerned with the direct negotiation between an
employer and employees (or people acting on behalf of the employees such as unions)
regarding the wages and conditions at a particular workplace or enterprise.
It is in direct contrast to the award system developed under arbitration. Whereas the
award system creates the same wages and work conditions for every workplace in a
particular industry, enterprise bargaining is designed to arrive at an enterprise agreement
to specifically fit the nature and requirements of the particular enterprise or workplace.
As alluded to by Creighton and Stewart (2005: 53), the Federal tribunal, the Australian
Industrial Relations Commission, when dealing with the National Wage in 1991 and
following the urging of the parties, including the Federal government and the ACTU
(Australian Council of Trade Unions), agreed to recognise the enterprise bargaining
principle subject to conditions. Since then, the Federal Government and the States have
17
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passed legislation recognising enterprise bargaining. In Queensland the relevant
legislation is the Industrial Relations Act 1999.
In 1993 a Federal Labor government passed the Industrial Relations Reform Act 1993
(Cth), which altered the industrial landscape, by making workplace bargaining the
centrepiece of industrial relations. In 1996 a Conservative coalition government made
further significant changes by passing the Workplace Relations Act 1996 (Cth). This
Act, as its name suggests, places emphasis on settling industrial disputes at the
workplace level. One way that the main aim of the Act was to be achieved was by
regarding (pursuant to section 3 (d) thereof) national wage increases as part of a "safety
net" ofminimum wages and conditions, supporting the enterprise bargaining process.
Under the Workplace Relations Act 1996, a certified agreement overrides an
inconsistent award or order of the Commission and inconsistent Commonwealth laws
(former sections 170LY and 170 LZ (4)). A certified agreement also overrides
inconsistent State laws, awards or employment agreements, with the exception of State
provisions dealing with occupational health and safety, workers' compensation and
apprenticeships (former section 170 LZ (1) - (3)).
The Workplace Relations Act has changed the fundamentals of employment or
industrial relations in Australia. Control of employment relations, through general
representation of employees by unions and the upholding of the public interest by
arbitration commissions or tribunals, has been done away with (Gardner 1997:37~8). In
its place is the notion that employment regulation is to be based on a system of
bargaining between employers and employees/unions at the enterprise or industry level,
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supported by some minimum standards (such as "safety net" wage increases for those
not receiving enterprise bargaining increases). In this scenario, the role of the State is
confined largely to enforcement ofthe bargains struck.
2.3 Australian Workplace Agreements
A further alternative to the conciliation and arbitration process has been the creation of
AWAs (Australian Workplace Agreements) under the Workplace Relations Act 1996
(Cth).~ Under the 1996 Act these agreements are registered written agreements made
between an individual employer (mainly corporations) and an individual employee,
which set out the conditions affecting the relationship between employer and employee.
A prominent feature ofAWAs is that they operate entirely to the exclusion of any award
or agreement made or registered under Federal or State law (section 170 VQ).
The operation of AWAs so far has not been significant in workforce tenns, as it is
estimated that only about 2% of workers have taken up AWAs (Creighton and Stewart
2005:262).
2.4 Legislative Regulation
This chapter has dealt so far with the general or primary regulation of industrial or
employment relations. It is now appropriate to refer to more specific regulation in
Australia of the employment relationship, in the fonn of various "mandates"
(obligations created by legislation, courts and tribunals that employers owe to
2 It should be noted that strictly speaking AWAs are federal instruments only. However, some State laws,
including industrial statutes in Western Australia and Queensland, have also allowed the making of
registered individual workplace agreements.
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employees - Wachter and Wright 1990:243). These, as will be shown later, have
caused employers in general to be wary of hiring additional permanent employees and
to consider using employees from the secondary labour market.
Unfair dismissal
One particular mandate that has employers concerned is the unfair dismissal laws that
have been passed by Federal and State Governments in the last twenty years. In 1972
South Australia enacted section 15 (1) (e) of the Industrial Conciliation and Arbitration
Act 1972 (SA), which enabled that State's Industrial Court to hear claims from
individual employees of "harsh, unjust or unreasonable" dismissal or termination of
emplOYment. Since that time each of the other States and the Federal government have
adopted a similar approach in permitting individual claims on like grounds. Relief can
take the form of reinstatement to the original job or position or, more likely, damages as
compensation for the unjust dismissal.
New South Wales has had unfair dismissal legislation for employees smce the
Employment Protection Act in 1982. Part 6 of Chapter 2 of the Industrial Relations Act
1996 (NSW) enables an employee to apply to the Industrial Relations Commission for
relief from a dismissal or threatened dismissal that is or would be "harsh, unreasonable
or unjust" (section 84 (1)).
At the federal level, the first definitive changes came with the Industrial Relations
Reform Act 1993 (Cth), which provided for reinstatement or compensation remedies by
the Australian Industrial Relations Commission (AIRC) for cases of unfair dismissal or
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tennination of employment, where the termination was "harsh, unjust or unreasonable"
or infringes certain prohibitions against discrimination. Its successor· Act, the
Workplace Relations Act 1996, continued the concept of unfair dismissal, but limited
the coverage of the legislation. The emphasis under the Act, like the State Acts, was to
ensure that '''a fair go all round' was accorded to both the employer and employee
concerned" (section 170 CA (2)).
In Queensland section 74 of the Industrial Relations Act 1999 authorises the
Queensland Industrial Relations Commission to deal with "unfair dismissal" claims or
applications. By section 73 of the Act a dismissal is unfair if it is harsh, unjust or
unreasonable, or for an invalid reason (such as discrimination). Of significance for
smaller employers, the Act does not contain the small business exemption that once
existed in the legislation.
What may be of concern to employers is that, under the unfair dismissal legislation of
the States and Commonwealth, the concept of a dismissal has been interpreted quite
widely by the Industrial Commissions, according to Creighton and Stewart (2005: 473)
They note, for instance, that a concept of "constructive dismissal" has been accepted to
include cases where an employee is forced to resign or departs as a result of behaviour
by an employer which amounts to repudiation ofthe employment contract.
Under the Federal Act, the Workplace Relations Act 1996 (Cth), in determining whether
there has been termination of employment by an employer, it has been held that there
21
Chapter Two
History of industrial relations in Australia
should be an examination of whether "the action of the employer is the principal
contributing factor which leads to the termination of the employment relationship":
Mohazab v Dick Smith Electronics Pty Ltd (No 2) (1995) 62 IR 200 at 204-205.
There is normally no dismissal or termination of employment, where an employment
contract for a set term expires, without an offer of further employment. This has the
result that a casual employee who is not offered further work may be unable to try for
reinstatement or compensation: Pacific Waste Management Pty Ltd v Saley (1993) 51
IR 339. This feature is an attraction of the secondary labour market for employers in
that casual employees such as labour hire workers find great difficulty in accessing the
unfair dismissal laws.
What may also be of concern to employers about unfair dismissal legislation is that, in
line with the "fair go all around" approach (eg ss.170 CA, 170G (3) of the Workplace
Relations Act 1996 (Cth)), significant importance is assigned to procedural fairness in
terms of giving an employee a reasonable chance to reply to allegations of misconduct.
This involves employees receiving adequate warnings before dismissal.
Redundancy
In addition to the remedy of unfair dismissal Federal and State Commissions have
recognised that employers have obligations where, through no fault of an employee, an
employer "no longer wishes the job the employee has been doing to be done by anyone"
(R v. Industrial Commission ofSA; Ex parte Adelaide Milk Supply Co-op Ltd (1977) 16
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SASR 6 at 8). This may be a result of new technology, restructuring or fmancial
considerations.
Creighton and Stewart (2005: 431, 432) observe that, since the TCR (Termin.ation,
Change and Redun.dancy) case (1984) 8 IR 34 the issue of redundancy has been
considered in most federal awards. At State level where there are less limits on what is
contained in awards, redundancy provisions have become commonplace and are
reasonably generous. For example in Queensland severance benefits have been
increased to a maximum of sixteen weeks pay for 12 or more years of service.
Macken, O'Grady and Sappideen (1997: 189) note that under Federal and Queensland
legislation employees made redundant can apply to a commission for severance pay
(e.g. under section 170 FA Workplace Relations Act 1996 (Cth)). What may be of
alarm for employers is that, even in a redundancy situation, an employee may be able to
sue for unfair dismissal when not properly consulted before a decision to retrench or
when unfairly selected for a redundancy ahead of others, or where the severance
benefits are not adequate (Macken, O'Grady and Sappideen, 1997: 189,327)
Occupational health and safety
Another legislative mandate that has impacted on employer obligations is that relating
to occupational health and safety. This statutory obligation is in addition to the
common law duty of care placed on employers to look after the health and safety of
employees. As noted by Lante Wallace-Bruce (Butterworths, 1999: 122), all the States
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and Territories of Australia have elaborate statutory provisions dealing with
occupational health and safety.3
Occupational health and safety legislation was introduced in Australia, because of the
general recognition that the occurrence of industrial accidents in Australia was quite
high. The overall objective of the various pieces oflegislation is to promote and secure
the health and safety of all persons at work.
Prior to the OHS Acts passed in recent years based on the English Robens Report,
health and safety legislation in Australia was generally scattered and overly technical.
Gardner (1997: 493-4) observes that the first workplace safety legislation was in the
form of factory and shop legislation, based on British legislation. These Acts invariably
provided for government inspectors and penalties for breach of standards regarding
specific matters such as ventilation. Every Government in Australia from 1980 has
passed new occupational health and safety laws based on the recommendations set out
in the British Robens Report of 1972.
The Robens Report was the first British or Australian inquiry into OHS legislation in its
entirety, and it set out the shortcomings of the then accepted system of OHS regulation
(Johnstone 2004: 63-66). It sought to impose an overall coherent structure to OHS
regulation, instead of the previous fragmentation that existed. According to Johnstone,
3 The relevant statutes are as follows: Occupational Health and Safety Act 2000 (NSW); Workplace
Health and Safety Act 1995 (Qld); Occupational Health and Safety Act 2004 (Vic); Workplace Health
and Safety Act 1995 (Tas); Occupational Health, Safety and Welfare Act 1986 (SA); and Occupational
Safety and Health Act 1984 (WA).
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the same objections could have been raised regarding Australian statutes operating at
the time of the Robens Report.
The two prime objectives of the Robens Report were laid down in paragraph 41 of the
report. First, one main objective ofrefonn was to be "the creation ofa more unified and
integrated system to increase the effectiveness of the state's contribution to safety and
health at work". The second more controversial objective was "a more effectively self-
regulating system", which called for "the acceptance and exercise of appropriate
responsibilities at all levels within industry and commerce".
The first objective necessitated reducing or eliminating the existing legislative
provisions into one Act of Parliament (Robens Report 1972, p. 40, para 125), and
putting the agencies supervising the legislation under one management (1972, p.35, para
110). It was considered that future regulation should be simpler in style, and as far as
possible be limited to laying down general requirements.
By way of contrast with the previous Australian legislation that emphasised penalties
for contravention of specific offences, legislation in Australia based on the Robens style
laid more emphasis on more general responsibilities of the parties to prevent injury and
disease (Creighton and Stewart, 2005: 591, 592). The general responsibilities or duties
are owed to anyone reasonably likely to be hurt by a lapse in that duty, and can be owed
by a range of persons from employers and employees to occupiers of premises,
manufacturers, and suppliers ofplant. Breaching the duty creates the offence.
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On the issue of a self-regulating system, the report aimed for a situation whereby at
workplace level, workers and management would idealistically work together to achieve
and improve upon the required standards of health and safety (through workplace
committees and so on). This involved a statutory duty on every employer to consult
with employees or their representatives at the workplace on measures for promoting
safety and health at work.
Most of the report's recommendations were first introduced into the British arena in
1974, and have been taken up by all Australian jurisdictions. Acts such as the
Occupational Health and Safety (Commonwealth Employment) Act 1991 (Cth), the
Occupational Health and Safety Act 1983 (NSW), and the Occupational Health~and
Safety Act 1985 (Vic) were passed, the latter two Acts being replaced by recent
legislation of the same name in 2000 and 2004 respectively, (Creighton and Stewart,
2005: 589, 590). In Queensland the Workplace Health and Safety Act 1989 was passed,
which has been revised and strengthened in a 1995 Act of the same name.
The Occupational Health and Safety (ORS) legislation in Australia imposes a general
duty (in Queensland an "obligation" under section 28 of the Workplace Health and
Safety Act 1995) upon employers in relation to the health, safety and welfare of their
employees. The statutes also place duties on employers and self-employed persons in
relation to persons other than employees, who might be exposed to workplace hazards,
such as persons visiting the workplace.
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Under the legislation, employers owe to their employees a statutory general duty of care
to provide a safe working environment. This duty on employers is created as an
absolute duty, modified only by the limitation of what precautions were reasonably
practicable in the circumstances.
In Queensland formal enforcement methods under the legislation include improvement
notices, prohibition notices (requiring work to cease until a hazard is abated) and
infringement notices (on the spot fines). Inspectors generally have a broad discretion as
to the enforcement methods they adopt. A key issue in enforcement has been whether
inspectors should enforce obligations by formal resort to criminal sanctions, or seek
compliance through advisory and persuasive methods.
Workers compensation
A legislative mandate with a longer history than that of ORS is the workers'
compensation system that operates in all Australian States and Territories. This is a "no
fault" scheme of accident insurance for work injuries, funded by premiums paid by
employers.
According to Johnstone (2004: 47-56), in the nineteenth century, notwithstanding that
an employer's duty of care to employees had been acknowledged from the eighteenth
century, it was very difficult for employees injured at work to obtain compensation
through the courts, because of the available defences to an action for negligence
(namely, the doctrine of common employment, voluntary assumption of risk, and
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contributory negligence). In time there was acknowledgement that employers were
better placed than employees to carry the costs ofworkplace injury or disease, orin part
to transfer those costs to persons utilising the employers' goods and services.
Germany in 1884 was the first country to introduce a worker's compensation scheme,
and a Workmen's Compensation Act was subsequently passed in Britain in 1897. The
British Act was adapted by each of the Australian States to the local circumstances.
Queensland passed Acts in 1905 and 1916. The present Queensland Act is the Workers'
Compensation and Rehabilitation Act 2003 (Qld).
It appears (Johnstone, 2004: 60-63) that from the mid 1970s employers started to voice
concerns about increasing wages, which were forcing up labour costs and increasing
workers' compensation premiums. The result was that from the mid 1980s workers'
compensation schemes were radically changed, by for example the tightening of
eligibility for benefits, severely reducing or abolishing access to common law damages
(except in Queensland), and emphasising rehabilitation.
A common problem for the State workers' compensation schemes is a dilemma between
continuing rises in premiums paid by employers or cuts in the benefits available to
injured workers (such as abolishing common law claims to damages).
Unlawful discrimination
Another form of regulation or mandate imposed on employers in Australia in the last 30
years is that concerning discriminatory practices against individuals. Since the 1970s,
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all Australian States and the Commonwealth have introduced legislative provisions
intended to prevent discrimination in employment (and in other situations) on the
grounds of race, sex or physical or intellectual impairment. The statutes prohibit
discrimination in deciding inter alia to whom offers of employment should be made, in
the arrangements of employment or in the .dismissal ofa worker from employment.
Direct discrimination against a person is said to take place when a person treats a
second person with, for example, an impairment, less favourably than he or she would
treat a person without an impairment. Indirect discrimination extends to actions that
involve a person requiring another person as a member of a group with certain attributes
(for example an impairment) to conform to a requirement or condition, to which the
other person cannot conform, which is unreasonable and to which a substantially larger
share of persons outside the group are able to conform.
It appears that these directives against discrimination on the grounds of impairment
(such as in the Disability Discrimination Act 1992 (Cth)) would not permit an employer,
where there is a potential work hazard to an employee with an impairment to remove
the employee from the workplace. The hazard itselfwould have to be removed, though
not threatening the health and safety ofother employees.
The anti-discrimination legislation in general contains exceptions, which grant a
defence to an employer on the basis that discrimination was necessary because of
statutory requirements, or because ofhealth and safety.
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Commonwealth and State legislation restricts the freedom of employers to refuse to
employ someone for reasons apart from disability such as race and sex. For example, at
the Commonwealth level there is the Racial Discrimination Act 1975 and the Sex
Discrimination Act 1984, relating to discrimination on the grounds of race, sex, marital
status or pregnancy.
Most States have passed comprehensive anti-discrimination legislation. For example
the Anti-Discrimination Act 1991 (Qld) is very widely drafted, setting out almost every
ground of discrimination covered in the Federal Acts.
It would seem that each of the Anti-Discrimination Acts has a similar procedure for
handling complaints. A complaint may be made by a person (for example an employee)
on his or her own behalf or on behalf of others. The complaint is investigated by the
relevant officers and endeavours are made in the first instance to resolve the matter
through conciliation. If that fails, the complaint can be heard and determined by a
tribunal which hands down a decision on the matter. It should be noted, also, that the
relevant statutes deal not just with discriminatory conduct, but with allegations of
harassment or vilification at the workplace.
Companies in practice may wish to discriminate against some candidates because they
are thought to be inappropriate for the workplace but the companies are fearful that as
employers they could be liable under anti-discrimination legislation and unfair dismissal
laws.
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2.5 Summary
The preceding description of the development in employment relations in Australia
shows that over the last century there has been an increase in the legislative
responsibilities or mandates placed on employers generally in Australia arising from
workers' compensation, workplace health and safety, anti-discrimination and unfair
dismissal legislation. This is in addition to the more standard legal responsibilities on
an employer, such as the duty of care towards an employee and payroll and leave
obligations.
It will be shown that the preceding analysis, of the development of various types of
employment regulation, ties in with analyses on the growth of legislative employment
mandates in North America. According to commentators there this growth has caused
employers to go to less regulated or unregulated labour markets such as labour hire
which offer the prospect of escape from the employment mandates.
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3.1 General Theoretical Difficulties
It is considered that Australian courts have not directly confronted recent developments
in labour hire, and the analytical underpinnings of labour hire. Rather than seeking to
change or reform traditional employment law principles to accommodate labour hire,
the courts generally have sought to deal with labour hire, through the prism of
conventional common law employment principles.
It is because of this traditional focus of the courts, that the purpose of this chapter is not
to engage in close legal analysis of contemporary cases, but to illustrate the proposition
that labour hire runs counter to the traditional employment tests and principles. Most
attention therefore will focus on the problems and anomalies associated with the courts'
application of traditional employment principles to the labour hire situation generally.
The cases discussed are examples of the tensions between labour hire and common law
principles, especially where labour hire is used to evade traditional employment
responsibilities.
It is contended that the triangular nature of the labour hire relationship creates problems
with allocation ofrisk and legal responsibility, which are not satisfactorily recognised or
resolved by the law, in that there are two parties, the agency and the client, and both
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assume or split the traditional functions of an employer. For example, the labour hire
agency pays the wages of labour hire workers and has a contractual relationship with
them, while the client controls or directs the worker in the carrying out of work at the
client's premises. Employees find themselves interacting with the two parties, each of
whom assumes certain functions of a traditional employer. It is considered that this
separation of control and functions between an agency and client can give rise to legal
issues, in that the area of labour hire employment is not specifically regulated but is
subsumed under common law contract of employment principles (particularly the
control test). Explicit judicial support for this view was expressed by Marks J. in
Workcover Authority of New South Wales v. Swift Placements Pty Limited [1999J
NSWIR Comm 113 at 131 as follows:
An alternative approach is to state that the circumstances created by the use of
labour hire do not comfortably fit within orthodox concepts of control developed
by the courts over many years to deal with what were then contemporary
orthodox employment relationships or variations on them.
The fieldwork findings of this study will show that the virtual lack of regulation of
labour hire has encouraged greater use of labour hire. The findings also will show that
the prime factor of the regulation of the standard employment relationship has enhanced
the attraction of labour hire, in that it allows business to devolve the risks connected
with direct employment. This advantage has been adverted to also in the New South
Wales Labour Hire Task Force Report (2001:16). Labour hire in light of the empirical
findings is perceived as taking away significant legal responsibility associated with an
employer at law, particularly with respect to unfair dismissal laws, payment obligations,
vicarious liability, workers' compensation and payroll tax liabilities.
33
Chapter Three
Tensions with Traditional Principles
3.2 Identification of the "Employ.er" for the purposes of liability.
A basic legal problem that arises with labour hire is that it is difficult to classify it
according to the standard rules relating to contract of employment principles. The
triangular nature of labour hire can lead to a blurring of legal obligations, and confusion
as to the identity of the "employer". Possibly because of this it is difficult to determine
where legal liability should rest in some labour hire cases. For instance there would
appear to be problems applying common law principles to labour hire situations
involving unfair dismissal of workers, the vicarious liability of a labour hire employer,
the application of anti-discrimination legislation, and occupational health and safety
issues. As noted by the New South Wales Labour Hire Task Force (2001:43), there has
been an inconsistency in case law in defining the nature of the relationship between
parties in a labour hire arrangement. This exercise depends on the particular
circumstances of each case, with the degree of direction or control over the worker
being the dominant factor.
As Bomstein (2004:54) and Hall (2002:4) have noted, a fundamental quality of a labour
hire arrangement is the splitting of contractual and control relationships in the
arrangement. In this regard labour hire arrangements cause tensions in legal
employment theory in respect to the present tests for the existence of an employment
relationship. The labour hire agency, while paymaster and general overseer, in practice
has no day-to-day control of the labour hire employee and yet is the employer. The
host/client has day-to-day control over what is done, how it is done, and the hours of
work but has no legal relationship with the employee (because of no intention to create
a legal relationship and no offer and acceptance between the parties). However, just as
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in the traditional employment situation, the test applied by the Courts to detennine a
labour hire employment arrangement is the multiple factor test, with prime importance
placed on the right to control the manner of work of the employee (as stated by Mason
J. in the High Court case ofStevens v. Brodribb Sawmilling Co Pty Ltd (1986) 160 CLR
16, and endorsed by the High Court in Hollis v. Vabu (2001) 107 CLR 21).
Other factors taken into account in determining an employment relationship as shown
by the two cases include the mode of remuneration, the hours ofwork, the deduction of
income tax, the capacity to delegate or subcontract, the provision of tools, the
requirement of exclusive service, and organisational integration, as shown by the use of
uniforms or badges. In the Stevens case men had been involved in the felling and
delivery of trees for a sawmilling company. The issue in that case was whether those
men were the employees ofthe sawmilling company, so as to render it vicariously liable
for the negligence of one of the men in the loading of logs on a truck, which caused
injury to another of the men.
In an attempt to rationalise the control test in relation to labour hire, the Courts, as in
Swift Placements Pty Limited v. WorkCover Authority ofNew South Wales (2000) 196
IR 69 have come up with what has been termed the "ultimate control" test, via the use
of contractual arrangements with the agency and client and with the client and worker,
whereby for example in consideration of payment by the agency a worker would agree
to undertake work under the direction and supervision of the client. This test would
appear to be a gloss on the High Court's right to control factor. That the standard
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control test as applied to the labour hire situation is under strain can be shown by
judicial opinion that clearly queries whether the control test is an outdated notion for
some relationships such as labour hire (as suggested by Kirby J. in Pitcher v. Langford
(1991) 23 NSW LR 142 at 150).
Apart from the difficulty of applying the standard employment control test to a labour
hire situation, there are other signs that a labour hire employment arrangement should
be treated differently from the traditional employment situation. For instance, one of
the iridicia that has been used at common law (particularly in England) to point to a
contract of employment has been the mutual obligation to maintain the employment
relationship by both parties. A traditional employment contract envisages a situation
where the employer has an obligation to provide work, and the employee has an
obligation to accept work. In labour hire situations the employee is usually under no
obligation to accept or take on a particular job or work.
McDougall J. in Forsta.ffv. Chief Commissioner ofState Revenue (2004) NSWSC 573
considered the decision of the House of Lords in Carmichael v. National Power pIc
[1999] 4 All ER 897 where it was held that, because the arrangements between the
parties imposed no obligation upon one to provide any work or the other to undertake it,
there was no contract of employment between the parties. If that English case
represented the law in Australia, it would be difficult to maintain that someone who was
merely on the books of a labour hire company could be its employee, in view of the
circumstance that generally there is no obligation on the part of any agency to provide
work to a person on its books (the ability of an agency to supply work being dependent
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on demand), and no obligation on the part of a person listed with the agency to accept
an offer ofwork.
McDougall J. reformulated the common law mutual obligation test along the following
lines to read that:-
The mutual obligation test should be expressed, not as an obligation on the one
side to provide and the other to perform, but as an obligation on the one side to
perform work (or provide service) and on the other side to pay.
Accordingly, in McDougall J's view, In the labour hire context a contract of
employment between an agency and employee only comes into existence, when the
labour hire agency offers work to the employee and the employee accepts the offer.
Prior to that there is no mutuality ofobligation and no employment relationship.
A more fundamental concern however with the labour hire relationship is that, as noted
in the New South Wales Labour Hire Taskforce Inquiry (200I), there remains confusion
as to the nature of the employment relationship and the labour hire, and disputes have
arisen as to who should be considered the responsible employer in certain situations.
This is despite the fact that the concept of a labour hire arrangement should be well and
truly settled. Various cases can be quoted to illustrate a continuing uncertainty in this
regard. In Mischeva v. Spicers Paper Ltd (1998) 44 AILR 3-904, where there were
unfair termination proce.edings before the now defunct Industrial Relations Court of
Australia, at an early stage the judicial registrar took the view that both the labour hire
agency and client organisation were the employers of the labour hire employee. It was
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only later when the agency conceded that it was the employer, that the employer issue
was resolved.
A further example of confusion even at judicial levels occurred in Drake Personnel v.
Commissioner ofState Revenue (Vic) (2000) 44 ATR 413 where the Victorian Court of
Appeal, dealing with the issue of employer liability for payroll tax under the Pay-Roll
Tax Act 1971 (Vic), held that Balmford J. the judge at fIrst instance had misapplied the
control test to a labour hire situation. Balmford J. had looked at the particular labour
hire situation, and held that the temporary workers were not employees of the labour
hire agency on the basis of the traditional common law employment test, as the Drake
agency had no day-to-day control over the worker. In so doing the judge illustrated the
tensions or diffIculties that .arise in attempting to automatically apply common law
employment tests to labour hire.
Balmford J at fIrst instance «(1998) 40 ATR 304 at 312) noted the approach of Mason
and Brennan JJ in the Stevens v. Brodribb case, of treating the degree of control
exercised by one person over another as a prominent factor in an employment
relationship. In the case before her the evidence was that the temporary workers were
to do the work required by the client, in a manner required by the client. On this basis
in the judge's view the day to day control according to the common law approach
resided with the client, and not with the Drake agency. As the Drake agency did not
have the day to day control over the way in which the temporary workers performed
work whilst with the client, it could not be the employer of those workers.
However the Victorian Court of Appeal took the view that the contract between the
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Drake agency and a temporary worker should not be denied its character of
employment. It considered that an immediate benefit to the client by the worker was no
bar. The client's day-to-day control could be referred back to the contract between
Drake and the temporary worker under which the temporary worker accepted direction
from the client. By so doing, the Court of Appeal would appear to have added .an
accretion to the existing High Court test, by setting up what they referred to as an
''ultimate control" test in that particular case, whereby control is maintained through the
terms in the separate agreements with the worker and the client company (such as for
example the requirements on a worker to use his or her skills properly or face discipline,
and to undertake work under the direction and supervision of the client). This test has
been referred to also in Swift Placements Pty Ltd v. Workcover Authority ofNSW (2000)
96 IR. 69. By its approach the Court of Appeal has qualified the common law
employment control test with respect to labour hire situations. The practical result in
the case was that the Drake agency was held liable under the Payroll Tax Act 1971
(Vic), as the employer who paid the worker's wages.
Confusion as to the identity of the employer in a labour hire situation can also occur
where a party endeavours to escape from obligations under a statute. The South
Australian case of Mason & Cox pty Ltd. v McCann (1999) 74 SASR 438 is a case in
point. There an anomalous situation arose in that the client ironically argued that it and
not the agency was the employer of the labour hire worker, and that, as a consequence,
it could not be sued by the worker as its employee for damages for negligence pursuant
to the Worker's Rehabilitation & Compensation Act 1986 (SA). Under that Act an
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employee's common law rights against an employer were excluded, but the entitlement
of a worker to bring common law proceedings against third party wrong doers were
maintained. To add to the confusion the labour hire worker had already received
workers' compensation payments on the basis that it was accepted that the worker was
employed by the agency.
As noted by Crawley (2000:1-6) identifying who was the labour hire employer in the
case for the purposes of the Act was of fundamental importance in determining liability.
As in' a typical labour hire situation the agency in the case in no manner supervised the
work done by the worker. However it paid the worker, made superannuation
contributions on his behalf, deducted tax from his wages, and also paid workers
compensation premiums and payroll tax on behalfof its workforce.
The Full Court of the Supreme Court of South Australia unanimously held that the
agency was the legal employer, and that there was no contractual relationship between
the client and the worker, either express or implied. It was held that the fact of control
by Mason & Cox over the employee at their premises alone cannot have led to a
conclusion that there was a contract of employment between the employee and Mason
& Cox, or indeed that there was a contractual relationship at all. Doyle C.J. (at p.443)
stated that what mattered was the legal right to control, rather than the practical fact of
control. In the final result the court dismissed the appeal against the trial judge's
decision awarding $120,000 damages against the client. Crawley (2000:1-6), notes that
the Mason & Cox case is an example of a business being in a worse position under
legislation by using the less regulated option of labour hire than if it had employed the
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employee under standard guidelines, in view of its liability for common law damages
under legislation.
Labour hire can also be used by an organisation to conceal an existing employment
relationship with a worker, and so circumvent its legal obligations. In such a situation
there can still be basic argument and confusion over who is the employer of the worker
in proceedings. However, even where there is express documentation setting up a
labour hire arrangement, if the documentation is not consistent with the real nature of
the arrangement, a court may hold that there is an .employment relationship between the
worker and the client organisation. A labour hire agency may only be a conduit and the
host/client organisation, previously the employer, still may be liable as employer for
unfair dismissal purposes: Oanh Nguyen v. A-N-T Contract Plumbers Pty Ltd tlas
A-N-T Personnel & Thiess Services Pty Ltd. (2003)128 IR. 241. In that case the
employee was engaged by the Thiess company, who had contacted the employee
directly and had created formal documents stating that the labour supplier, A-N-T, was
the employer. Apart from organising workers' compensation, A-N-T had little contact
with the employee, who was a union delegate at the worksite and who also participated
on bodies such as the Thiess's Occupational Health and Safety Committee.
The employee became pregnant, but concealed the fact for some weeks before
indicating her state to Thiess. The Thiess company arranged for the woman to
undertake a medical assessment which cleared her for work generally but not for the
performance of certain tasks. The Thiess company subsequently stopped the employee
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from continuing to work on the basis that her services from the A-N-T Agency were no
longer required.
The employee commenced unfair dismissal proceedings against Thiess and A-N-T. The
A-N-T agency asserted that it was the employer but that it had not dismissed her. It
alleged that it had work available for the employee following her termination at Thiess,
and accordingly she had not been sacked.
Thiess was ultimately held to be the legal employer by the New South Wales
Commission, who had to take into account all the factors relevant to the case. On the
one hand it had to consider the control that Thiess had over the worker's recruitment,
employment and termination, which was a significant factor. On the other hand it had
to take into account the A-N-T agency's role in paying wages and organising
compensation. The Commission reached the conclusion that it was dealing with an
"atypical" labour hire relationship, and found that A-N-T was used as a mere "conduit"
by Thiess to pay their employees' wages and deal with on-costs such as workers'
compensation. The result was that Thiess had to pay the employee for 15 weeks pay
and compensation. The case is yet another example ofhow the labour hire arrangement
is used by organisations in an attempt to circumvent their legal obligations as an
employer.
A similar situation occurred in Damevski v. Guidice (2003) 202 ALR 494, where a
cleaner was informed that he would no longer be employed directly by the organisation,
but instead he would be hired through an agency. The worker signed a document from
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the organisation indicating his acceptance of the offer ofwork from the agency, after an
assurance that "nothing will change" and on pain of not being offered further· work
otherwise.
The Full Federal Court held that the worker was still an employee of the organisation,
and so could pursue a claim for unfair dismissal against it. Justice Wilcox in the case
considered that the whole point of the agency's intervention was to effect an
arrangement, that would enable the organisation to avoid some of its employer
obligations.
The circumstances of the Nguyen and Damevski cases are similar to those of the
American case of Vizcaino v. Microsoft 120 F.3d 1006 (9th Cir. 1997), where long term
"contractors" worked under the direct supervision of Microsoft managers on software
products essential to the company's core business. The workers were treated by
Microsoft as "temporary non-employees" and denied company benefits and other rights
available to traditional employees that were doing similar work. The Circuit Court of
Appeals found that the workers were employees of Microsoft and not of the agencies,
and therefore entitled to participation in the company's stock purchase plan. The case is
an American example of how an organisation will not be permitted to evade its
employer's responsibilities by merely interposing an entity that performs managerial
tasks such as issuing pay slips, collecting tax and arranging for worker's compensation
insurance. According to Gonos (2005:302) the case drew attention to staffing industry
practices.
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Notwithstanding the preceding, there may be no circumvention of employer obligations,
where a worker is placed with a host business for a lengthy period, and there has been
little involvement by the agency. In this situation the original labour hire contract
between the agency and worker may become superseded by a direct agreement by the
worker with the host, where a worker, once assigned to the host, virtually has no contact
at all with the agency: Melbourne v. J.D. Teehforee Pty Ltd (1998) 65 SAIR 372 at
390-1.
Another conundrum with respect to labour hire, as regards evasion of regulatory
responsibilities, is that even when a labour hire arrangement is used, a labour hire
agency Can avoid the statutory responsibilities of an employer and can contract out of
minimum employment standards contained in awards and collective agreements, by
taking advantage of the legal distinction between employees and independent
contractors. As has been noted, in so doing an agency relies on the courts' deference to
the apparent form of a contract (Fenwick, 1992:238). The leading example ofthis form
of labour arrangement is the case ofBuilding Workers' Industrial Union ofAustralia v.
Odeo Pty Ltd (1991) 29 FCR 104 (the "Troubleshooters" case). In that case the agency
ODCD supplied labour to the building industry in Victoria.
As to the circumstances of the case there was fIrstly a written contract between the
worker and agency which acknowledged the following -
• there was no relationship of employer/employee, the worker was self-employed
and not bound to accept any work;
• the worker agreed to work for a fIxed rate;
44
Chapter Three
Tensions with Traditional Principles
• the worker's personal insurance was the responsibility ofthe worker;
• Troubleshooters was forbidden to make deductions in respect of pay as you go
(PAYE) taxation;
• the worker had no right to holiday pay, sick pay, or long service leave;
• Troubleshooters had no liability or responsibility, other than to pay the worker in
accordance with condition two above;
• the worker guaranteed the work done against faulty workmanship and covered the
work for all insurance;
• the worker had to be a member ofthe trade union covering the worker's trade;
• the worker would provide all the relevant equipment.
A second agreement involved a standard commercial arrangement, whereby under a
written contract between the agency and the client the agency would supply labour to
the client on request.
It was held by the Full Federal Court that the first contract between the agency and the
worker was not a contract of service, that is a contract of employment, but was a
contract with the worker as an independent contractor for services. Further, there was
no contract of employment nor contract of any kind between a builder and a worker
provided by Odco, because there was no promise of payment by the builder to the
worker and no intention to create legal relations. The Court pointed to the lack of any
control normally held by an agency in a labour hire situation. The Odco company, in
supplying labour hire workers to the building industry, was not the legal employer of
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the workers. The overall result was that the workers, who were hired out by the agency,
were not the employees of either the agency or client, but independent contractors not
covered by industrial instruments or employment legislation. The labour hire agency
thus for example could avoid the occupational health and safety duties of an employer,
by hiring out the staff in the form ofindependent contractors.
The Court stated (at p.125) :
It is easier to impute the requisite degree of control, in the sense of the right to
exercise it, to a putative employer who maintains a body of workers paid by the
week, whom he leads or charges out by the day to contractors or others requiring
work to be done ... the relationship between these labour hire firms and the
workers whom they make available is one of employer and employee. In our
view there was no reservation of a power in Troubleshooters to require one of its
workers to move from one site to another, or to work beyond the initial agreed
day, sufficient to prevent the imputation of a right to control that worker which
would satisfy the test enunciated by Mason J. in Stevens v. Brodribb.
Stewart (2002:20) notes that the Odeo case illustrates the fact that, while an agency
worker is not an employee of the client for whom he/she performs services, it does not
follow that the worker is necessarily employed by the hire agency. The Troubleshooters
agency engaged and paid workers in respect of whom it claimed that it exercised little
control over their work. The agency lent them out to clients who, though closely
supervising their work, had no contract with the workers and hence could not be their
employer. The result was that no one was the legal employer ofthe workers. Unlike the
standard labour hire system, there is no legal relationship between the worker and
service provider. The arrangement can be illustrated as follows -
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ODCOsystem
Host employer
~
Provider agency ~ Worker
(No contract of employment)
The Odeocase can be considered another fonn of statutory evasion, just like a labour
contract with a private company or partnership fonned by a worker under which there
can be no employment relationship: AMP v. Chaplin (1978) 18 ALR 385 at 391-2.
Odeo arrangements bring about independent contracting arrangements where workers
are neither employees of the labour hire agency nor that ofthe agency's clients.
The Australian decision in the Odeo case is in line with a previous English decision of
Construction Industry Training Board v. Labour Force Ltd. [1970] 3 All ER 220.
There Labour Force, a labour hire agency, supplied workmen to a building contractor.
As to the relationship between Labour Force and the workmen, the
Court held that a contract "sui generis" existed between the parties on the basis that the
workmen were contractors rendering services exclusively to the other party.
The decision was based on the circumstances that Labour Force had no control over the
work of the workmen, there was no continuity of contract, no sick pay and no bar on
the workmen working for others when they liked. The building contractor also was held
not to be the workmen's employer because he did not pay them, but communicated the
number of hours worked to the labour hire agency who then was responsible for the
payment ofthe workers. The upshot of the decision was that the labour hire agency,
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Labour Force, did not have to pay the industrial training levy calculated on the basis of
the payroll.
In cases such as the Odeo case and the Labour Force case, it could be argued that by
classifying certain labour hire arrangements as contractor situations, the Courts have
encouraged the short circuiting by businesses of employee-protection legislation, of the
tenns under awards and collective agreements and of common law principles designed
for .the protection of individual employees.
By way of counter-balance, it should be noted that the New South Wales Labour Hire
Task Force in its final report (2001) observed (at page 6) that the number of contractors
in the labour hire sector is relatively small, being less than 1% in an AlO (Australian
Industry Group) survey. In addition, there are legislative provisions such as section 275
of the Queensland Industrial Relations Act 1999, whereby a contractor not truly
independent but mainly reliant on one party for work can be deemed to be an employee
for industrial protection purposes.1
Under section 275 of the Queensland Act, the Commission is granted the power to
declare persons who perform work in an industry under a contract for services to be
employees, if it considers that such persons would more appropriately be regarded as
employees. In considering whether to make such an order, the Full Bench of the
Commission may consider -
• the relative bargaining power of the class ofpersons;
1 It should be noted that the deeming provisions ofs.275 of the Queensland Act have now also been
sterilised for most employers by the federal Independent Contractors Act 2006 (Cth).
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• the economic dependency ofthe class ofpersons on the contract;
• the particular circumstances and needs of low paid employees;
• whether the contract is designed to, or does, avoid the provisions of the Act, an
industry sector order or an industrial instrument;
• the particular circumstances and needs of employees inclUding women, persons
from a non-English speaking background, young persons and outworkers;
• the consequences ofnot making an order for the class ofpersons.
By way of example section 275 was applied in ALHMWU v Bark Australia [2001] QrR.
Comm 22. There the Queensland Industrial Relations Commission deemed security
guards to be employees where they had been designated as independent contractors
under an agreement, so as to deprive them of the entitlements such as annual leave and
overtime payments under an award and certified agreement.
There have been ongoing cases however where businesses attempt to set up labour hire
workers as independent contractors. In this way both client organisation and labour hire
agency seek to avoid the burden of employment regulation. As observed by Collins
(1990: 354) where the management of a business can turn an employee into a
contractor, it thereby substitutes a commercial contract for one ofemployment relations.
An example of the trend is the South Australian case of Country Metropolitan Agency
Contracting Services Pty Ltd. v. Slater and WorkCoverlCGU Workers Compensation
Insurance (SA) Pty Ltd. [2003] SAWCT 57, where the Full Bench of South Australia's
Worker's Compensation Tribunal upheld the ruling that a labour hire worker under an
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apparent Odeo style independent contracting system was an employee rather than a
contractor, for the purposes of the South Australian Workers' Rehabilitation &
Compensation Act 1986. As .the employee Slater was an employee of the Country
Metropolitan agency for the purposes of the Act, she could bring a worker's
compensation claim against that company.
In the case the applicant worker had been engaged as a tomato picker by the Country
Metropolitan Agency (CMACS), which had described itself as an agency contracting
service, to work on a tomato growing property run by Chiquita Brands Adelaide Pty
Ltd. Her work there was the result of a contractual arrangement between her and the
agency, following the worker's response to an advertisement by the agency. After
Slater injured her wrist while working, the agency told her that they no longer required
her services. Slater was held to be an employee of the agency at first instance and this
decision became the subject ofappeal.
The CMACS labour hire agency had argued that under the terms of the agreement with
Slater it had no contractual relationship as an employer with Slater but that she was self
employed; that the worker had agreed to work for an hourly amount for on-site hours;
that the agency was not allowed to make PAYE tax deductions; that the worker agreed
that she had no claim in respect of holiday pay, long service leave or sick pay; that the
worker had guaranteed against faulty work and had agreed to cover the work for public
liability, accident insurance, long service leave and holiday pay; and that the worker
had agreed to supply her own equipment. The labour hire agency maintained that it had
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simply supplied Slater to a third party such as Chiquita, the client! "host employer" in
the case to pick tomatoes.
The Full Bench of the Tribunal upheld the finding at first instance that, despite the fact
that Slater had signed a contract stipulating that she was an independent contractor, the
indications were that Slater was an employee. In looking at the facts of the case, the
Tribunal took the view that Slater was an unskilled labourer with no capacity to
delegate and who apart from her gloves, supplied nothing but her labour. These
indicators pointed to an employment relationship. In addition the agency had the
ultimate authority to direct the employee and had delegated this control to Chiquita.
In considering the agency's submission that parallels ought to be drawn with the
decision in Odeo Pty Ltd v. Builders' Workers' Industrial Union ofAustralia ("The
Troubleshooters" case), the Tribunal took the view that the Troubleshooters case was a
special case in respect of the building and construction industry which generally
concerned skilled tradespersons. Accordingly, the Troubleshooters case was not a
binding precedent. The case accordingly cast doubts on the general applicability of
Odeo style contractor arrangements in various situations.
The Country Metropolitan Agency case is another demonstration that courts, whilst
inclined to accept the formal terms of a contract, will not automatically accept the label
given to a party under a contract. The case is a reminder that courts and tribunals will
look at substance over form in determining the true nature of a contractual relationship.
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At common law it is well settled in Britain and in Australia that the label parties attach
to their contracts will not determine the true nature of the relationship. Whileexpress
declarations can be regarded as helpful, especially in doubtful cases, a court will look at
the remaining circumstances including implied tenns, to classify the contract according
to the reality of the situation.
In the English case of Young & Woods Ltd v. West (1980) IRLR 201 the Court held that
the label of self-employed given to a worker was a sham, given that fellow workers
doing essentially the same job were engaged as employees. In the Australian case of
Narich v. Commissioner ofPay-roll Tax (1983) 50 ALR 417 the Privy Council held
that, notwithstanding that a tenn of the agreement between Narich and the lecturers
provided that the lecturers were not employees of the company but were independent
contractors, the effect of the contract as a whole, which contained details as to the
manner in which the lecturers were to perfonn their contracts, created an employer-
employee relationship under a contract ofservice.
Justice Gray of the Federal Court ofAustralia in Re Porter (1989) 34 lR 179 reinforced
this substance over fonn approach, when he stated:
a Court will always look at all the tenns of the (employment) contract to
determine its true essence and will not be bound by the express choice of the
parties as to the label attached to it ..... the parties cannot create something which
has every feature of a rooster but call it a duck and insist that everybody else
recognise it as a duck.
At the highest judicial levels in Australia too, it would seem that there has been an
approach to characterise a work relationship as one of employment by looking at the
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economic reality of the work relationship. The High Court in Hollis v. Vabu Pty Ltd
(2001) 207 CLR 21 dealt with the question ofwhether a company was vicariously liable
for one of its bicycle couriers, who knocked down the plaintiff on a Sydney footpath.
The Court held by majority that the bicycle couriers, while described in their contracts
as independent contractors, were in fact employees, and thus found the company Vabu
to be liable vicariously. In so doing they endorsed the multi-factor approach of Mason
J. in the Stevens v. Brodribb case «(1986) 160 CLR 16). The factors that influenced the
majority judges in rmding an employment relationship were that the couriers were "not
providing skilled labour or labour which required special qualifications"; that they had
"little control over the manner of performing their work"; that the couriers were
"presented to the public and to those using the courier service as emanations of Vabu"
in the wearing of uniforms with a corporate logo; and that their fmances were
"superintended" by Vabu.
The fact that the couriers supplied their own bicycles was not regarded as influential,
"because the capital outlay was relatively small and because bicycles are not tools that
are inherently capable of use only for courier work but provide a means of personal
transport or even a means of recreation out of work time". The overall view in the joint
judgment was that ''viewed as a practical matter, the bicycle couriers were not running
their own business or enterprise, nor did they have independence in the conduct of their
operations" (PAl).
As noted by Stewart (2002: 17), cases such as Hollis v. Vabu demonstrate that there can
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be legal problems for organisations, that hire out workers and label them as contractors
where there is an attempt to maintain substantial control over the workers. In light ofthe
Vabu case, it would seem that even a carefully drafted contract by lawyers may not be
sufficient to create a contractor situation (Stewart 2002: 17).
The preceding situations support the view that, as Lobel (2003:121) contends, the
traditional common law employment test is difficult to adapt to the triangular
employment relations of labour hire. Apart from general problems as to the
identification of the employer and the classification of a worker under a labour hire
arrangement, the fractured division of control and responsibility in the tripartite labour
hire arrangement can create legal and practical problems in specific areas. Problems
can arise with respect to DRS, the termination of a worker's services, vicarious liability
for a labour hire agency, anti-discrimination provisions, and coverage by industrial
instruments. These issues will be dealt with in turn.
3.3 Risk Apportionment in OBS
The essential problem with workplace health and safety responsibilities ina labour hire
situation is that a labour hire relationship differs in nature from a normal employment
relationship. A labour hire agency as employer does not supervise the tasks that its
labour hire employee performs, or control the workplace where they are carried out.
It has already been noted that each of the Australian ORS (occupational health and
safety) statutes imposes a duty upon employers in relation to employees. Australian
ORS statutes also impose a duty of care upon employers or self employed persons in
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relation to non-employees. If workers are employees of a labour hire company, that
company owes the workers a general duty of care under the employer's statutory
general duty to employees. A client company in turn owes a duty to them as non-
employees. This DHS obligation on a client company to some degree cuts out the
benefit ofusing labour hire for client organisations.
As DHS legislation applies to both the labour hire agency as employer and client
company as an employer and an occupier of workplace premises, it is the only
legislation specifically dealing with labour hire, and as such represents the most
developed approach to labour hire up to the present time.
As Hall points out (2002: 5), the complex legal nature of labour hire arrangements is
problematic for determining liability, where there has been a breach of DHS legislation.
For example, a labour hire worker may be injured and both the labour hire agency and
client company may each dispute responsibility. The OHS area is another example of
risk apportionment under labour hire. Under risk management theory it has been argued
that, for the sake of efficiency, risk should be allocated to the party better able to sustain
the cost associated with any particular risk (Stiglitz, 1987: 50).
Difficulties arise with respect to labour hire, because the legal obligations under the
Workplace Health & Safety Act 1995 (Qld) (which reinforce the common law duty of
care) are general and rely on a shared and overlapping liability approach, and thus there
can be an uncertain cut off point with respect to the division of DHS responsibility
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between an agency and client. As is the case under the legislation of other States, both a
labour hire agency and a host employer/client have a duty under that Act to ensUre that
labour hire employees, who are on-hired to a host employer, are provided with safe
place to work, and are not put at risk of injury.
There is thus scope for confusion and uncertainty over the respective roles of an agency
and client company, and the allocation of risk and responsibility. This may mean that
labour hire employees may be brought onto sites not properly trained, and lacking the
organisational knowledge and the work skills associated with the safe carrying out of
work procedures. Evidence to this effect was received by the Inquiry into Labour Hire
Employment in Victoria (2005:83), and by the Commonwealth Government fuquiry
into independent contracting and labour hire arrangements (2005:77). This uncertain
division of responsibility between agency and client has the potential for obfuscation,
deliberate or otherwise, of DRS obligations. This view is supported by a finding in the
United Kingdom, that the sharing of DRS responsibility between agency and host
company is a significant problem (Storrie, 2002:50).
Because of the lack ofprecision over the parties' respective roles, there is a tendency
for "buck passing" of responsibility between the parties. As demonstrated in the
empirical findings, this is illustrated by the use of disclaimer ofresponsibility clauses by
agencies, and the use of "hold harmless" clauses by client bodies. The latter clauses
(usually of an indemnity nature) represent an attempt by client bodies to transfer the
financial responsibility to an agency and seek reimbursement for the costs of any DRS
breaches by the clients. There is some survey evidence that indicates that 45% ofRCSA
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(Recruitment and Consulting Association) labour hire agencies, and 47% ofnon-RCSA
agencies, have been requested by clients to complete a "hold harmless clause"
(Brennan, Valos and Hindle, 2003:73).
These "hold harmless" clauses appear to be untested in the courts, but are of doubtful
validity, given thatsection 28 of the Workplace Health and Safety Act 1995 (Qld) places
responsibility on the labour hire employer and client, and given the legislative intent
that duties under ORS legislation cannot be delegated (Kondis v. State Transport
Authority (1984) 154 CLR 672). The clauses could be in breach of the workplace
health and safety legislation, if they constitute a clear attempt to evade or undermine the
legislation. Section 28(1) of the Workplace Health and Safety Act 1995 (Qld) provides:
A person (the relevant person) who conducts a business or undertaking has an
obligation to ensure the workplace health and safety of the person, each of the
person's workers and any other persons is not affected by the conduct of the
relevant person's business or undertaking.
It would seem too that the use of hold harmless clauses could act as a financial
detriment to agencies, in that it has been estimated that, in New South Wales, the
insurance cost of providing such indemnities could have added between 15 to 30 per
cent to the premiums labour hire firms paid to WorkCover (Sydney Morning Herald
newspaper, 19 January 2000, p.8).
The Committee in the Inquiry into Labour Hire Employment in Victoria Report 2005
(and the Victorian government in its response of January 2006) agreed that "hold
harmless" clauses as agreements that transfer the risk of financial implications f{)r
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breaches of duties (whether legally enforceable or not) are contrary to the intent ofOHS
regulation.
Further, as was suggested to the New South Wales Labour Hire Task Force Inquiry
(2001 at p.58) a practical problem under labour hire could be that a host or client
company "has little direct financial incentive to manage OHS risk" because the labour
hire agency carries the workers' compensation liability in respect ofthe workers. It has
been noted that host organisations could shift the risk ofunsafe work practices to labour
hire agencies, through utilising labour hire for the most dangerous workplace tasks
(Inquiry into Labour Hire Employment in Victoria (2005:104)). However where
agencies have to pay increased workers' compensation premiums because of a higher
injury rate, this ultimately will result in higher labour hire fees.
It has been observed in Victoria that the labour hire industry, compared to other
employment areas, has a noticeably higher rate ofworkers' compensation claims (supra
Inquiry, p.60). It could be the situation too that a labour hire company may not wish to
press a client to spend on OHS prevention, for fear of losing business. The Victorian
inquiry however noted that this did not change the fact that a client company bears
substantial OHS responsibilities under the legislation. Further, where a labour hire
employee is injured, the workers' compensation insurer may seek to claim from the
liability insurer for the client, on the basis that the employee was under the supervision
ofthe client at its premises.
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It was submitted to the New South Wales Labour Hire Task Force by three interested
business organisations, that the host company and the labour hire company can have
different views as to the extent of responsibility of each of them for OHS training.
Further labour hire companies indicated that not all host companies fully appreciated
their responsibilities. One agency stated that some host companies expected the labour
hire company to have all OHS responsibility, notwithstanding that the host company
had control of the actual workplace.
A view was expressed to the Inquiry into Labour Hire Employment in Victoria 2005
(2005: 85), that for a labour hire agency the practical application of its general duties is
problematic, in that an agency often has an incomplete knowledge of and no control
over a client's premises and work practices and faces difficulties in inspecting all
workplaces where there are short-term labour hire assignments.
The result of the foregoing in practice could be that insufficient measures are taken to
protect labour hire workers, because both parties believe that the other is looking after
training on a particular matter, or because the labour hire workers are not covered by
OHS programs conducted by the labour hire agency and client. The consequence is that
labour hire workers could be exposed to risk, especially for short term placements in
high risk areas, and on worksites where there is constant change. This view is
supported by comments from industrial agencies interviewed in this work, and
reinforced by findings in a Victorian study that revealed that only 50 per cent of labour
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hire employers surveyed supplied any training to their employees (Brennan, Vales and
Hindle, 2003: 79, 80).
Regardless of the attitude of the parties, the legal policy is well established that both
parties cannot avoid responsibility for workplace safety. New South Wales cases have
established the position that a labour hire agency and a client can both be prosecuted for
workplace safety breaches. In particular, it is clear from decided cases (such as Drake
Personnel Limited v. WorkCover Authority of New South Wales (Inspector Ch'ng)
(1999) 90 IR 432 at 455, 456) that an agency, that sends its employees into another
workplace over which it exercises limited control, is for that reason under a particular
positive obligation to ensure that those premises do not present a threat to the health,
safety or welfare of those employees. Its obligations in that regard are increased, not
diminished.
In the case of WorkCover Authority (NSW)(Inspector Ankucic) v. Drake Personnel
Limited tlas Drake Industrial Limited (NSW) (1997) 89 IR 374 the Drake agency
pleaded guilty to failing to ensure the health, safety and welfare of its employees at
work and was fined $25,000. Hungerford J held that Drake as employer could not rely
on the client to ensure safety at the workplace. In the case a worker was injured while
cleaning a circular saw. He had been hired out by Drake to a company Warman
International Ltd. The worker was inexperienced in the operation of the saw and had
received no formal training on it from either organisation (his previous experience with
the agency being in packing and forklift duties). The agency's failure in the case was
that it had not ensured that it and the client organisation had properly trained the worker
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in machinery operation and workplace procedures, and had not inquired as to the
precise duties of the worker. Similarly the company Warman was fined for not
providing proper training to ensure safe operation ofthe saw.
In the case of Drake Personnel Limited v. WorkCover Authority ofNew South Wales
(Inspector Ch 'Ng) (1999) 90 IR 432, where a process worker sustained a crush injury
while operating an unguarded machine, it was held by the Full Bench of the New South
Wales Industrial Relations Commission, that a labour hire agency cannot escape
liability, merely because a client is also under a duty to ensure that persons working at
its workplace are not exposed to risks. The process worker had been hired out to work
at factory premises in the assembly of electrical components. Although a labour hire
agency representative had inspected the machine which the worker was to operate, the
worker was directed subsequently by the client business to work on another machine,
the one where the worker was injured.
It was further held in the case that Drake Personnel had breached section 15 of the
Occupational Health & Safety Act 1983 (NSW), by failing to put in place a system
which required the worker or client to report to it any significant changes to work
conditions, such as in the case the employee being instructed to work on a different
machine. A preliminary induction and safety inspection of a work site is only a partial
discharge of an agency's OHS responsibility, and an agency has an ongoing
responsibility to ensure the safety of a workplace for a labour hire worker. The case
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indicates that there is an onus on an agency to ensure that a client gives notice of any
work changes fora hired employee.
The case of Inspector Gillarte v. Integrated Group Ltd (formerly known as Integrated
Workforce Pty Ltd) (2003) NSW IRComm 98 demonstrates the difficulty a labour hire
company confronts in discharging its OHS obligations, when it does not control the
workplace and does not supervise its workers there, and may be responsible for many
workers on different work sites. In that case where a large structural beam had been
transported across a galvanising plant, it was held that the defendant agency had failed
to provide instruction and training to ensure that workers did not perform work at risk to
their safety, contrary to section 16(1) of the Occupational Health and Safety Act 1983
(NSW). It was found that the defendant, while it had conducted a risk assessment, had
relied upon the host company to ensure that established systems were followed. It had
not ensured that the host company had undertaken a risk assessment regarding the
movement of steel structures by crane. It had also not enquired about the host
company's OHS record, which would have shown there had been four previous
convictions against the company.
The Commission made the following observations on the extent of the agency's duty:
"There is a positive obligation on labour hire companies to take such steps as are
necessary to ensure that the work environment in which their employees are required to
carry out work is safe and that those employees are not required to carry out work in
circumstances which are unsafe or otherwise pose a risk to their health, safety or
welfare. The difficulty this creates for labour hire companies is that they are, in a
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pragmatic sense, compelled to exercise the same degree of foresight and vigilance as
does their third party client, as if the third party client were the direct employer of the
labour hire company's employees. This vigilance and foresight must be exercised in
circumstances where the labour hire company will rarely have a responsible
representative engaged full time at the third party client premises or otherwise involved
full time in the operations ofthe third party client."
The Commission in the Inspector Gillarte v. Integrated Group case again emphasised
the positive obligation on a labour hire company to take the necessary steps to ensure a
safe work environment for its employees. A recent Queensland case on this point is
Newman v. David Knox Holdings Pty Ltd (2002) 170 QGIG 189. That case concerned a
forklift driver who was fatally injured while driving without a seatbelt. Though the
client was regarded as having primary liability because it had an unsafe work site and
unsafe work practices, the court held that the labour hire employer should have made
reasonable enquiries and inspections ofworkplace practices (which included the culture
at the client's worksite that seatbelts were not worn).
An even more recent decision about the positive ORS obligations of a labour hire
agency towards its employees is the Victorian Court of Appeal decision in Victorian
WorkCover Authority v. Carrier Air Conditioning Pty Ltd [2006] VSCA 63, which
concerned a claim for indemnity on account of negligence by a third party. There
Ashley JA (with whom Chernov JAand Mondie AJA agreed) held at paras 64 and 65
that the labour hire agency at the very least should reasonably have insisted that the
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Carrier company give adequate instructions to the employee subsequently injured about
the duties to be performed, and the equipment to be used for same; and should have
insisted the employee be fully instructed on details of Carrier's ORS regime before he
began work.
Overall Ashley JA held the agency to be considerably culpable, in that the
circumstances indicated that it had sent its employee to work at (the host) Carrier,
without showing any interest or concern for his safety. There was no evidence that the
agency had made a site assessment as to the adequacy of Carrier's induction process
and safety regime. There was also no evidence that it had inquired about what work
was to be done, where, or with what equipment.
Ashley J however found the host Carrier should bear the main responsibility for the
employee's injury. Carrier owed a duty of care to the worker which was akin to that
owed by an employer to a worker. Though the task was simple, in the absence of
adequate instruction, warning or equipment, there was a real risk that the worker would
improvise to check on the loading of a skip, and lay himself open to injury.
Accordingly Ashley J determined that the host's percentage of responsibility for the
injury was 65%, and that of the agency was 35%.
As is shown by the Newman and Carrier cases, both agency and client can share liability
in negligence. In TNTAustralia Pty Ltd v. Christie [2003] NSWCA 47 the plaintiffhad
been assigned by a labour hire company, Manpower, to work for TNT. While operating
a pallet jack, he suffered injuries to his foot when the machine malfunctioned. The New
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South Wales Court of Appeal found TNT as the host company to be 75 per cent liable,
and the agency Manpower to be 25 per cent liable. Mason P endorsed the trial judge's
view that TNT's duty of care to the worker in relation to a safe system of work Was
similar to that ofan employer.
On the issue of shared OHS responsibility, it has been noted in the New South Wales
Labour Hire Task Force Report (page 64) that some client companies still expected,
contrary to legislative provision, that a labour hire company should take full
responsibility for OHS matters, even though a client company has control of the
workplace. As a matter ofpolicy this would seem unfair, given the lack of a labour hire
company's direct control of a workplace. On the other hand, placing sole OHS
responsibility on a client company, (as some agencies have argued in the New South
Wales Report and in the empirical fmdings of this study), would be contrary to the
purpose of a labour hire arrangement, in that this sole responsibility would cut out to
some degree the benefit ofusing a labour hire by a host body.
It could be argued that the OHS legislation attempts to strike a proper balance in placing
obligations on a labour hire agency and its client, rather than placing obligations solely
on a labour hire agency or the client. As referred to in the interview findings of this
study, one peak employer body considered that the labour hire workplace could be safer
than a normal workplace by virtue of having more interested parties concerned with
workplace safety. It referred to this as "proportional responsibility" present in terms of
OHS.
65
Chapter Three
Tensions with Traditional Principles
In this view, if a labour hire company comes in to assist and facilitate the ongoing
review and assessment of a workplace, then there are now two parties involved in
monitoring workplace safety, that is, a labour hire company working in conjunction
with a client company. In this way workplace risks and hazards can be better identified
and controlled. At the 2002 National Industrial Relations Society Conference at
Adelaide, some of the large labour hire firms in Australia advanced the argument that
this concept of "proportional responsibility" between agency and client meant that.
supervision is best carried out on the actual worksite by the client company.
In light of the foregoing it appears that there is ongoing potential for dispute between an
agency and client as to the division of responsibility and risk for workplace safety. It
would seem from the general demarcation of responsibility, that ongoing differences of
opinion between the parties can occur .as the extent of responsibility of each party for
general safety induction, training and specific issues of safety. As will be later referred
to, one large union in the fieldwork interviews noted that a general problem with OHS
legal obligations under legislation is that they are very general, rely on a joint liability
approach, and rely to a large degree on self-regulation (for example through workplace
committees). It was thought by the union that these factors were not conducive to
labour hire. Johnstone (1999:73) argues that OHS legislation should recognise new
work forms such a labour hire, explicitly outline the general health and safety
obligations of those in control of the work processes, and provide for the coordination
of efforts of the parties.
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On the issue of clarification of OHS responsibility too, it is of interest to note that,
notwithstanding the case law already on the subject, the New South Wales Labour Hire
Task Force believed (at pp.IO, 70) that there was sufficient doubt about the
responsibility of labour hire companies and host organisations for OHS obligations, to
warrant the need for case law to be reflected in legislative amendment to mandate the
notion ofjoint responsibility for occupational health and safety.
In a recent decision too (28 February 2006) the Full Bench of the Industrial Relations
Commission of New South Wales in the Secure Employment Test Case [2006]
NSWIRComm 38 agreed with evidence of Unions NSW, that confusion existed
between "host" and labour hire employers in relation to their respective OHS
obligations, and that further clarification was needed. Evidence was submitted to the
commission that labour hire employees normally were supplied to fill short-term gaps.
Because of this environment host employers (client companies) were unable or
unwilling to provide appropriate induction training and supervision.
The Full Bench agreed to an application by Unions NSW to a variation of exemplar
awards, requiring host employers engaging labour hire employees to consult with those
employees on OHS issues, and to provide to them appropriate OHS induction training
and protective equipment. The result of this decision was that a host or client company
had to satisfy the safety requirements of OHS legislation, and of the new award
provisions.
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3.4 Unfair Dismissal Legislation and Labour Hire
Fear of the unfair dismissal legislation was one reason identified in the interview
findings, why organisations were attracted to labour hire. There are problems applying
unfair dismissal principles to a labour hire situation, particularly with respect to
applying the notion of an employer's control over an employee. As noted in the
interview ftndings and in the Stevens Report 2002 (SA) (2002:59), one apparent
advantage of labour hire to organisations as non~employers was the perceived ability of
clientslhost employers to "hire and fire" without risk ofunfair dismissal claims, because
there is no employment relationship between them and .a labour hire worker. This
finding has been supported by research that concerns over unfair dismissal regulation
are a strong disincentive to the willingness of business to employ more staff (Harding,
2002). A client's power to end a worker's services with immunity has parallels to an
employer's right under the employment at will doctrine in the U.S, whereby an
employer could dismiss an employee for any reason or no reason at all.
The services of a labour hire employee can be terminated through the actions of a client
company, merely on the basis that "it was unfortunate that your name was the one that
came up": Fary v. Clements Techforce Pty Ltd (2000) SAIRC 56. Labour hire in that
sense transfers the responsibility for unfair dismissal from the host business to the
labour hire agency even though in practical terms it is really the client that is dismissing
the employee of the agency, notwithstanding that it has no legal relationship with that
employee. The agency thus as the legal employer will dismiss its employee essentially
at the instigation of the client.
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In addition, the triangular nature of labour hire makes it difficult for a worker to lodge
an unfair dismissal claim against a labour hire agency, in the event of a ternrlnation of
employment. Where a worker does not obtain further work at a host business or
through a labour hire agency, it may be difficult to substantiate that a termination of
employment has occurred for the purposes of the unfair dismissal legislation, where
there is no further work available to occupy the worker. A labour hire worker may
have also a practical problem in suing for unfair dismissal, in that he or she is not in
continuous employment long enough to qualify to sue.
In summary, the termination position under labour hire is as follows. The traditional
theory is that the legal employer has the control over the firing of an employee. The
labour hire agency can be subject to the risk of unfair dismissal proceedings, even
though in practice it is the host or client company that is the effective terminator of the
worker's services. The custom under labour hire is that, if it is not happy with a worker,
the host or client company is not to act directly against the employee. The host is to
contact the provider agency and to request the agency to remove the worker. At present
under labour hire there is an inability to join a host employer in an unfair dismissal
action, even though the host employer's actions may have led to the labour hire
employee being dismissed.
In effect, the host/client can hire and remove a labour hire worker without the risk of
unfair dismissal claims, because there is no employment relationship between the host
and worker, notwithstanding that the labour hire employee is dismissed effectively
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through the actions of the host employer. As Stewart points out (2002:18), as part of
the arrangement under labour hire there is agreement between an agency and client, that
a client may dispense with a worker's services at its discretion orin stipulated
circumstances. The client is the effective terminator of a worker's services, however
any formal action is taken by the agency following a client's request.
While businesses may use labour hire as a form of risk management by minimising
being exposed to the risk of an unfair dismissal claim, there can still be difficulties
under the legislation for both the agency and client, where the client acts peremptorily
without the agency's knowledge or where the agency does not insist on its contractual
rights that the client give proper notice of a termination. Misheva v. Spicers Paper Ltd
& Adia Personnel Pty Ltd (1998) 44 AILR 3-904 is an example of judicial confusion
caused by the problematic nature of labour hire. In that case there were unfair dismissal
proceedings before the now defunct Industrial Relations Court of Australia. The case
concerned a worker who had been sent by the Adia labour hire agency to work for a
business, Spicers Paper. After two months there her services were terminated. At an
early stage of the proceedings the judicial registrar took the view that both agency and
client were the employers of the worker. This problem was resolved later when the
agency conceded that it was the employer. The court held that the agency Adia had
breached the unfair dismissal provisions of the Workplace Relations Act 1996 (eth),
ss.170 DB - 170DF, when the business Spicers had terminated the employment of the
applicant, and was ordered to pay $8,000 to the applicant.
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The Misheva case is of some importance in that it showed that a labour hire agency
could be sued for unfair dismissal (the power ofdismissal being one ofthe powers ofan
employer), even when effectively it was the client that had ended the working
relationship with the worker. In the case it was decided that the agency was liable for
unfair dismissal, on the basis that the agency had not insisted on its contractual right
that the client give eight hours notice of the worker's termination to the agency.
Insistence on this condition would have given the worker a chance to respond to any
allegations against her. The Misheva decision is consistent with the orthodox legal
theory that recognises the labour hire agency being the employer as the entity
responsible for an unfair dismissal where it can occur in labour hire, notwithstanding
the fact that in many cases it is the client company that effectively brings about the
dismissal.
Problems can also arise with respect to unfair dismissal claims, where the labour hire
firm, as well as the client, seeks to deny that the agreed worker is its employee. The
case ofPotts v. To/sat Pty Ltd PR 924332 (6 November 2002) illustrates the point. This
case involved an application for relief in respect of the termination of employment
under the Federal Workplace Relations Act 1996 (Cth).
The Commonwealth legislation like the Queensland legislation set out specific factors
that the Commission was required to have regard to when determining whether a
dismissal was harsh, unjust or unreasonable. These included:
(a) whether there was a valid reason for the termination;
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(b) whether the employee was notified ofthat reason;
(c) whether the employee was given an opportunity to respond;
(d) whether the employee was warned about the unsatisfactory performance
before termination; and
(e) any other matters that the Commission considered relevant.
Potts was a trainee at an abattoir, and asserted that he had been an employee of Tolsat,
the abattoir operator. Tolsat in return claimed that it was not the employer, but that the
Food Safety Operations Group Employment & Training Ltd. ("FSOGET"), which
provided labour hire employees and trainees, was Pott's employer. It was alleged
however on behalf of Potts, that the abattoir operator employed the man, and only later
re-arranged his employment as a trainee through FSOGET.
In determining the identity of the true employer, the Commissioner in the case had
regard to the following factors:
• FSOGET was part of a group of companies responsible for the employment,
training and "arms length" supervision ofemployees placed at client's sites.
• This group of companies invoiced Tolsat weekly on the basis of the employees'
daily time sheets.
• The employee, Potts, had completed an ATO (Australian Tax Office)
employment declaration that identified FSOGET as employer.
• FSOGET provided training, group and employment separation certificates.
• The employee, Potts, was under the direct supervision of Tolsat on the site, for
day-to-day operations and also for occupational and safety reasons.
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The Commissioner found in the case that there was a genuine commercial arrangement
between FSOGET and Tolsat, and that the agency, FSOGET, provided the labour on the
basis that the employee would not become the employee of Tolsat. Accordingly, the
agency and not Tolsat was the man's employer. The arrangement did not constitute a
sham but was a labour hire arrangement. As a result the Commission's jurisdiction
could not be invoked to deal with the application.
A contrasting case is the case ofNguyen v. A-N-T Contract Packers Pty Ltd tlas A-N-T
Personnel and Thiess Services Pty Ltd (2003) 128 IR. 241. There the client company,
Thiess was held to be the true employer, and the engagement by the labour hire entity
was seen to be a charade. In that case however, the New South Wales Commission
regarded the arrangement as "atypical" and different from a normal labour hire
arrangement, in that the employee, Nguyen, was initially engaged directly by Thiess,
and it was only after a number of days that her employing entity became the labour hire
company. The New South Wales Commission found that Thiess as the host company,
not the labour hire company, was the "actual or real and effective" employer, because it
had "day-to-day control over the (labour hire worker's) recruitment and employment in
every real and practical sense and, similarly, over the termination ofher employment".
The New South Wales Commission thus held Thiess responsible for the unfair dismissal
of the labour hire worker in violation of the proscription on dismissing on an employee
on the grounds of pregnancy. The labour hire agency ANT Contract Packers was
considered as a mere "conduit" or payroll service provider to pay the employee's wages
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and on-costs such as workers' compensation. The case is an illustration of the point
that, merely because an apparent labour hire arrangement is put in place, it does not
always follow that a client company is immune from an unfair dismissal claim.
As pointed out by Orr (1998:159-185) and Noakes (1999:1-34), the case of Patrick
Stevedores Operations No.2 Pty Ltd v. MUA (1998) 195 CLR 1 illustrates that
corporations law and the concept of labour hire can be used for doubtful purposes with
respect to the termination of employees' services. This case concerned the well
publicised 1998 waterfront dispute between Patrick Stevedores and the Maritime Union
of Australia (MUA). In the case waterside labour was transferred to subsidiary
companies of Patrick that had been set up as labour hire companies, pursuant to a
restructuring by Patrick. In this way the head Patrick company rid itselfof its unionised
workforce, with a view to engaging a replacement non-union labour force. It then
stripped the labour hire subsidiary companies of their assets, forcing them into
liquidation.
The result was that those companies as the legal employers of the labour force had no
money to pay to the waterside employees their entitlements on termination. These
manoeuvrings were in the end blocked by the grant of an injunction, on the basis that
Patrick was violating the freedom of association provisions contained in section 298K
of the Workplace Relations Act (1996) (Cth). The High Court upheld this decision by
North J. of the Federal Court to impose an injunction, which prevented Patrick
Stevedores terminating the labour hire agreements.
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Noakes (1999:33,34) points out however that the restructuring undertaken by Patrick
was not per se an infringement of any sections of corporations law, and that the Patrick
case illustrates that the separate entity principle in company law can be availed of to
avoid liability for termination of services in an employment situation, in this case one of
labour hire.
A recent Queensland case demonstrates however that the potential exists for a labour
hire company to be found liable under unfair dismissal legislation, where it
automatically relies on a host company's direction. The decision of the Queensland
Industrial Relations Commission indicates that a labour hire company should make a
full and proper enquiry prior to any dismissal action which may impact on one of its
employees. In the case ofAMEP.KI (for Vincent Fenech) v. eHR Group Pty Ltd
[2005] QIRComm 6, the Queensland Commission confirmed that an employer cannot
avoid its rights and obligations arising under contract with an employee, through its
contract with a third party outside the employment relationship. In circumstances where
an employer in effect gives control over its employees to a third party, it still may be
held responsible for any unfair or unlawful conduct of the third party in respect of its
employees.
The circumstances of the case were that Mr Fenech was employed by the CRR Group
and placed at a worksite pursuant to a contract between the CRR Group and the client
company for the supply oflabour. The contract provided that the client could advise the
CRR Group, that a particular employee was not required and could request a
75
Chapter Three
Tensions with Traditional Principles
replacement. After being nine months at the work site, Mr Fenech was elected the
union delegate for the CRR Group's employees at the work site. A short time later the
CRR Group issued a warning about poor productivity to MrFenech, essentially
following directions from the client company.
The union on behalf of the employee responded to the CRR Group that the client's
complaint was driven by Mr Fenech's role as a union delegate and that there was no
basis to productivity claims. Though the CRR Group relayed these claims to the client
company, it accepted without question the company's denial about the matter. Later on
following more allegations about Mr Fenech's poor productivity, the CRR Group
removed Mr Fenech from the work site without further enquiry. The Commission
found that the CRR Group's actions were for reasons including a prohibited reason, that
is the employee's role as a union delegate. The CRR Group as the employer labour hire
company was found to have breached the freedom of association provisions of the
Industrial Relations Act 1999 (Qld), notwithstanding that the dismissal had occurred as
a result of the actions of the host company. The labour hire company was ordered to
pay $7,500 in damages to Mr Fenech.
It can be seen from the preceding authorities that the use oflabour hire is an .avenue that
can be used by business to escape from regulation of the standard employment
relationship, that is contained in the proscriptions of unfair dismissal legislation.
However it has been shown that legal difficulties exist for labour hire agencies, where
client businesses use labour hire, and do not act appropriately in terminating the
services of labour hire workers.
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It has been pointed out too that labour hire workers can have threshold difficulties in
pursuing claims under the legislation, because ofproblems with continuity of service, as
labour hire workers are invariably classed as casual workers, and as such not eligible to
make a claim under Queensland or Federal legislation, unless engaged on a regular and
systematic basis for at least twelve months. A distinction is made between long-term
and short-term casuals for unfair dismissal purposes. Thus under section 638 of the
Workplace Relations Act 1996 (Cth), short-term casuals (those engaged for less than 12
m0!lths) are excluded from lodging unfair dismissal claims. As to the distinction
between casual workers it has been held in Franks v. Reuters Ltd and First Resort
Employment Ltd [2003] EWCA Civ 417 that a long term labour hire worker (five years)
could be an employee of the host company, not the labour hire agency, pursuant to an
"implied" contract.
3.5 The "Joint Employer" Concept
A new development which has significant implications for labour hire arrangements is
the concept of "joint employment". In essence this means that an employee may be
employed by more than one employer at the same time. Under this concept a client or
host company may be made liable for unfair dismissal and other purposes, and a party
to a labour hire dispute, even though it has no employment relationship with the labour
hire worker. The theory is based on the view that the client company has powers
integral to the dispute and can directly affect the employer/employee relationship. This
theory of dual employers is of course contrary to and an erosion of the common law
doctrine that there is only one employer in an employment relationship.
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As pointed out by Tansky and Veglahn (1995: 293), a labour hire arrangement is made
more complex than a traditional employment arrangement in that there is more than one
organisation carrying out employer-like activities. In this regard it appears plausible to
argue that assumptions about labour hire responsibilities should move, if control over
dismissal and worker's performance moves. However the doctrine of "joint
employment" while recognised in the USA, and while noted in Australian cases, has yet
to be adopted here, partly it would seem because it flies in the face of the common law
approach. There is no jurisdiction in Australia that has legislative provisions to deal
withjoint employment.
A key notion of the joint employment concept is that an employee should be permitted
to take action against either the labour hire fIrm or host company or both. Thus it would
permit an employee to sue a client company for unfair dismissal. As noted there
presently is an inability to join a host business in an action for unfair dismissal, where
the host business's actions have led to the labour hire employee being dismissed. As
such, it seriously challenges the present common law principles under the contract of
employment. It would also reduce the value of using labour hire workers for
organisations.
The concept ofjoint employment was referred to in the Stevens Report (SA) (2002:60-
62), and also in the Commonwealth House ofRepresentatives Inquiry into independent
contracting and labour hire arrangements (August 2005). The latter inquiry (at pages
63-65) notes that the concept of joint employment arose "in the United States in the
1930s as a statutory response to labour hire arrangements aimed being used to avoid
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collective bargaining laws and employee entitlements protections". The
Commonwealth Inquiry notes (at page 64) that under the doctrine ofjoint employment
recovery action for employee benefits or entitlements can be taken .against a labour hire
company or its client, on the basis that both are regarded as employers.
Cullen (2003: 1-2) points out that in the USA there is both common law and statutory
recognition that separate entities may be joint employers of a single employee, and that
under the US common law and the National Labour Relations Act (the NLRA) a joint
employer relationship is found where parties "share or co-determine those matters
governing essential terms and conditions of employment" (Texas World Service Co.Inc.
v NLRB 928 F 2d 1426 at 1432) (5th Cir 1991».
Under US law the fundamental criterion in determining whether an entity is a joint
employer is the degree of control exercised by that party over the worker in question.
Factors used in determining the degree of control include the power to hire and have a
worker removed or fired; whether the employment takes place on the client's premises;
the right to supervise work; the control of the work schedule; and the ability to
discipline workers (Cullen 2003: 2).
While the concept of joint employment is well established in the United States, the
doctrine has not been the subject of rulings by any Australian court or commission. The
doctrine however has been the subject of comment in some Australian cases. In
Morgan v. Kittochside Nominees Pty Ltd (2002) 117 IR 152 the Full Bench of the
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Australian Industrial Relations Commission (AIRC) stated that they were inclined to .the
view that no substantial barrier existed, if the right factual situation arose, in finding that
a joint employment relationship could be given effect to for certain purposes under the
Workplace Relations Act 1996 (Cth). The Full Bench referred to the USA concept of
joint employment, and observed that the concept had been used in the USA to respond
to ''the use of labour hire arrangements by employers in circumstances that conduced to
an avoidance of labour regulation and employee protections". With respect to the latter
comment the Stevens Report (SA) (2002:61) indicated that the concept could be used by
a commission to deal with situations where there had been an unfair dismissal of a
labour hire employee because of the intervention of a host employer, or where the
employee had not received wages because the host employer had not paid the labour
hire company.
The concept of joint employment was also regarded with favour by the New South
Wales Industrial Relations Commission in Nguyen v. A-N-T Contract Packers Pty Ltd
(2003) 128 IR 241, though it was noted that there was at that time no clear authority for
reaching such a conclusion. The concept of joint employment was also raised in the
New South Wales case SDA v. Glaxo Smith Kline (11 June 2002). There a worker was
engaged at Glaxo Smith Kline (Glaxo) through the labour supplier, Forstaff. The
worker was declined continued employment, after he was involved in a fight with
another worker. The SDA (the Shop, Distributive and Allied Employees Association)
on behalfof the worker notified the New South Wales Industrial Relations Commission
of a dispute between the parties under section 130 of the Industrial Relations Act 1996
(NSW).
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An issue for detennination then was whether the SDA had jurisdiction to intervene in a
matter involving a person, who was the employee of another entity. Glaxo argued that,
because of its labour supply relationship with Forstaff, there was no legal relationship
between it and the labour hire worker. However Commissioner Tabbaa took the view
that an industrial dispute existed which could be arbitrated, on the basis that the worker
was in a position ofbeing from an industrial relations perspective within an "ofservice"
relationship with Glaxo, because ofGlaxo's control over the worker.
The Commissioner was ofthe view that:
there is a need for a re-examination ofthe principles of IR. law, as they should be
applied to host employers due to the control they exercise over workers they
engage through a labour supply agency.
It should be pointed out too, that in the Stevens Report 2002 (SA) (pp.13-14) a specific
recommendation was made that a labour hire employee be able to take action in the
Industrial Court or Commission against a labour hire agency, host company or both for
unfair dismissal (and underpayment).
Harley (2003: 84) and Jesser (2005: 81-83) point out that the application of a joint
employment doctrine in Australia would have substantial ramifications for employment
relationships and in particular the use of labour hire arrangements, in that a client
company would be affected directly by claims such as in relation to termination of
employment and for employer negligence.
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3.6 Vicarious Liability
Vicarious liability is another instance of the legal anomalies arising under laboUr hire,
because of its different nature to that of a standard employment relationship. Here, as
elsewhere, a labour hire agency is regarded as the employer for legal purposes,
notwithstanding its general lack ofcontrol over its labour hire employees.
Vicarious liability refers to the liability imposed on a person for loss or injury resulting
from the wrong doing of another person, even though the person who is vicariously
liable may not have been personally at fault. Vicarious liability in tort arises by virtue
of the relationship between the wrongdoer and the person who is vicariously liable. An
example of the common law principle of vicarious liability is the situation of an
employer who is vicariously liable for the torts of an employee, committed during the
course of that employee's employment: Darling Island Stevedoring Lighterage Co.Ltd.
v. Long (1957) 97 CLR 36 per Kitto J. at 63.
As stated by the Queensland Law Reform Commission in its report on Vicarious
Liability (Report No.56, 2001 :9), vicarious liability is used as a matter of policy to
extend liability arising from the commission of a tort. In this regard it noted the
statement of Scarman LJ in Rose v. Plenty (1976) lWLR 141 at 147 that "... the
principle ofvicarious liability is one ofpublic policy. It is not a principle which derives
from a critical or refined consideration ofother concepts in the common law".
The Queensland Law Reform Commission drew attention to the fact (at p.18) that the
most common example of vicarious liability is where an employer is liable for the torts
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(wrongful actions) of an employee committed in the course and scope of his or her
employment. The employer is regarded as liable because of what the employee has
done or failed to do, as contrasted with liability where the employer is personally at
fault, such as where .an employer unreasonably fails to control an employee's conduct,
where it is reasonably foreseeable that the employee may cause harm to a third party.
The two essential elements for vicarious liability are that an employment relationship
exists, and that a tort is committed in the course and scope of an employee's
employment. Generally speaking a principal is not vicariously liable for the negligence
of an independent contractor or the contractor's employees with respect to work done at
the request of the party. It may be liable where the safety of employees is involved
(Kondis v. State Transport Authority (1984) 154 CLR 672).
Vicarious liability is a further example of a regulatory burden imposed upon an
employer under the standard common law employment relationship. As is the case with
other legal responsibilities ofthe standard employer, labour hire here provides an escape
from this burden for business organisations. In labour hire the host company/client gets
the benefit of the work from a labour hire worker. However, it does not carry any
employer-like risk associated with the work of a labour hire worker, such as the
employer's liability to provide a safe system of work for an employee. In particular a
client company does not carry the vicarious liability of an employer for the wrongful
acts of the employee causing harm to others. The client organisation is able to absolve
itself of responsibility by excluding itself from such risks that are carried by the
standard employer.
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However such a legal arrangement under labour hire poses special problems for a labour
hire agency as employer. A labour hire agency as employer is vicariously liable for the
actions of a labour hire worker, if they cause injury or damage to another person. This
situation raises obvious practical difficulties for a labour hire agency, in that it may not
always be aware ofwhat its employee is doing at any particular point in time, given the
impracticality of overseeing the day to day activities of that worker. As will be
disclosed in the interviews with agencies, agencies will try to get around this difficulty
by requiring notice pursuant to the agreement with the client, ofany changes in work or
work procedures.
It is noted that under the Anti-Discrimination Act 1991 (Qld.) a labour hire agency as an
employer can be vicariously liable for sexual harassment by one of its employees.
Section 133(1) of the Act provides that, where an employee contravenes the Act, the
employee and employer are jointly and severally liable for the contravention, and .action
may be taken against either or both.
Perhaps with respect to the labour hire arrangement an alternative view could be argued
that vicarious liability should be devolved onto the client organisation (following a
Scandinavian approach) in that the labour hire agency-client contract is a means by
which the agency delegates its authority to control and direct the employee to the client.
This approach of course would militate against the advantages ofusing labour hire for a
client organisation.
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The legal trend however is finnly in favour of regarding the employer as liable for the
torts of its employee, where it "lends" the services of an employee to another party. At
cornmon law where an employer lends an employee to a third party and that employee
commits a tort while carrying out work for a third party, the employer remains
vicariously liable for the tort of the employee, unless it can be shown that the employee
has become an employee "for the time being" of the third party. The onus ofproving a
transfer of employment rests with the initial employer, and is a "heavy onus which can
only be discharged in quite exceptional circumstances": Deutz Australia Pty Ltd v.
Skilled Engineering Ltd (2001) 162 FLR 173 per Ashley J. at 189.
An earlier authority for the proposition is the English case ofMersey Docks & Harbour
Board v. Coggins & Griffith (Liverpool) Ltd. [1947] AC 1. There the Harbour Board
Authority had hired out a mobile crane and driver to a stevedoring company. Although
the power ofdismissal over the driver remained with the Board, under the general hiring
conditions the driver was to be the employee ofthe hirer.
While operating the crane the driver negligently injured an employee belonging to the
stevedoring company. The Harbour Board argued to no avail that it was not vicariously
liable for the driver's negligence, on the basis that it was not the employer of the driver
at the time of the accident. Notwithstanding the terms of the agreement between the
Board and the hirer company, the House ofLords held that the Board had not succeeded
in satisfying the burden ofproving that a transfer ofemployment had taken place.
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In a later English case ofDenham v. Midland Employers Mutual Assurance Ltd 19552
QB 437, Lord Denning appeared to confuse the issue of vicarious liability with respect
to labour hire when he stated that a transfer of employment "only applies when the
servant is transferred so completely that the temporary employer has the right to dictate,
not only what the servant is to do, but also how he is to do it". This statement seems to
suggest that vicarious liability would be placed on a client organisation under labour
hire.
However Denning's view was opposed by Ashley 1. in the Victorian Supreme Court
case of Deutz Australia Pty Ltd v. Skilled Engineering Ltd (2001) 162 FLR 173. In
commenting on circumstances which are sufficient to shift the responsibility of
vicarious liability from a general to a temporary employer, Ashley 1. declared (at
pp.189-190) that a transfer of vicarious liability occurred apart from other situations
"where it cannot be said that the reason that the worker subjected himself to control of
the so-called temporary employer as to what he did and how he did it was that his
general employer told him to do so". By doing so Ashley J. denied the transfer of
vicarious liability ina labour hire situation.
This view of Ashley J. was backed by the Queensland Law Reform Commission in its
report (at page 55), where it expressed the opinion that while a contract of employment
remained in place between a general employer and an employee the general employer
should remain vicariously liable for the torts of a lent employee, committed in the
course ofhis or her engagement with a third party. Under the Queensland law as it now
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stands an employer (such as a labour hire agency) who "lends out" an employee is to all
intents and purposes vicariously liable for any civil wrong by that employee.
The result is that, in contrast to the standard employment relationship, under labour hire
a client organisation can get the benefit ofwork from a labour hire worker, but does not
carry the risk of vicarious liability nonnally associated with an employment
relationship.
3.7 Anti-Discrimination Legislation and Labour Hire
There would appear to be evidence from the empirical data of this project, that there is a
potential for labour hire to be used to evade the prescriptions against discrimination by
employers in the selection of employees, contained in legislation such as the Anti-
Discrimination Act 1991 (Qld).
Confirmation for this view comes from the Inquiry into Labour Hire Employment in
Victoria Report (2005:36), where it was found from evidence received that ambiguities
raised by labour hire arrangements in the application of Victoria's anti~discrimination
legislation, the Equal Opportunity Act 1995, were an example of the triangular
relationship of labour hire providing avenues for unscrupulous agencies and client
organisations to take advantage of. It was an illustration to the investigating committee
of"labour hire's uneasy fit with laws based on bipartite employment relationships".
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A feature of the labour hire arrangement, as opposed to the common law arrangement,
that emerged from some of the agency field interviews was that client companies
actually were using labour hire to evade the anti-discrimination legislation because it
gave them a way of actually discriminating, that they could not do as a normal
employer. From the information supplied labour hire appears to permit a fOrm of
discrimination by client companies in the selection of candidates, in a way that the legal
employers cannot act. Clients in practice select from a list of candidates prepared by
the agency, who is the legal employer. It would seem that even if an agency has
reservations about a client's intentions the agency protects itself by submitting the list,
and leaving it up to the agency to make a choice of employees. The client in a sense
can discriminate by virtue ofbeing a non-employer, who is not subject to the regulatory
burden on an employer not to discriminate towards potential employees.
While it will appear from the field work evidence that discrimination issue does not
appear to be a major problem in labour hire, it is noted that one labour hire agency
thought that the anti-discrimination laws were a significant factor in why companies use
labour hire. The agency thought that the use of labour hire avoids any potential liability
that may occur normally, where employers discriminate against potential candidates
thought to be inappropriate for a workplace, even though they may have the best
qualifications for the job. As a non-employer a company thus can take advantage ofthe
medium of labour hire to avoid the requirements ofanti-discrimination legislation.
In the agency's view discrimination could arise because a client company could pick
and choose at its discretion, from a group of candidates recommended by an agency. In
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addition agencies tended to be always mindful of the "fit factor" (that is, the person
being compatible with the organisation). It would seem that borderline situations of
unlawful discrimination could occur because of this, in that while an agency and client
may generally be after the most efficient person for the role in question, both parties
have to be mindful whether the person in question can fit in with the rest of the
organisation, given the nature of the employees there. This view was shared by another
labour hire agency: "Why would you put a worker in an environment that you know
that they are not going to be happy in? Sometimes we will challenge the employer by
putting in say a male receptionist. I mean males don't traditionally apply for those
positions".
It would appear that, as in Australia, potential exists in the USA for labour hire to be
used in the evasion of anti-discrimination legislation. This potential is referred to by
Houseman (1998: 1138), who notes that it is often asserted that companies can avoid
liability for discrimination by using agency temporaries and others instead of their own
staff. However she observes that with respect to the engagement of agency workers a
client, along with the staffing firm, may bear some liability for discriminatory behaviour
under USA legislation such as the Americans with Disabilities Act, which prohibits
discrimination in employment on account of disability. The latter Act specifically
prohibits participation by a business in an arrangement that causes discrimination
against a disabled applicant or worker. Thus both a client business and staffing firm can
be liable under the legislation.
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The preceding raises the legal issue of whether in Australia a host organisation in a
labour hire arrangement should be classified as a quasi-employer for anti-discrirhination
purposes. An observation could be made in this respect that a client's involvement in
the discriminatory selection of a candidate could be likened to a situation under the law
of trusts, in that it could be argued that a client company is "intermeddling" in the
contract of employment relationship between the labour hire agency and the labour hire
employee, by improperly carrying out one of the roles of a legal employer, that is, the
role of selecting employees. Just as a person becomes liable as "a trustee de son tort"
by intermeddling in a trust by doing acts characteristic of trustee, so it could be
submitted that a client company should incur liability for doing acts characteristic of an
employer in a labour hire situation, such as the selection of employees and exercising
direct control and supervision over the employees, even though it is not the legal
employer.
3.8 Labour hire and coverage by industrial instruments
One issue at the heart of labour hire is how labour hire workers should be treated in
terms of remuneration and work conditions, compared to the workers they work side by
side with. Questions of fairness can arise if labour hire employees are doing the same
work, but are getting paid less (say at an award rate), after taking into account casual
loadings) than their permanent counterparts, and are denied other higher benefits of a
collectively negotiated labour agreement of the host business. Such a practice creates
two classes ofworkers in respect ofthe same work.
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Evidence was supplied to the Commonwealth House of Representatives Inquiry
(2005:169), that a major reason for the growth of labour hire was the ability that it
provided to undercut industrial agreements, that is the awards or certified agreements
applying to a host company. Labour hire agencies can provide inferior wages and
conditions compared to the site rates, while essentially the same work is being carried
out.
An industrial issue which arises from this then is whether labour hire workers should be
paid "site" wages, and enjoy the same "site" entitlements as far as possible, as provided
to permanent workers on the site. The practical problem with this, however, for the
other parties to the labour hire arrangement is that, if agencies are forced into site
awards or enterprise agreements, then a client could be charged more for the service,
and in this wayan agency could lose business. Because a labour hire agency is not the
employer at the site or enterprise, it is unlikely to be legally subject to site awards
and/or the conditions of collective agreements for that site. The Labour Council ofNew
South Wales in this regard brought to the attention of the New South Wales Labour Hire
Task Force, the situations where flight attendants employed by awell known labour hire
agency work side by side with employees ofthe Qantas airline, but for lower rates.
A key issue then in light of the foregoing (as considered by the New South Wales
Labour Hire Task Force 2001) is "the desirability of facilitating industrial instruments
for the labour hire industry, or of applying the prevailing conditions of the host
employer to labour hire workers". On this issue the Task Force itself (p.75) could not
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reach any consensus, but at the same time expressed sympathy for the view of unions
that payment ofhost company rates for labour hire workers ''promotes fair .and equitable
outcomes, consistent with the objects ofthe Industrial Relations Act 1996".
As noted by Bernstein (2004:56), there have been attempts by Australian unions in the
federal sphere to obtain awards binding client companies of labour hire agencies, so as
to obtain greater security for labour hire employees. For this to occur, the Australian
Industrial Relations Commission (AIRC) had to make a finding of an industrial dispute
as to matters that pertained to the employment relationship, before it could attempt to
resolve the matter by various means such as award regulation. The issue for decision
was whether a client company (a non-employer) could be a party to such a dispute. On
a few occasions the AIRC has held that this could be the case.2
In CPSU (the Community and Public Sector Union) v. DFP Recruitment Services Pty
Ltd and Another (pR933447, unreported, 25 June 2003, Smith C) a dispute was held to
have existed between the CPSU, Telstra and a labour hire company known as Dorothy
Farmer. In the case the labour hire company employed call centre workers, who were
hired out to Telstra at its Ballarat call centre. The workers were advised that, as a result
of a decision by Telstra, their hours of work were to change from daytime to night and
weekend times. Non-agreement to this change would lead to termination of
employment. Commissioner Smith, in dismissing an application by Telstra to cancel a
finding of dispute with it, stressed ''the underlying influence of control exercised by the
non-employer". He noted in particular that "the contract which the employee is
2 However it should be noted that labour hire restrictions are now explicitly NOT allowable award
matters. In particular see Workplace Relations Act 1996 (Cth) s.515(1)(h).
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required to sign with Dorothy Farmer makes the control by Telstra, in relation to .skills
required, work practices and remuneration, clear".
It Was claimed by the Queensland Government before the Commonwealth House of
Representatives Inquiry (2005:138), that very few labour hire employees were covered
by enterprise bargaining agreements, and that most were only covered by basic awards.
Further one union at the inquiry argued that being in labour hire employment was not
conducive to enterprise bargaining, as labour hire employees being invariably
temporary employees were in a weak bargaining position.
One way of providing site coverage to labour hire workers, at least in Queensland,
could be by way of a "common rule" award, which applies to anyone working in an
industry, and is not restricted to locality or respondents. Such an award would apply
throughout Queensland, and would provide for minimum conditions. A general
example of this type of award would be the Clerical Award (Q). It would seem too in
other States wages and conditions applying to all clerical employees have been .set by
State based common rule awards (Australian Services Union submission to the Inquiry
into Labour Hire Employment in Victoria). A result of this type of award would be that
clerical work performed through labour hire companies would have to be paid at the
same rate as that ofother clerical work generally. However it needs to be conceded that
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since 1996 a corporate employer could avoid the application of such an award by
entering into federal certified agreements or AWAs.3
Another way awards have been used to restrict the use of labour hire arrangements is by
having provisions (such as in the Fresh Start Bakeries Australia Pty Limited (NSW)
Enterprise Award, 2004) limiting the length of placement of labour hire workers. An
award also may specifically provide that labour hire employees are to receive the same
rate as permanent employees. For instance a Federal award involving the
Commonwealth Bank of Australia (CBA), Adecco (a leading labour hire company) and
the Finance Sector Union, prescribed the same pay rate for casual labour hire staffas for
CBA employees, plus a 25% casual loading.
Unions also have tried to cater for labour hire workers by seeking provisions in certified
agreements with host companies that ensure, in addition to consultation and agreement
over the use of labour hire, that labour hire workers enjoy the same wages and
conditions as the employees of the host companies. The Australian Services Union in
its submission above indicated that this approach had been a practice of the union.
However this would seem to be no guarantee ofequal pay for equal work for labour hire
workers. Hall (2002:7) refers to case studies presented to the New South Wales Labour
Hire Task Force by the AMWU (Australian Manufacturing Workers Union) which
revealed, apart from failures to pay according to the appropriate award classification
and to casual loadings, failure to pay site rates to labour hire workers, where it was a
condition of an enterprise bargaining agreement. In any event, it would seem that in
3 In particular the manner that the "no-disadvantage test" applicable at the time was administered allowed
erosion ofsome award conditions.
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future specific clauses in collective agreements about labour hire would be ineffective,
as the Commonwealth Work Choices legislation (which prima facie at present would
override State legislation) forbids conditions regarding the use of labour hire in
enterprise agreements, (such as those restricting the use of labour hire as for example in
the Queensland Public Health Sector Certified Agreement (No.4) 20004).
As noted there have been some specific collective agreements relating to labour hire in
Australia. These have usually been struck in areas where unions have possessed a
certain level of industrial strength, such as the construction industry in Victoria. The
Labor Council of New South Wales in its submission to the New South Wales Labour
Hire Task Force (p.28) referred to one union, the TWU (Transport Workers Union)
having 15 registered agreements with labour hire firms (large and medium) operating in
the transport industry, because of the increasing use of labour hire in the industry. One
aim of the agreements is that labour hire workers are paid the greater of the site or
award rate applicable to site workers. One specific agreement ofnote was registered in
1999 between Adecco (a very large international labour hire company) and the
Australian Services Union, which provided for the conditions of supplementary clerical
workers supplied by the company to its clients in New South Wales and the Australian
Capital Territory. This covered a number of work issues, such as pay, OHS, dispute
settling procedures and so on.
4 Ironically the Queensland Public Health Sector CA may be one which is exempt from the impact of
Work Choices, so long as it applies to Queensland government employees.
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This chapter provides an analysis of legal issues or anomalies relating to labour hire
which have arisen in Australian case law, or are affected by legislation. The analysis
gives support to and is consistent with the theoretical contentions outlined at the
beginning of the thesis, about the uneasy fit of common law employment principles to
labour hire, and the relationship between increased regulation of standard employment
and the rise of labour hire.
Australian cases are referred to show that there is scope for confusion about and
blurring ofthe legal obligations of a labour hire agency and ofa client, on issues such as
the identity of the employer in labour hire situations, vicarious liability for the actions of
workers, and liability under workplace health and safety, unfair dismissal and anti-
discrimination legislation. As well the problematic nature of industrial coverage is
highlighted. The disputations as to liability between agency and client in the cases
referred to, and the apparent attempts to evade employer responsibilities, tend to add
weight to the argument about the attraction of labour hire to organisations, in that labour
hire allows the devolving ofrisks associated with direct employment.
In this chapter it is shown in particular that, because the special tripartite nature of
labour hire involves the splitting of the standard employment responsibilities (such as
for example the day to day control of a worker) between agency and client, the use of
labour hire has been problematic from a legal (and practical) point of view as regards
allocation of risk and responsibility. One result of this is that courts at various times
have been confronted with difficulties, as to where liability should lie in different labour
hire situations.
96
Chapter Three
Tensions with Traditional Principles
Tensions are thus shown to exist between the concept of labour hire and present legal
principles, which were designed for application to the standard employment situation,
based on the existence ofonly two parties.
In conclusion a review of the analytical insights of this chapter will be undertaken in the
concluding chapter.
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Regulatory impact on the
standard employment
relationship
4.1 . Introduction
The area of employment is but another example of how legal regulation of an area of
human activity can have an impact that has unintended or collateral consequences, in
this case, the development of labour hire.
This chapter critically reVIews American and Canadian literature that deals with
regulatory impact on the standard employment relationship, with its attendant
consequences of added costs and obligations on employers. The conclusion drawn from
the literature is that legal regulation of the standard employment contract has had the
effect, from an employer point of view, of adding further costs and obligations on
employers. As a consequence, employers in the USA have incentives to go to less
regulated or unregulated labour markets .such as labour hire, which offer the prospect of
potentially cheaper labour costs overall and, more importantly, actual or perceived
avoidance of the health and safety, workers' compensation and unfair dismissal
obligations ofan employer.
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The chapter begins with an overview of theories ofregulation, with particular reference
to some general propositions on the effects of regulation. It then moves to particular
theories from the United States (US) and Canada about why employers there are
attracted to using secondary labour markets like labour hire. It ends with descriptions of
empirical studies explaining why US employers use contingent work arrangements.
4.2 Spillover effects of regulation
Various theories have been advanced as to the rationale for the existence of regulation.
For instance according to Rosner (1974: 335, 336) under the "public interest theory"
regulation is a mechanism used in response to public demand to set right or counteract
inefficient or unfair market practices. In this way regulation is justified which imposes
minimum wage levels or occupational licensing. According to Jordan (1972: 154, 176)
however the actual result ofregulation ofvarious areas has been to protect the producers
rather than the consumers, on issues such as price levels.
By way of contrast the economic theory ofregulation introduced by Stigler (1972:3-21)
argues that economic regulation exists to serve interest groups in society, such as labour
or business organisations. Any resultant regulation as a result of their pressures is
intended to confer an economic gain of those groups. The value of the theory lies in
identifying who gains and who loses from regulation. Where entry to an area of
economic activity is unregulated, a result may be over competition and too many
failures amongst competitors.
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Rather than being concerned with theories of regulation per se, this thesis specifically
focuses and builds on the issue of the "spillover" (or unintended) consequen,ces of
regulation. In particular a review of the relevant literature on these consequences now
follows.
Makkai and Braithwaite (1993: 272, 285), in looking at the compliance costs of
conforming to Australian nursing home regulation, reach a predictable conclusion that
the anticipated costs of conforming to regulation is a likely indicator of the extent of
future compliance to that law by management of nursing homes, that is, there is data
that suggests that growing anticipated regulatory costs will cause a corresponding fall in
regulatory compliance.
The authors analysed data, on the costs ofnursing home compliance with regulation, to
test the hypothesis earlier suggested by Viscusi and Zeckhauser (1979: 437-456), that
the higher compliance costs are, the lower the level of compliance will be with
regulatory standards. Data on over four hundred nursing homes in Australia constituted
the basis for the analysis.
Makkai and Braithwaite also discovered (1993: 281) from analysis ofdata that there is a
connection between compliance and a view that the regulated standards are proper in
the sense of worth having, practical or fair, and the likelihood of punishment for non-
compliance. Makkai and Braithewaite (1991: 191-200) have demonstrated elsewhere
that a belief that regulatory standards are proper and reasonable is important in securing
voluntary compliance. They note that longstanding business studies indicate that
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voluntary compliance with regulation is hard to obtain, where industry does not
consider the standards to be beneficial, achievable or fair. Makkai and Braithwaite, in
reaching their conclusion that the estimated cost of compliance provides a meaningful
gauge as to the likelihood of subsequent compliance, highlight their earlier reference
(1993: 272) to the possibility that imposing a more stringent safety standard might have
a reverse consequence.
Grabosky (1995: 351) makes the point that "A common outcome ofregulatory policy is
the tendency for non-compliance to be displaced into other areas within or beyond a
regulatory jurisdiction or policy demand". To him this situation would yet be another
example of a regulatory initiative having an unintended consequence or creating
collateral damage. He, for example, notes that industries in practice move to areas that
have less stringent environmental and health and safety obligations. Grabosky's interest
in regulation (1995: 347-369) is to show that it can have objectionable and unintended
consequences, and that these can be reduced through knowledge and analysis of prior
counterproductive regulation.
Various examples of regulation are referred to as having counter-productive effects.
This includes "escalation" (strict regulation of new risks increasing existing risks, such
as new costly emission controls in new vehicles causing motorists to hold on to their
older "dirty" vehicles); "creative adaption" (stringent regulation evoking a sophisticated
avoidance culture, such as in the circumvention of taxation); and "perverse incentives"
(where for example the offering of rebates on waste might provide incentives for the
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greater production of waste, thus having the potential of worsening the problem
regulated against).
However, the two forms of examples of most interest to the writer are the
"displacement" and "spill over" effects. A result of regulation is for the movement of
regulated activities and industries to other areas or jurisdictions, so as to escape the
regulation. In this way environmental, health and safety risks associated with industry
may be transferred to less regulated areas. Businesses may move their operations to
another state, where the level ofregulation is more favourable to them (Macaulay, 1993:
263). A consequence may be that the displaced activity has a more deleterious effect
than the original activity. For instance less rigorous standards in another state may lead
to greater pollution emissions. Displacement also occurs where a substance is
substituted for a banned substance. It may be that the new substance also has a harmful
impact (Whipple 1985: 37-44). Andrews (1993: 529) refers to the banning ofDDT out
of concern for wildlife, which led to substitute pesticides more sharply toxic for
agricultural workers.
There can be a spill over effect from regulation in that the regulatory burden can be
shifted on to or shared by others other than the targeted group (Fisse and Braithwaite:
187-189). Minimum wage legislation for instance may benefit those in work, but
reduce the prospects of work for those who are unemployed (Sunstein, 1990: 430).
Downs (1973) has noted that hard line enforcement of building codes subsequently
caused a shortage of rental premises. In the employment area, policies to dissuade
employers from employing illegal immigrants, through the imposition of penalties on
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employers, may have the effect that employers are loathe to employ people from certain
ethnic backgrounds, thus causing discrimination. Objectives under the polices to
preserve the employment prospects of citizens may thus have an undesirable or
unintended consequence (Grabosky, 1995: 353).
Grabosky demonstrates that in this situation the persuasive aim. of safeguarding the
employment prospects for normal workers may cause harm to the employment
prospects of immigrants generally. Grabosky concludes (1995: 364-365) that a strict
analysis of regulatory policy is needed to foresee the negative ramifications of
regulation, so as to prevent or greatly reduce their effect. This will result in better
regulation.
4.3 The effects of labour regulation
4.3.1 Development of dual labour markets
Some argue that the regulatory impact of prescribed obligations on employers has
created a dual labour market, that is, a labour market divided into a primary sector with
better jobs and a secondary market with lower wages and benefits (for example,
Wachter and Wright, 1990 : 240-262). The primary sector is made up of large
organisations providing training, high wages and benefits, while the secondary sector
consists ofbodies offering low wages and prospects to their workforces.
Incentives arise for employers to go to the less regulated or unregulated secondary
labour market, incorporating labour hire, which offers the prospect of decreasing or
103
Chapter Four
Regulatory impact on the standard employmentrelationship
shifting labour costs and obligations. The situation is thus an example of regulatory
burden causing employers to seek aD. escape from that burden.
Rabin-Margalioth (2003: 311-314) argues that increasing prescribed obligations on
employers in favour of employees have encouraged "dual labour markets". She
acknowledges that the concept of a dual labour market is not novel, and she observes
that the operation of a primary labour market and also that of a secondary labour market
has been acknowledged (Wachter and Wright, 1990: 240-262; Ehrenberg and Smith,
2000: 396-412).
According to Wachter and Wright (1990: 243) the defining feature of the primary
labour market is that firms and workers absorb significant investment costs, which
promotes the continuance of their relationship. On the other hand, the external
secondary labour market provides a reference point or gauge for the internal labour
market, in supplying an alternative source of employment for workers, and an
alternative supply of labour for firms. Previously it was assumed by researchers that
labour market employment practices were the result of market forces, and not of
regulation (Wachter and Wright, 1990a: 240-242).
Rabin-Margalioth argues that the increasing obligations created by legislation and the
courts that employers owe to employees, which are described as "mandated employee
benefits" or "mandates", force co-existing labour markets onto the parties participating
in the labour market i.e. external secondary labour markets operating alongside core or
primary labour markets.
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Mandated employee benefits have not been accepted voluntarily by the parties, and are
invariably non-avoidable in that the parties (employer and employee) cannot contract
out of them. The benefits are any type of compulsory non-wage recompense required
by regulation. These cover benefits such as workers' compensation, occupational health
and safety standards, antidiscrimination prohibitions and protection from unjust
dismissal (Rabin-Margalioth' 2003: 314-315). Regulation can arise either from
legislation or the decisions ofthe courts.
4.3.2 Development of the implied contract theory by US courts
There is argument that there is a definite connection between the adoption of one
mandate, the implied contract exception to the employment at will doctrine by US
courts supporting permanent tenure, and the growth in the temporary help industry
(which includes labour hire). This is a situation that fits weU with the dual market
theory (Rabin-Margalioth, 2003: 336).
The implied contract theory is one ofthree judicial exceptions to the employment at will
doctrine, which has operated generally in the US (the other two being the public policy
exception and the covenant of good faith and fair dealing exception). The judicial
exceptions, which represent a form of judicial regulation, aim to prevent wrongful
terminations.
The employment at will doctrine operating in the US since the last halfofthe nineteenth
century is to the effect that, where an employee enters an employment contract which is
not in writing and is for an indefinite duration, an employee can be fired by an employer
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for good cause, bad cause or no cause at all (Muhl, 2001: 3-12). This doctrine is based
on the view by US courts that employers and employees had equal bargaining power in
an employer relationship. The parties thus can agree to an employment contract for a
specified period. Where however no period is set out, because employees can resign at
their discretion, employers can dismiss employees at their will or discretion.
Under the implied contract exception representations made by an employer .about job
security and disciplinary and dismissal procedures, that are contained in oral statements,
company handbooks and other sources, are regarded by courts as contractually binding.
The implied contract exception is recognised in thirty-eight of the fifty US States (Muhl,
2001: 7-10).
4.3.3 Redistribution of labour costs because of regulation
Mandated benefits create added labour costs for employers. With respect to the unjust
dismissal protection for instance, Lee (1996: 549) argues that the limitations placed on
dismissing permanent workers have placed much greater costs on employers than the
direct costs of defending wrongful dismissal claims. Wrongful dismissal claims are not
common, and their costs comprise only 0.1 per cent of total wage costs (Dertouzos and
Karoly, 1992: xiii). However, indirect costs are incurred to guard against the likelihood
of litigation. There are costs incurred in keeping on workers whose work standard
warrants dismissal. Additional costs are incurred in vetting candidates to ensure that
unsuitable persons are not hired.
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As employers cannot avoid the fixed mandated benefits costs which increase their
labour costs in the primary labour markets, they have a tendency to pass on these costs
to the external labour market. If the imposition of mandated benefits results in the
movement of employment from one labour market to another, then the regulatory
process per se is helping to create a relocation ofjobs between the two labour markets.
This relocation results in the secondary market employees suffering as a consequence of
the requirement to provide mandated benefits to standard or core employees. For
example, their wages and/or benefits are being lowered to cover the costs of the
mandates (Rabin-Margalioth, 2003: 314-315,323)
Rabin-Margalioth notes (2003: 340) that, while employers could reduce the wages of
standard employees, employers refrain from doing so for the sake of work morale and
productivity. Downward wage inflexibility in the internal or primary labour market
influences employers to shift benefit costs onto the parties in the external or secondary
labour market. Because of high changeover and use of part-time workers, lack of
contact between workers makes wage equity in the secondary market less significant
than it is in the primary market (Bewley, 1999: 326-327).
In the primary labour market workers enjoy relative stability and higher wages and
benefits, while in the secondary labour market workers have lower wages and benefits
(Rabin-Margalioth, 2003: 323). Doeringer and Piore (1971: 165) emphasise that a
partitioned labour market leads to unfairness. In their view workers in secondary
markets (such as labour hire), as opposed to workers in the primary labour market, are
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likely to experience worse working conditions, less benefits, reduced prospects for
promotion, less employment protections, and less settled work histories.
The existence of mandated benefits arrangements strengthen the operation of dual
labour market operations, under which employees, who are not covered by the
mandated benefits, are partly subsidising, through lower wages and/or benefits, the costs
ofproviding these benefits to those employees who are covered. This in tum reinforces
the disparities in reward for work between the two groups of employees (Rabin-
Margalioth, 2003: 344). Using non-standard employment arrangements, especially
temporary agency employees (labour hire workers) and contract workers, may allow
management to reduce wages for those employees with little negative effect on the
morale ofprimary employees (Abraham and Taylor: 1996: 394,397).
These preceding views are in line with the ideas of Jolls (2000: 248-249; 270-271), that
employers who are prevented (even though they may have the incentive to do so), from
altering wages and/or their demand for groups of employees receiving special benefits
("targeted group members"), are required to spread the costs of the benefits across all
their employees. The special benefits are referred to by Jolls as "accommodation
mandates" or "targeted mandates", and include protections such as workers'
compensation and antidiscrimination statutory prohibitions. The result of conferring
these benefits (in addition to reinforcing separation of the different groups of workers)
is that all the workforce is forced to bear the cost of the benefits, even though only the
accommodated groups of employees are enjoying the special benefits.
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Several studies (Miles, 2000: 74; Autor, 2000: Autor, Donohue and Schwab, 2002)
support the view that use of temporary help agency workers has increased, because
these workers are not considered to be affected by the judicial mandate and thus are
unable to seek judicial remedies for loss of employment because of the employment at
will doctrine. Autor (2000; 2003: 3) calculates that twenty per cent of the growth of the
temporary help supply employment between 1973-1995 (i.e. a rise of half a million
workers) has been caused through the implementation of the implied contract theory in
the US. The process also explains the 365,000-530,000 additional workers in the US
temporary help services industry (TRS) employed daily as of 2000. At the same time,
the growth of temporary help employment has been five times that of employment
overall.
Autor's study (2003: 1-42) refers to empirical analyses, such as those by Morriss (1995:
999-1148) and Autor, Donohue and Schwab (2001), who examine the effects of unjust
dismissal principles on employment numbers and patterns. His study estimates the
effect of the unjust dismissal doctrine on employment outsourcing, particularly
temporary staffing (labour hire). In coming to the conclusions mentioned, he reaches
what he considers an "ironic" finding (2003: 32), that judicial attempts to shield workers
from unjust dismissal have promoted the development oftemporary employment, where
there is less job security and lower wages than in regular employment.
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4.3.4 Effect of regulation on the US temporary help (labour hire) market
Peck and Theodore (2002a: 151-152) argue that the temporary help (labour hire)
employment market is a product of regulation to a large degree. Its existence is linked
to the more regulated labour markets, and it is revealing that it is more likely to occur in
more regulated working environments, where benefits for regular employees are
considerable and where termination of employment by managerial prerogative is
substantially limited (Mangum, Mayall and Nelson, 1985: 599-611; Kalleberg and
Reynolds, 2000). Peak and Theodore posit (2002b: 465), that the regulatory costs,
related to what they call "mainstream" employment, draws more employers into using
the temporary staffing option.
Peck and Theodore point out (2002a: 158) that, because temporary (or labour hire)
workers are, in the eyes of the law, under the triangular employment relationship of
labour hire discussed earlier, employees of the temporary staffing agencies and not
those of the client firms to which they are sent to work, numerous employment
protections operating under US law can be avoided by a client firm, which is released
from the obligations connected with engaging permanent employees.
According to Rabin-Margalioth (2003: 336) the perceived increase of the temporary
help industry arising from the implementation of the implied contract exception sits
comfortably with the dual market theory. Employer organisations will be inclined to
engage temporary help or agency employees, as they are less likely to seek employment
protection through the courts .and thus increase firing costs. This is because courts have
shown themselves on numerous occasions to be reluctant to invoke the benefit of the
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judicial exceptions to the employment at will doctrine for contingent workers, such as
the employees oftemporary help agencies (Berger, 1997: 1, 8, 28-35).
Peck and Theodore argue further (2002a: 152) that the basis of the temp industry would
be weakened by a totally deregulated labour market, as then the less regulated
employment circumstances applicable to the temp sector would be readily obtainable
for employers. Lips (1998: 39) concludes that since temporary staffing enables
businesses to utilise the services ofworkers without adopting the legal role ofemployer,
temporary staffing assists businesses to evade the negative aspects of the present
regulation of the standard employment contract. Accordingly, in his view, one way to
dampen any increase in temp staffing, instead of regulating the industry, would be to
free the standard employment relationship from regulation. In his view regulations
Hraise the costs of employment for businesses and, therefore, encourage the use ofthird-
party staffing companies" (1998: 33).
Gonos (1997: 86; 1998) contends that the avenue provided through temporary help
work to avoid the regulatory costs and legal obligations ofregular employment is at the
heart of accounting for the heavy increase in temporary employment since the 1970s.
He points out (1997: 85, 86) that the main purpose behind using the temporary work
(labour hire) arrangement is to break the employer-employee relationship between
workers and the client organisations, at whose workplaces they perform services. Thus
the client bodies can use their labour but escape from the increasing regulatory or legal
obligations placed on an employer.
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Allan points out (2002: 105) that, in particular, with respect to small business, some
businesses are reluctant to deal with recruitment, workers' benefits, workers'
compensation and unemployment insurance claims, and transfer those functions for a
fee to temporary staffing agencies, who may achieve cost savings through economies of
scale.
Allan observes however that employer hopes about cost savings may not necessarily
eventuate, because employers usually do not have information (such as on training
costs) on the performance and cost-effectiveness of contingent workers (Barker and
Christensen, 1998). Should employers ever doubt the cost advantages of using
contingent workers, they are likely to cut back or abstain from using these workers.
Allan, nevertheless, earlier notes, however, (2002: 103) that the contingent workforce is
a large and significant part of the US workforce. There are predictions that the
temporary workforce will increase at a faster rate than the permanent workforce in
coming years (Feder, 1995: 37).
In light of the foregoing the use of temporary (labour hire) workers in the US
accordingly appears to represent an effective way for organisations to shift work from
the primary or core labour market into the secondary labour market.
4.4 Contractualisation of employment arrangements as a reaction to regnlation
4.4.1 Theory of contractualisation of employment arrangements
On the issue of regulation of employment relations, Trudeau (2003: 137-160) argues
that there is a trend in North America (the US and Canada) towards a return to
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individual freedom of contract principles and sanctioned negotiation between labour and
management, with reduced government intervention. Trudeau argues that contractual
solutions are being used in North America to evade regulation. In his view two factors
in particular are responsible for this trend.
The first factor is a shift in the balance of power between labour and management, in
favour of employers. This is due in large measure to their greater capacity to lobby and
influence government to adopt pro-business policies, by arguments that international
market pressures require greater flexibility in local labour markets to create
competitiveness and encourage foreign investment.
The second factor is that the State has lost its authority to be the only source for
regulation (Arthurs, 1996: 1-45). The complex nature of matters to be regulated (for
instance balancing concerns for competitiveness and employment growth) and the need
to gain acceptance and co-operation requires the State to involve labour and employers
into the development and carrying out of policy, for example, labour training and
occupational safety issues.
This process is called "the contractualisation of labour relations law". Employment
issues, which were previously controlled by legislation and the courts, are now allowed
to be dealt with by negotiation between labour and management, or by the individual
contract ofemployment.
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The process can be regarded as a turning back from the way in which labour law has
developed (Trudeau, 2003: 137-138). Labour law was developed by removing features
of the contract of employment relationship and having them controlled by mandatory
legislative requirements or conditions. Trudeau posits that contractualisation works in
the opposite way. Matters formerly regulated by law are now transferred into the
contractual domain. For example employers and unions are now pennitted to negotiate
the content of legal mandates.
Supiot (2002: 25) remarks that "The object of negotiation is thus to lay down the law
and the only object of the law is to give legal force to an agreement". In Supiot's
opinion the State lays down general aims in law but leaves it to labour and management
to carry out these objectives. More sharply contractualisation may indicate that an
employment issue is removed from legal regulation and left to individual freedom of
contract principles. The general effect is that contractualisation gives the market
primacy before the law.
It is argued that there must be a change in the regulation of employment relationships at
workplace level. Because now a lesser number ofworkers conform to the paradigm ofa
full time permanent worker with one employer, because more are self-employed or
temporary workers, a new regulatory system is needed to deal with the different
employment relationships that have arisen (Lowe, 2002: 93-104).
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4.4.2 Regulation of labour law in North America
Collective bargaining (recognised negotiations between employers and unions) has been
the fundamental method of regulation of the employment relationship in the United
States and Canada. In Canada, apart from federal control over special activities, the
provinces have jurisdiction over labour relations, in contrast to the US where the
jurisdiction is federal (Trudeau, 2003: 138, 139). Labour law is in fact quite similar
across the Canadian provinces (Carter, England, Etherington and Trudeau, 2001).
Canadian labour law has its foundations in the framework laid down in the US by the
1935 Wagner Act (Arthurs, 1996: 36).
Unlike the position in Europe, the North American collective agreement
comprehensively deals with all the terms and conditions of employment (eg wages,
holidays, employee rights and benefits such as seniority rights, hours of work, job
security and management rights such as the right to discipline a worker). Importantly,
an individual contract of employment between and employer and an employee cannot
contain terms at variance with the terms at negotiated in the relevant collective
agreement.
In North America, collective bargaining only takes place between management and
unions certified to represent particular groups of workers. It does not apply to a whole
industry, but only a single employer or enterprise. Where workers are not so
represented, their employee interests are governed by the common law dealing with the
individual contract ofemployment.
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Collective bargaining was primarily directed to the traditional fulltime employee
working for large businesses in the primary and manufacturing sectors under the. direct
supervision of an employer on the latter's premises (Gunderson and Riddell, 2000).
Because of lack of union coverage, collective bargaining has never applied to the
majority ofworkers, and the number of employees covered by collective bargaining has
been steadily falling. For example, the percentage ofprivate sector employees covered
by collective agreements (because they are unionised) in the US has gone from almost
40% in the 1950s (Weiler 1993: 84) to less than 10% in 2001 (Girard 2002: 4), with the
overall percentage ofUS workers covered being about 15% today.
Similarly, in Canada there has been a slide in the number of private sector workers
covered by collective agreements because they are unionised, from a high of 38.8% in
1984 (Kumar 1993: 12-13). Girard reports (2002: 3-4) that overall coverage in Canada,
apart from Quebec, was 32% in 2001, with an 18% rate in the private sector. The
corresponding figures for Quebec were 40.7% overall, and 27.9% in the private sector.
4.4.3 Indirect or "passive" contractualisation of labour law
It is argued that individual employment law is being subjected to "passive
contractualisation", because of the considerable change in the composition ofthe labour
market (Trudeau, 2003: 146). As with collective labour relations law, the influence of
individual employment law is reduced by the movement towards self-employment,
which will remain the case while the protection of labour law is only relevant for
employed workers (Trudeau, 2002).
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Workers in North America, whose interests are not represented by a certified union,
cannot avail themselves of the advantages of collective bargaining and must rely on the
common law (in Quebec the civil law), with its freedom of contract rules. This shift
from collective bargaining to the individual contract of employment should be viewed
as leading to a type of contractualisation ofthe law (Trudeau, 2003: 140).
Unionisation has declined due to a number of factors. For example, there is the failure
of labour law to keep up with the structural changes going on in labour markets, such as
the considerable rise in non-standard or atypical jobs, which includes part-time work,
temporary work (of which labour hire is a form) or independent contracting. Other
factors are the introduction of new production and management methods (such as the
just-in-time ordering of supplies) and information technologies, and the changing of the
American and Canadian economies from those based on manufacturing industries to
service industries.
4.4.4 Direct or "active" contractualisation of labour law
In the US and Canada overall the legal rules relating to the individual contract of
employment are based on the common law. The employment relationship arises from
an individual employment contract subject to general contract principles. There are an
increasing number of laws imposing compulsory employment conditions, that limit the
freedom to contract.
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Nonetheless, features of individual employment law have been contractualised in recent
times, with the Quebec experience being an example of this. There have been separate
cases of contractualisation there, which in totality are important. Some mandatory rules
have been dispensed with, while at the same time employment laws have been passed
setting out broad objectives, but leaving it to the parties to determine how these are
carried out or negotiated (Trudeau, 2003: 145-148).
Reference is made by Trudeau to non-unionised workers who were affected by
legislative amendments in 1996, which removed the benefit of mandatory industry
conditions established by government decree (such as in the clothing industry). The
result is that those workers now have to rely on the conditions of an individual
employment contract, and the minimum legislative standards under the Act respecting
Labour Standards. This can be regarded as an obvious case of contractualisation.
Governments in the United States and Canada have contributed actively to the trend
towards contractualisation of the law. An example is cited by Trudeau of the amending
of the Labour Code in 1994 in Quebec to end the three-year maximum period of
collective agreements, which comprehensively cover the mandatory terms and
conditions of workers (Trudeau: 2003, 142). This would mean in practice that, if the
duration of collective agreements are extended, then it normally will be longer before
the conditions ofemployment in the agreements can be renegotiated.
There is employer sentiment that longer agreements aided workplace stability, better
scope for planning and labour costs restraint. Labour unions saw them as a direct threat
118
Chapter Four
Regulatory impact on the standard employment relationship
to their negotiating powers, .and a worsening of employment conditions, which would
lead to a fall in the quality ofemployment conditions negotiated and union support.
The legislative move by the Quebec government results in a kind of contractualisation
of labour law, in that an important feature of the collective bargaining system (the
duration of collective agreements) is no longer regulated by government, but left to the
discretion of the parties in the agreement. The trend to contractualisation can be seen
also in the actions of the Quebec government in delegating powers to employers and
unions (in the form of an Occupational Health and Safety Commission) to determine the
detail in occupational health and safety regulations through consultative processes
(Trudeau, 2003: 148-152).
A somewhat similar approach has been adopted with respect to employment training,
with the setting up of a Labour Market Partners Commission, where representatives of
labour and employers help to determine manpower needs and objectives, and how
training funds are to be spent. In this way, government lays down general objectives by
an Act and leaves it to unions and management to work out how to achieve objectives.
Labour law is seen as leading towards contractualisation and the move towards
contractualisation of labour law has been argued to be not a form of de-regulation of
industrial relations, but as a form of "re-regulation" of industrial relations. The move
has come about through the inability of the State to adjust labour law to the new labour
market, and a shift in the balance ofpower to employers, at the expense of labour. Also
119
Chapter Four
Regulatory impact on the standard employment relationship
the complicated nature of labour issues calls for the State to involve labour and
management in dealing with such matters. The result is that matters formerly the
subject of State intervention now are placed under the influence or control of labour and
management, or left to individual freedom ofcontract (Trudeau, 2003: 152-154).
Whether the developments outlined by Trudeau can be described as re-regulation or de-
regulation, it is considered that the developments are really attempts to evade the
previous system or systems of regulation that existed. Increasing regulation means that
employers will look to solutions like contractualisation.
It could be argued that the greater the exercise of contractualisation in the primary or
traditional labour market, the less incentive there is for the use of labour hire. Where in
the estimation of employers there is a flexible contracting system for them in the
primary or main employment market, there is less need for them to seek greater
purported flexibility through the use of labour hire, which is really a different form of
contractualisation.
Contractualisation implies a greater freedom through the terms and conditions of the
employment relationship, which is the same thing that is achieved through the use of
labour hire agencies. Under a labour hire arrangement, substantial freedom or
flexibility is obtained by a client company in the use of labour, in that instead of being
concerned with a regulated employment relationship, essentially all the hiring client
company has to worry about (apart from occupational health and safety issues) is
contracting with the labour hire agency.
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In light of the preceding, it could be argued that increasing regulation is likely to result
in companies looking to contractualisation. The view could be taken that
contractualisation and labour hire in particular are two procedures for evading
regulation, and being involved in deregulation. Contractualisation then is actually
another example of how people are adopting different processes to avoid regulation.
Labour hire in particular is a special or different form of contractualisation, where the
staffing agency and client organisations essentially control the relationships through
their contracting with one another.
4.5 Empirical studies on the effects of regulation on US labour markets
4.5.1 Houseman stUdy
Houseman (200I) sets out the results of a large US survey on why employers use
flexible staffing arrangements and in particular agency temporaries.
Houseman presents the findings of a nationwide survey of private sector employers in
the US, sponsored by the Upjohn Institute for Employment Research, into the extent of
use of flexible staffing arrangements by employers, and the reasons why they are used.
The purpose of Houseman's study is to explain why employers use contingent or
flexible staffing arrangements. The investigation in this thesis has a similar objective,
that is, why employers are motivated to use contingent working arrangements in the
form of labour hire. This thesis also studies how labour hire arrangements presently
121
Chapter Four
Regulatory impact on the standard employment relationship
operate and are regulated in Australia. There are no previous surveys of this nature
done in Queensland and the writer is doing the first Queensland survey.
The survey that Houseman refers to was conducted in the form of a nationwide
telephone survey by the Kercher Center for Social Research at Western Michigan
University in July and August 1996. A random representative sample consisting of 550
mostly private sector employers was selected, and the employers were questioned on
whether they used five flexible staffing arrangements: temporary agency (or labour hire)
workers, short-term hires (persons employed directly by an organisation for a limited
period), regular part-time workers, on-call workers (persons called to work only as
needed), and contract workers.
The sample group of employers were taken from an extensive list kept by the American
Business Information Inc (ABI). The sample covered establishments with widely
ranging employee levels from less than ten to five hundred or more, with the proportion
of different sized establishments representative of the number of those establishments
generally. About half of the people contacted (such as human resources managers and
owners) agreed to the subsequent telephone interviews, in which the great majority of
interviewees were able or willing to give answers to questions.
4.5.2 Houseman, Kalleberg and Erickcek study
Houseman, Kalleberg and Erickcek (2003: 104-127) provide empirical evidence which
support Houseman's previous survey conclusions. They examine case study evidence
drawn from in-depth interviews carried out in six hospitals and five auto parts
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manufacturers in 1999 and 2000. They use that evidence to ascertain why employers
maintained and even expanded the use oftemporary help (labour hire agencies) during a
tight labour market period (oflow unemployment) in the 1990s.
The participant organisations were selected from a service industry and a manufacturing
industry, that occupied leading positions in the US economy, and that engage a great
number of workers (including inter alia agency temporaries) in non-standard work
arrangements. The hospitals selected were from different regions of Michigan and
North Carolina, and varied in size from a hospital with 450 employees to one with 6,000
employees. As for the auto supply companies, while all were from the Midwest, they
differed as regards size, union presence and structure, and employed from 430 to 2,100
employees. Two ofthe auto supply organisations were locally owned, one a branch of a
larger US company, and two were subsidiaries of foreign owned companies.
Interviews were conducted with human resources directors and managers in charge of
nursing and other staff and production workers. Interviews were also carried out with
representatives of the agencies supplying staff to the organisations. Focus groups were
also conducted with full time and agency employees at some organisations. Finally data
was obtained from each participant body on details such as the use of agency workers
and wages and benefits paid, including the rates paid to agency workers. A drafted set
of questions was used for each interview in the two industries, with follow up questions
used to seek clarification or further information. All the interviews were tape recorded
and transcribed.
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4.5.3 Kalleberg, Reynolds and Marsden study
Kalleberg, Reynolds and Marsden (2003: 525-552) make findings from an examination
of a large representative survey of US establishments, the second National
Organizations Study (Kalleberg, Knoke and Marsden, 1995: 32-49), concerning flexible
staffing arrangements (such as temporary, contract or part-time work). The survey
analysed was wide and representative data of establishments from different size
groupings (in particular many medium sized and large organisations) obtained by a
computer-assisted telephone interview survey ofmanagers, by the Minnesota Centre for
Survey Research in 1996-1997. Establishments were randomly selected from a list
provided by Dun and Bradstreet Information Services of about 15 million US
establishments, so as to get a final sample representative of the establishments
employing US workers. In the process most interviews took place with human resource
managers.
4.5.4 Similarities in the findings of the studies
There is agreement in the three studies that the use of flexible staffing arrangements is
widespread and will increase. Houseman concludes that the use of flexible staffing is
commonplace and, in particular, the high use of agency workers has continued.
Houseman (2001: 149, 166-169) arrives at findings that suggest that employers use
agency temporaries to fill positions both in times of high and low demand. She finds
overall that the use of flexible staffing arrangements by US companies is commonplace.
Of those surveyed, 72% had used part-time workers and 78% had utilised some other
form of flexible staffing. The attractions in benefits for employers in a secondary
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labour market are shown by the survey results, which reveal a widespread view amongst
employers that organisations in their industry would increase the use of flexible staffing
arrangements such as agency temporaries in the following five years.
Further comparison with a survey conducted ten years earlier indicated that the high
degree of usage of agency temporaries (labour hire workers) had continued. This trend
is in line with the general attitude amongst the surveyed employers that flexible forms
of staffing will continue to increase. Two-thirds of those surveyed (Houseman, 2001:
167) agreed to the proposition that employers in their industry would use more flexible
staffing methods such as agency temporary (labour hire) workers in the next five years.
Houseman, Kalleberg and Erickcek (2003: 25) find that the use of agency workers is
increasing in tight labour markets, where establishments resort more and more to using
temporary help agencies to fill vacant positions.
Kalleberg, Reynolds and Marsden reveal that most US organisations use flexible
workers. Analysis of data by the commentators show that fewer than one in five US
organisations employ only full-time workers in some oftheir areas.
Significantly there is a consensus in the three studies that a major reason for the use of
flexible staffmg is to reduce labour costs. Houseman's findings provide support for the
views of Rabin-Margalioth (2003: 311-344), that employers are turning to contingent
labour to avoid mandated costs associated with standard labour. Houseman's empirical
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study points to employers using contingent workers such as agency workers, inter alia
because of the lower costs of these workers compared to standard employees.
Houseman notes (2001: 161) that, while most full time regular employees are provided
with paid vacation and sick leave, pension benefits and health insurance, few of these
benefits were provided to contingent workers.
Houseman (2001: 167) fmds that using flexible staffing arrangements reduced labour
costs considerably. When benefit costs were taken into account for the arrangements,
the majority of establishments reported that hourly wage costs plus benefit were lower
for staffing arrangement employees, than for regular employees holding similar
positions. Perhaps this explains why a majority of agency temporaries in a quoted
Current Population Survey (CPS) declared their preference for regular jobs (Houseman
and Polivka, 2000), suggesting to the author that there was a notable disparity or lack of
correspondence between the preferences of employers and the employees regarding
flexible staffing arrangements.
Information from the survey (2001: 159-161) indicates that wages and in particular
benefit costs in many cases were less for workers in the different categories of flexible
staffing arrangements. In particular, in respect of agency temporaries, 38% of
employers surveyed disclosed that the hourly billing rate for them was less than the
hourly wage and benefit cost of regular workers, and only 19% indicated the opposite.
The lower costs of the arrangements thus make them more appealing to business bodies.
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Houseman notes (2001: 156) that numerous persons (such as Krueger 1991) consider
that the increase in legal actions has added greatly to the expense for companies of
firing employees. In comparison, an employee on a fixed-term contract or hired
through a temporary help (labour hire) agency can be dismissed with minimal risk of
legal action.
Houseman, Kalleberg and Erickcek find that the lower costs associated with agency
workers make the use of agency firms an attractive choice for business. Their evidence
indicates that employers paid agency workers more than regular employees mainly to
have extra time to recruit permanent employees and, in this way, to avoid increasing
wages for new and existing employees. In contrast for low-skill positions the evidence
indicates that temporary agency workers in hospitals did not have higher compensation,
while in production auto positions they received substantially less. As with high-skill
occupations the use of agency temporary employees reduced pressure on organisations
in tight labour markets to increase employees' wages.
In light of their findings the commentators argue that companies were encouraged to use
agency workers because of the lower costs associated with engaging and dismissing
them.
A subsidiary factor for the use of flexible staffing is the flexibility that it gives to
organisations to adjust their workforce numbers according to workload fluctuations and
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labour supply. This emerges from the Houseman study and the Kalleberg, Reynolds
and Marsden study.
Houseman finds (2001: 149, 166-169) that, inter alia, the need to adjust workload
fluctuations and to cope with the staff absenteeism were the major reasons given by
employers to use contingent work arrangements, and that using agency temporaries and
part-time workers were useful means of screening for permanent positions (though it
seems that in practice few contingent workers were promoted into permanent positions).
As to the probability of the use of flexible staffing arrangements by organisations,
Houseman and Kalleberg, Reynolds and Marsden both find that there is a correlation
between the size of organisations and the greater use of flexible staff. Kalleberg,
Reynolds and Marsden find that organisations with a greater number of full-time
employees are more likely to have recourse to all flexible arrangements (temporary,
contract and part-time). Houseman finds (2001: 165) that there is a correlation between
the size of employer companies and greater use of agency temporaries (which confirms
anecdotal evidence).
A downside to the attraction ofreducing lower labour costs, according to Houseman and
Kalleberg, Reynolds and Marsden, is that the motivation to reduce costs will result in
continuing low wages and benefits for workers in flexible staffing arrangements.
Houseman (2001: 155) opines that employers may use flexible staffing arrangements so
they can pay some groups of employees lower wages or benefits. She gives the
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example of a unionised company paying above market wages, that may be attracted to
the idea of using temporary agency (labour hire) workers or contract employees, for
whom it is not the legal employer and with whom it does not have a collective
agreement.
Kalleberg, Reynolds and Marsden contend that, if organisations are essentially
motivated by cost factors to use flexible staff, the people in those jobs are likely to
receive low wages and miss out on fringe benefits. If, however, organisations adopt
flexible staffmg arrangements to vet possible future employees or to have flexibility in
the face of changing labour supply, then job positions under the arrangements may be
comparatively remunerative (2003: 547).
4.5.5 Differences in the findings of the studies
The studies are largely compatible and arrive at similar conclusions about the use of
flexible staffing. One point of divergence between the studies relates to the motivation
to reduce labour costs as a factor in the use of flexible staffing. In the Houseman
survey, only a minority of organisations mentioned this as influential in the use of
flexible staffing arrangements. Houseman, by the use ofother data, is able to show that
the desire to reduce costs is a relevant factor. Multivariate analysis of the survey data
by Houseman (2001: 162-166) suggests that cost savings are a strong factor not only in
the use of flexible staffing arrangements by employers, but also in respect of the extent
of use of these arrangements. In contrast, in the Kalleberg, Reynolds and Marsden
study, organisations admit to using flexible staffing to reduce costs.
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Houseman, Kalleberg and Erickcek made their own particular finding that resort is
made by business to agency workers in tight labour markets (when employees are in
short supply). Because of her particular focus, Houseman concludes that existing laws
have caused increased interest ofemployers in flexible staffing arrangements.
In conclusion, there is considerable evidence to suggest that increasing government and
judicial regulation of the standard employment situation has encouraged the
development of a secondary labour market of contingent workers, such as labour hire,
where labour costs are lower for the users of that labour. To summarise, regulation of
the primary labour market has had the consequence, that there are incentives for
employers to go to less or unregulated markets (such as the labour hire market), to avoid
employer obligations such as unfair dismissal and health and safety laws. These results
prompt the question, whether there would be similar results or findings as to the effects
of regulation on the standard employment relationship in Australia (in particular
Queensland). Evidence on this issue will be set out in the later chapter dealing with
research on the operation of labour hire.
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5.1 Introduction
This chapter describes the research methodology used to carry out the empirical
res~arch for the thesis. The research is in the form of a qualitative study. It involved
almost fifty (forty-nine) in-depth field interviews predominately of labour hire agencies,
but also ofpeak business and union bodies, smaller unions and some individuals. What
is of particular importance is that, as far as the writer is aware, there has been no
previous empirical work with labour hire agencies of this nature done in Australia and
the writer has done the first Australian study.
There have been some limited case studies touching on labour hire by the Australian
Centre for Industrial Relations Research and Training, and some quite limited
investigation for the Australian Industry Group (AlG) into emerging attitudes towards
labour hire. The writer's empirical fieldwork is much more extensive in that it involves
across the board in-depth interviewing of the important parties involved in the labour
hire field.
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5.2 Qualitative research through the interview process
Because there is little information on how labour hire agencies do their business and
regulate their activities, an aim of the writer's research project was and is to gather and
analyse information about the way in which labour hire companies operate. In
particular, the aim was to get a clear picture of how labour hire agencies operate in
practice, which would provide a research question, issues and data. The aim in other
words was to obtain empirical data that could highlight or generate legal issues for the
purposes of research. It was considered that this could be best done through carrying
out empirical research of the agencies via the interview process, to obtain a good
description ofwhat they do in practice and how they do it.
Infonnation was elicited in the exploratory studies of the labour hire agencies using
taped planned interviews of senior officers or owners of the agencies. There was also
the intention (which was realised in a number of cases) of obtaining copy documents
from the agencies relating to the terms and conditions on the supply, payment and
control of staff hired out. The upshot was that the author was able to study
organisations, contracts and arrangements.
5.3 Confidentiality in the interview process
No names of the interviewed parties or individually identified data were recorded, and
all data was grouped for analysis. Codes for the data were used to protect
confidentiality. The raw data tapes were destroyed on completion or finalisation of the
transcription ofthe interviews.
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5.4 Ethical clearance and considerations
The empirical study and the interview documentation were cleared by one ofthe human
ethics committees of the University of Queensland in accordance with the National
Health and Medical Research Guidelines. The University of Queensland clearance is
attached as Appendix A in the Schedule to this study. No apparent ethical difficulties
arose during the course of the interviews. An ethical consideration or problem, for
example, could have arisen where clear or blatant breaches of legislation by a
participant were revealed during the interview process.
It could have been the case that breaches of occupational health and safety legislation
could have been revealed, that is a lack of training which could lead to injury at the
workplace. In that situation, the writer would have had a responsibility or obligation to
indicate informally to the participant organisation its duty of care and statutory duty to
remedy the situation. After the conclusion of the interview, the intention of the writer
was to mention informally to the interviewee for the information and benefit of the
agency that there might be a contravention of State legislation.
As it turned out, no ethical problems arose out of the interviews. For instance, agencies
invariably were at pains to indicate that they were conscious and vigilant about their
health and safety duties and obligations. In the odd case, an agency might have
intimated that, because of distance or geographical factors (such as where employees
were in isolated parts of Queensland), it was limited in its action by what was
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reasonably practicable. No agency gave any indication of deliberately attempting to
evade legislation.
The writer observed confidentiality and trade secrets of a participant body. How this
consideration was addressed will be described in the section dealing with the interview
procedure.
5.5 Contacting potential interview sUbjects
The first stage involved contacting a senior officer of the organisation by a pro forma
approved letter (together with a subject information form) in which details of the
writer's formal research project are set out. This letter is marked Appendix B in the
Schedule to this study. Permission was then sought to interview a senior officer of the
organisation at a time convenient to him or her, in order to obtain an understanding of
how labour hire arrangements are conducted by the organisation or firm. The senior
officer was advised that any interview/s will be taped and codes will be used to protect
confidentiality.
An undertaking in the letter was given that any information obtained from discussion
with the person would be used with discretion and confidentiality. It was pointed out
that the writer has obtained an ethics clearance from the University, before conducting
any research involving human subjects, and that the University's ethics guidelines for
research require confidentiality, anonymity and the right of a subject to withdraw at any
stage. The senior officer was then advised that if he/she agreed to be interviewed, then
the writer would be happy to send the officer a transcript of the interview for checking.
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This latter procedure was in fact the invariable practice adopted by the writer. Where
changes to a transcript were requested or made by a subject, an amended transcript was
sent to the person .concerned. The officer concerned was told in the letter that the
officer would be contacted by telephone by the writer in the next week or so, with a
view to arranging a time for interview convenient to the person. Participants if they so
desired were provided with a copy of the interview questions in advance. The letter
concluded by giving contact details ofthe writer's supervisor at the University.
The accompanying subject information form or sheet to the letter (marked Appendix C
in the Schedule) provided background information to the research project. It set out the
project title, the interested parties, a description of the aims and procedure of the
research project, the foreseeable benefits of the study, the confidentiality and participant
conditions, the fact of ethical clearance and the provision for feedback via a typed
transcript ofthe interview.
At the interview as part of the preliminaries, the interviewee would be shown the list of
interview questions that would be asked and asked to sign a participant consent form
and participant authority/recognition form. The interviewee would then be told that the
formal interview would commence, and that it would be taped for transcription
purposes.
Interviews lasted (and were planned to last) on average about an hour. Interviewees
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were encouraged to deviate from the set questions, and make additional comments and
insights on labour hire where they so desired. The writer often would pursue issues
with the participants that arose from the standard questions.
After the interview process the participant would be sent a copy of the transcript of the
interview for attention and possible amendment. The participant was advised that if
nothing further was heard, it would be assumed that the participant was happy with the
transcript. Copies ofthe pro forma letter, subject information form, interview questions,
participant consent form and participant authority/recognition form are contained in the
schedule.
The confidentiality and trade secret interests of a participant body were protected as
follows:
No names ofparticipants were to be mentioned in publications or the thesis
Codes were assigned to the transcripts ofthe interviews
Tapes containing the raw data were destroyed after transcripts were made
Transcripts were kept securely
The main risk to a participant, that is envisaged, would be where the confidentiality of
the participant's information is breached through the divulging of that information to
another competitor or person, and as a result, the participant is dismissed or punished by
the organisation.
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After the effort in setting interviews up, the interviews almost without exception went
smoothly. In some cases, the participants were only too eager to offer some information
and assistance, in the hope ofhaving the industry "cleaned up".
Other participants were eager to paint a positive view of the industry, and to maintain
the position that the industry should be left to self-regulation. There was only one
instance where consent to use a transcript of an interview was withdrawn, on the basis
that information had been divulged, which in hindsight the participant did not want
released.
5.6 Representativeness
As a preliminary step a peak body for labour hire agencies in Australia was consulted to
provide a list of its members in Queensland .and Northern Territory specialising in
labour hire and labour placement. This list provided a useful starting point for the
contact of labour hire agencies in Queensland.
The writer added to the list other agencies that advertised in the Yellow Pages telephone
directory. A judgment call was made in the initial selection of agencies for contact,
based on the industries they serviced and their varied geographical location in south-
eastern Queensland. In the end result it is considered that a good "snap shot" of the
labour hire industry in south-east Queensland (particularly Brisbane) was obtained, in
that the writer was able to interview large international and national labour hire agencies
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that catered for several industries and had branch offices across Australia, and smaller
"niche" firms that catered for a particular industry or profession.
Importantly at an early stage of the thesis, the writer was able to conduct in-depth
interviews with the two peak bodies representing the interests of labour hire businesses
in Australia. These interviews revealed the strategies in place for the self-regulation and
protection ofthe labour hire industry in Australia.
To obtain a balanced perspective on the area oflabour hire, a number ofinterviews were
conducted with peak union bodies and miscellaneous unions. The peak union bodies in
particular referred to strategies to combat what were considered the undesirable aspects
of labour hire.
Where a labour hire agency declined to take part in the interview process, the usual
excuse related to time commitments or occasionally, lack of interest. One labour
agency withdrew consent after having been interviewed. Approximately eighty percent
of agencies contacted agreed to be interviewed.
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6.1 Introduction
This chapter aims to give an outline of the participants and their responses during in-
depth interviews on the operation of labour hire. To improve comprehension the data
has. been set out under key headings. Summaries of findings are included in this
chapter. Conclusions and implications are set out in the following chapters.
The data below that has been collated and analysed draws attention to several key
issues, which have significant implications for the legal regulation of labour hire. These
issues can be summarised succinctly in the following terms:
(i) increasing regulation of the standard employment relationship has had the effect
ofadding costs and obligations on employers;
(ii) as a consequence employers have incentives to go to less regulated or unregulated
labour markets such as labour hire, which offer escape from regulation such as the
unfair dismissal laws;
(iii) the movement to labour hire is encouraged by the largely unregulated nature of
the labour hire industry, and perceived benefits in using labour hire such as
flexibility in the engagement of staff and reduced costs;
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(iv) the legal and practical problems that may arise given the unique tripartite nature
of labour hire when it is utilised for a labour hire agency and client organisation,
arising from the sharing ofcontrol and responsibilities for a labour hire worker.
Attention now will be devoted in this chapter to exploring empirical information which
relates to these key issues.
6.2 Profile of Participants
As described in Chapter Five, labour hire agencies were selected in South East
Queensland to provide a representative sample of existing labour hire agencies. A total
of 34 agencies were interviewed and asked a series of set questions, with the
opportunity provided to add additional comment. A total of 12 peak and ordinary
unions were also interviewed and asked to respond to some broad issues that related to
them. In addition peak business bodies in the recruitment and labour hire field were
interviewed at some length and asked to comment on the interview questions given to
labour hire agencies. To obtain a unique perspective on labour hire three individual
labour hire workers were queried at some length and asked to give their views on labour
hire as it affected them individually and others collectively.
6.3 Survey Response
With respect to the 17 survey questions asked of labour hire agencies, this study
concentrates on the responses to nine key questions relating to labour hire so as to
obtain an overall view of the participant agencies' views and opinions of labour hire in
practice. The study in turn also deals with the responses of the union participants to
four key questions relating to union attitudes to the phenomenon of labour hire and its
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implications for employment generally. The two business bodies for the labour hire
industry were questioned in depth as to the operation of labour hire in Australia. The
three participant labour hire workers were asked to give their views on how working in
labour hire has affected them and their colleague workers.
Participant responses are analysed by reference to relevant and key issues.
Labour Hire Agencies' Views and Opinions
The following headings directly relate to the previous issueslhypotheses that were
outlined above. These issues will be further elaborated on in the subsequent analysis
chapter.
This study concentrates on agency responses to rune headings which provide
information on the key issues mentioned earlier in the chapter. These issues are:
(i) The benefits of labour hire
(ii) Clients/industries catered for
(iii) Why work in labour hire
(iv) Typical arrangements initiated
(v) Negotiation re terms and conditions in labour hire
(vi) Do disputes arise in labour hire
(vii) Occupational health and safety issues in labour hire
(viii)Anti-discrimination issues in labour hire
(ix) Reasons for the expansion of labour hire
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These issues will be dealt with in tum below.
In carrying out the study, there was interest by the writer as to whether responses to the
survey questions would unearth findings about Australian labour market changes and
circumstances, which would be similar to the North American experience. In particular
the writer was interested in investigating findings to the following questions:
• Are labour market changes in Australia, and particularly in Queensland, similar
to the North American experience?
• Are increasing labour costs and regulation (as well as economic factors)
encouraging employers into using less regulated fonns of employment such as
labour hire, referred to as temporary staffing in US tenninology?
• Is the virtual lack ofregulation of the labour hire industry encouraging a greater
use of labour hire arrangements?
• Are occupational health and safety (OHS) issues problematic in labour hire
employment, in the light of the division of legal and practical control of a
worker between a labour hire agency and the client or organisation using the
worker.
The results of the responses to the interview questions will provide answers to those
questions.
The reporting of the results ofthe interviews is split up along the following lines:
• Quantitative responses about labour hire coverage, the nature of labour hire
arrangements, disputes, OHS and workplace discrimination.
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• Qualitative responses about the benefits oflabour hire.
• Reasons for the expansion of labour hire.
6.4 Quantitative Responses
6.4.1 Clients/industries accounted for by the agencies
In terms of the clients and industries that they cater for, the labour hire agencies
interviewed could be broadly divided into three categories:
• Generalist agencies that cover services across the board or support services
to industry. With services covered across the board, they may include
professional, clerical (or ''white collar") staff, and administrative support
staff.
• Agencies catering for the blue collar/industrial/factory markets
• Specialist/'boutique' agencies catering to specific segments of the
employment market.
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Generalist Agencies
Of the fifteen generalist agencies mentioned in category 1, a further subdivision can be
made into those agencies that are of a large multinational or national nature that cover
virtually all areas of the employment market. For instance some large multinational
agencies indicated that they had a very wide spread geographically and industry wide in
Australia or Australasia, covering diverse areas such as manufacturing, construction,
banking and financial services, the IT sector, call centres, clerical, secretarial and trades.
In addition their clients included various levels of government, who outsource their
requirements.
One multinational agency commented "the agency is a broad based organisation that
covers all industries and all management disciplines. In tenns of size we would employ
1,800 staff in Australasia, "the agency has developed a very good internet strategy,
global internet strategy and that is what has driven our growth".
One large international labour hire firm operating in Australia mentioned that it had a
foothold in the British employment market. It stated that, in addition to its branches in
Australian capital cities, it had a large market oyer in the United Kingdom through its
London branch, particularly in banking and finance where itinerant workers are used.
Overall the generalist agencies exhibited similar patterns of operation. They covered a
wide range of callings (in particular support services) and industries, and employed an
even spread of males and females. To build up client bases, they utilised advertising
and marketing, for example knocking on doors, word of mouth, the internet, and the
"yellow pages" in telephone directories. They also seemed to go for high volume
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placements, and to cater for workers in the salary range of $20,000 to $50,000 per
annum.
One generalist agency highlighted the volatility of the labour hire industry, when it
revealed that the emphasis in its generalist coverage varied from time to time, according
to demands and trends. It described the progression of its coverage as being in the
1980s mainly involved with computing placements (for independent contractors), then
moving on in the 19908 to be heavily involved withwhite collar and professional areas.
In recent times the emphasis changed yet again for the agency, with a heavy shift into
industrial labour hire.
Industrial agencies
The second category of labour hire agencies (consisting of six agencies) operate
essentially in the industrial area.
The agencies considered industrial work to cover a large area of the labour market, and
they referred to it as covering work such as construction, maintenance, factory and
process work, boilermaking, warehousing, landscaping, and work for local councils.
This type of work called for a range of skills from basic to semi-skilled and skilled. In
some cases people with no skills were hired to do easy work in large stores, factories
and smaller construction sites. For heavy labour the agencies employed mainly males
because of the nature of the work, whereas a majority of females were process workers
in factories.
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Because of the nature of the workers they supplied, the industrial (also referred to as
"blue collar") agencies overall were involved in high volume, small margin business
which relied on having hundreds of workers hired out in order to be profitable (for
example, many boilermakers were hired out when there was a lot of engineering work
being carried on).
Specialist agencies
The third category of agency (totalling thirteen) were agenCIes offering specialist
services to companies. The labour hire agencies or firms focused or specialised in
supplying workers to particular or specific niche areas of the employment market in
Australia and even overseas, where they had specialist knowledge.
The agencies supplied a wide range of professionals from engineers and architects to
lawyers, accountants and financial planners, and staff such as chefs, waiters and
waitresses for the hospitality trade. Thus depending on their expertise the agencies
might supply technical and engineering staff for projects, financial services staff to
banks and financial institutions, and staff to large corporations and government
departments. The ratio of male to female employees for the positions was open, in that
the focus was on getting the best person for the job.
One speciality emerging area was the hospitality and security industry. Three of the
specialist agencies specialised in providing labour hire staff (for example to hotels) in
that industry. It was pointed out by an agency that client companies could take
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advantage of the training and public liability insurance provided by a security firm or
agency, who supplied staff.
A passing reference was made by one agency to the special situation, where some
construction companies actually have established their own agencies to help with the
supply of labour hire professionals for their projects, apparently on the assumption that
the supply of staff should be related directly to industry knowledge, and what people do
in the industry. If this is the situation, then this approach marks a further development
in the way that labour hire is utilised.
6.4.2 Typical labour hire arrangements
(a) How labour hire arrangements are initiated
All of the thirty-four agencies interviewed confirmed that the standard invariable
commencement to a labour hire arrangement or relationship was the initial request or
inquiry to an agency by a client, about the availability of a labour hire employee/s to
perform work for the client. This then set in train searches by an agency to see whether
it had a person or persons on its database or register that would fit or satisfy the client's
request. The agencies referred to this process as "mixing and matching". In many cases
the client does not interview the candidate, .and relies on the agency's judgment. One
agency put it "we're an extension oftheir human resources".
The mix and match process .started with the building up of a database or register of
workers. The interviewed agencies in anticipation of a request for employees from
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clients have built up a database of likely employees, whom they have interviewed,
investigated, inducted and trained. As one agency put it succinctly: ''The idea of the
labour hire is that you've got the people on your books or database, ready, willing and
able for a project or work tomorrow".
The agencies in general indicated that they built up their databases or registers of
employees and their business in various ways, ranging from using inquiries from
prospective employees, advertising, referrals, networking and marketing. Advertising
by the agencies tended to be selective, and reserved for when mass recruitment was
wanted or a particular type of worker was required. A common observation was that
employees naturally tended to stay with agencies that supplied them with regular work.
As one agency observed: "They go wherever the work is, so ifyou have more work then
they will stay with you generally."
A couple of agencies indicated that in exceptional circumstances they were prepared to
"reverse market" a high calibre candidate to clients, by actively marketing or selling the
skills and worth of a candidate to clients. More generally twelve agencies expressly
indicated that they were proactive in the sense that, because of the competitive nature of
the industry, they would target or contact regularly companies, that were likely to
require labour hire staff in the future. One agency stated that the industry average was
about five contacts with a client, before the client would give an order to an agency.
The agenCIes interviewed indicated that there was some prior interviewing and
induction of candidate employees, before their entry on the agency's database or
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register. The agencies followed a similar pattern in the vetting of a potential employee.
Candidates were asked to sign an application form, a questionnaire on skills and health
issues, and a reference check authorisation. They were then interviewed, the length of
the interview depending on the position involved, and given some form of safety
induction.
The standard procedure for hiring, according to the agencies, was that a client would
call an agency and state its requirements for a particular type ofworker or workers. The
agency then took down a detailed job description for the position or positions, taking
into account the client's needs and wants. After that the agency did a prompt search of
its database or register to see if it had appropriate staff available to fill the position or
positions.
If there were available staff prepared to work under the job conditions, the client was
given a resume or general details on the candidate. If the client was agreeable to the
candidate or relied on the agency's judgement, then it was just a matter of the candidate
turning up at the workplace at the required time. Where a new client was involved a
consultant from the agency might introduce the worker.
Three agencies commented on the unrealistic demands of some clients. In this regard
one agency made special reference to the fact that it tried to take into account how a
candidate was likely to fit into the culture of potential workplaces, so that the person
actually had not only the skills to do the job, but was actually going to fit in with the
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people in the workplace. Another agency mentioned that, where its labour hire workers
were to work in a confidential work environment, it required them to sign
confidentiality agreements with clients because of their access to confidential
infonnation.
(b) Contractual issues and negotiations
While most contractual tenns were found to be of a routine nature, particular terms
called for comment where agencies attempted to exclude their liability in respect of the
provision of a labour hire worker's services, purportedly on the basis that the client had
the daily control and supervision over the worker. This data highlights the issue
referred to of the problems that arise, from the sharing ofcontrol and responsibility for a
labour hire worker between an agency and client.
After arrangements were initiated between client, agency and candidate worker, written
or written in part contracts are entered between the agency and client and between the
agency and worker. Thirty-two of the thirty-four respondent agencies interviewed
specifically indicated that they had a standard agreement or terms and conditions with
clients and workers. This was then used as a template from which negotiation regarding
tenns and conditions took place. Twenty of the thirty-four agencies provided copies of
the written agreements that they used.
As to the two agencies that differed from the rest, one stated that it was really a matter
of what it negotiated with the other parties, though even here some guidance was
obtained from fairly standard tenns. The other differing agency declared that it did not
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have a standard agreement, but formulated a personalised agreement with each client
company. For example the agency indicated that a condition in one of its agreements
might require a client "not to provide employees with work unsuitable to their skills or
with unsafe work".
Typical terms and conditions that were found in an agency - client agreement were as
follows:
• An hourly wage rate based on awards, enterprise bargaining agreement, or
negotiated market rates (in 13 agreements)
• Provision for removal ofan unsatisfactory worker after a minimum period (often
four hours) (in 12 agreements)
• Provision after a certain period (for example three months) whereby a client
could keep a worker on a permanent basis, subject to a placement "charge or
fee" (in 13 agreements)
• Client to advise or seek approval of the agency for any change of duties or
relocation for a worker (in 6 agreements).
A term in seven agencies - client agreements, and one of a special nature, was a term
where there was no acceptance by an agency of vicarious liability for a worker in any
claim by a client. Vicarious liability is the liability which an employer such as an
agency owes to third parties for the negligent or wrongful acts of its employee
committed in the course of employment. In this way the agencies attempted to transfer
responsibilities and liabilities in respect of the contracted services onto the client. By
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way of contrast no agency indicated that it had agreed to the insertion by a client of a
"hold harmless clause", whereby an agency agreed to indemnify (compensate for loss)
clients in respect ofclaims against them.
Some representative examples of clauses in agreements excluding vicarious liability of
an agency are as follows:
... does not accept responsibility for any action brought against the Candidate and
does not accept any liability for any losses, damages or expenses caused by the
Candidates' actions or omissions in the course of fulfilling assignment
obligations.
Subject to clause ... , we will not be liable to you in respect of any loss or damage
however caused whether by our negligence or negligence of a successful
candidate whilst in your employ, or one of our employees or otherwise, which
may be suffered or incurred, whether directly or indirectly, in respect of the
services provided under this agreement.
Four agencies prefaced their disclaimer of liability in clauses in their agreements on the
basis that it was appropriate, because an agency was not entitled to and did not seek the
day to day supervision, direction or control over the manner of the execution of the
services of its employees (which was the responsibility of the client), while they were at
the client's workplace. They thus relied on and drew attention to the lack of practical
control or control in the field experienced by a labour hire agency, which is
characteristic of a labour hire arrangement. On the basis of their rationale the agencies
consequently accepted no liability whatsoever for the actions of their employees during
their assignment, which caused any loss or damage to the client.
Examples ofthe particular clauses are as follows:
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The client will be solely responsible for allocating the Contractor's (employee's)
work and for supervising the manner in which the work is carried out. Since the
company is not entitled to~ and does not in practice seek to, exercise supervision,
direction or control as to the manner in which the services are executed, the
Company is in no way liable for any loss, damage cost or expense incurred by the
Contractor or arising otherwise in connection with any act, omission or neglect in
executing the service.
The Agency recruit experienced staff and contractors only and adhere to a strict
recruitment policy including skills checks and reference checks however the
Agency is unable to supervise all employees and contractors on the job sites of
our clients and as such the Agency accepts no liability whatsoever for any actions
taken by the employee/contractor resulting in any loss or damage to clients'
premises or reputation.
The hirer agrees that because the personnel are for the hirer to direct and
supervise, then liability to the public, including its products and/or services and
consequential loss occasioned by substandard orunworkmanlike performance,
will vest with the hirer. Accordingly, the hirer agrees to advise its Public Liability
Insurers to extend cover to indemnify the agency and its personnel against claims.
The type of exemption from liability clause referred to would appear to be of mixed
value for the agencies that seek them, in that it would bind only the client as a signatory
to the agreement, and would not protect the agency from claims by the client's
employees and members of the public, who may be affected by the actions of the
agency's employees. It would seem that, for an agency to have protection from such
latter claims, it would have to require the hiring client to agree to indemnify the agency
in respect of claims by members of the public (as happened in the last clause quoted in
the preceding paragraph), and in respect ofclaims by the client's own employees.
Typical conditions in an agency - worker agreement were:
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• An hourly wage rate for a casual worker based on an award, enterprise
bargaining agreement, Australian workplace agreement or negotiated market
rates (13 agreements)
• A minimum period of work for a worker (for example of four hours) (4
agreements)
• Completion ofweekly timesheets for authorisation by the client and for payment
by the agency (usually electronically) (12 agreements)
• Agreement to observe the policies and standards of the agency and/or client (9
agreements)
• Working hours ofthe worker (3 agreements)
• A worker to follow the .directions and requirements of the client's supervisors
(10 agreements)
• Notice (for example one hour) to be given by a worker (11 agreements)
• A confidentiality clause regarding non-disclosure of a client's sensitive
infonnation (such as in the financial services area) (9 agreements)
• Worker to advise agency if given duties different to those originally designated
(4 agreements)
• No guarantee ofongoing work by an agency to a worker (8 agreements).
In general, agencies were prepared to be flexible and to negotiate with clients on rates
and conditions, but some would not reduce their rates beyond a certain limit or
''undercut'' others just to get work, because they thought that such practices were not
economically sustainable in the long term. Twelve agencies however indicated that
they offered credit to clients on certain conditions (for example thirty day credit). Two
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of those agencies however stated that the provision ofcredit was standard practice in the
industry. One of the agencies wished that it could get clients to pay up front, to avoid
the risk ofpayment default by a client.
While there was usually little negotiation with workers, some agencies were prepared to
push for a higher rate for a worker, where the worker was performing specialist tasks, or
different or higher duties to those originally agreed upon, such as where a person was
initially hired as a labourer, and then asked to perform plant operating duties. There
waS also an appreciation that where high skills were in demand notice had to be taken of
market rates. In these situations the agency would approach the client to renegotiate the
rate. Further agencies indicated that they were prepared to pay "site rates" to their
labour hire workers, by abiding by whatever industrial instrument (award or enterprise
bargaining agreement) was in place for permanent employees at the workplace of the
client or host employer.
Ten agencies indicated that they would not supply a worker, where they thought that the
terms and conditions were unreasonable or unsafe. They insisted on conditions
permitting their inspection of client premises in order to protect the safety of workers
sent there. Where this was not acceded to, a worker would not be sent to the premises.
This approach to workplace safety is an illustration ofhow an agency can deal with the
problems associated with an agency's lack of practical control of its worker at a
workplace. According to one agency "it comes down to how you manage your
workforce and how you manage your client relationships".
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There was a consensus among the agencies that overall clients were cost conscious, and
that clients wanted service at the best price they could get it. But it was noted at times
that cost was not always a final determining factor, in that a client may also be
concerned about the agency's process of recruitment, its after hours service, and the
experience and skills ofthe consultants in the agency.
In negotiating with clients, agencies saw and promoted themselves as the intermediary
between the client and the labour hire worker, who insulated the client from issues such
as uilfair dismissal claims, which could otherwise affect the client. In that role an
agency is not only the recruiter and paymaster of the hired out workers, but is also
responsible for the payroll tax, workers' compensation levies, and any public liability
insurance coverage in respect of those workers. In return an agency retains a margin or
mark up for itself.
In general most agencies did not mention their margin or mark up rate. One agency
referred to its rates as confidential. One agency remarked that the margin of.an agency
is "generally 5 or probably 10%". Another agency stated that "our margins in this
industry are anything in the temp market from 10% to 20% gross profit margin". In
another situation the margin of the agency was expressed as "generally 5 or probably
10%". One agency referred to the rate in monetary terms - "We then add a service fee
on top of that, from 65 cents to $2.50 per hour depending on the type ofperson". There
was also mention by an agency that it charged special rates for clients, from whom it
received substantial custom.
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One operator of an agency summed up the service in the following terms: ''What we sell
is simplicity. We will say, you pay us $18 an hour and we will pay the people $15, and
we'll look after all the details, and this is how you pay us, you pay us once a fortnight,
once a week".
As to situations where a labour hire worker was taken on by a client as a member of the
client's staff, one agency pointed to an industry practice that an agency would charge a
transfer fee, where the change over occurred within the first three months of working
with' the client. Whether a fee was charged depended on the particular agency. The
levying of a fee was more likely with clerical and executive positions than with
industrial positions. Another agency disclosed that it had the option of charging a
"$1,000 referral" fee, where a client directly engaged a labour hire worker in the first
six month period, without notice to the agency.
6.4.3 Nature of disputes between agencies and clients
The following data draws attention to the issue of the problems that arise from the
sharing of control and responsibility in labour hire, between an agency and client for a
worker.
While the respondent agencies admitted encountering disputes in labour hire
relationships, twenty-seven of the thirty-four respondent agencies expressly claimed
that disputes did not happen often. It appeared to be the norm for disputes to be
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recorded on computer and on a paper file. One agency by way ofexception stated that it
did not record disputes, "because they're either fixed or they're not".
Twenty agencies generally indicated that disputes were avoided in a proactive way by
the use ofpreliminary screening processes and through the use of their consultants who
were trained to avoid disputes. Mention was made too that as the ''middle man" or
intermediary it was the role of the agency to resolve problems that may arise.
Types of disputes between agencies and clients
The types of disputes between a labour hire agency and its clients, said by some
agencies to be caused by a lack of communication or misunderstanding between the
parties, can be classified under various heads and these heads are set out below.
(a) Competency and suitability of the worker
These types of disputes were mentioned as occurring by twenty~fiveagencies, and were
thought in particular to be caused by lack of communication and misunderstanding
between an agency and client company. The disputes were thought to be preventable by
the agencies through the use of quality checks, ongoing monitoring by an agency and
proper supervision of the worker by the client. The processes said by the agencies to be
used to resolve the situations included mediation, more supervision, efforts to lift the
performance of the worker, or in the final resort, movement of the worker to another
job.
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As regards the reasons for disputes in this area, it appears from the agency responses
that in the first instance no party may be really at fault in that arrangements may not be
working as they were foreseen to work (for example unexpected personality clashes
between worker and management), or where the parties were genuinely mistaken as to
the other's expectations, such as where the client and worker have oversold each other,
which then resulted in disappointment for the parties. It has been for example the case
that a candidate was not the match for a position, because ofmisunderstanding over the
skills level or work standards of the candidate, or because it turned out that the
candidate did not have the appearance or image required (such as for retail clients). It
was pointed out by two agencies too that it was no-one's particular fault, where in
exigency situations the shortness of notice given by a client for workers may have
resulted in a hasty screening process by an agency ofcandidates.
In some circumstances the agencies pointed out that the fault for the disputes lie with
the workers. This occurred where the workers had personal problems, were not
punctual, did not work toa reasonable standard, or were not the type of employees or
willing employees that they said they were to the agency. Fifteen agencies were also of
the view that disputes about the competency and fit of a worker were problems arising
from a client's behaviour. In some instances the agency view was that client
expectations were unrealistic. It was mentioned that could arise where a client did not
specify exactly the selection criteria required for a position. Problems also arose where
the job on the site was not what the client had indicated initially.
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It was pointed out too by agencies, that disputes arose as a result of a lack of proper
supervision and monitoring of a hired worker by the client. In such a situation where
for example the client was too busy to give the worker proper instruction and
information, the worker became lost and found it difficult to perform the allotted tasks.
Even where the client was at fault, it appeared to be likely that the client won out,
because three agencies stated that they took the approach that the reality of the situation
was that the client was favoured to the detriment of the worker, because it was the client
payiilg the money to the agency. The consequence was that generally, if an agency said
that they were not happy with a worker, then that worker would be removed or replaced
by the agency. In some situations the agency was prepared to renegotiate with the
client. One of the attractions of labour hire was that a client could exercise this option
or flexibility to discontinue a worker's services.
One agency conceded that from time to time the problem may lie with the agency,
where there has not been sufficient screening of a candidate or insufficient attention to
the client's requirements. Diligent agencies pointed out that it did not happen too often
for them. The more conscientious agencies indicated that they were proactive, and
carried out fairly regular quality checks on the performance and timeliness of the staff
that they sent out. In this way they tried to prevent situations developing into disputes.
(b) Wage and fee disputes between an agency and a client
Disagreements over wage and fee matters and incidental matters (such as the general
responsiveness of an agency to a client's demands) between agencies and clients
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emerged as an issue in the interviews of fifteen agencies. The disagreements centred on
matters such as the correct wage rates, punctual payment by clients, the transfer fees for
the permanent placement of workers within a client organisation, and the general
responsiveness of an agency to a client's needs. Generally agencies were prepared to
negotiate with their clients or customers on money matters, and extend credit and
payment times.
Agencies indicated that from time to time disputes arose as to the proper charge rates to
be paid by a client. Where through error a higher charge rate was imposed on a client
then was warranted, because a worker had been wrongly classified by an agency, it
seemed that, depending on an assessment of the value and worth of the client and its
future potential, an agency might leave the pay rate for the worker where it was, or cut
its own margin and bring down the charge rate to the client to where it should be.
Where faulty work occurred, in that a worker had not carried out a task properly (such
as where a chef had burnt and not properly cooked food), agencies made monetary
adjustments or arranged for rectification work. Where an agency was faced with claims
by its clients that competitor agencies were charging cheaper rates, the agency
explained to its clients that it was because the other agencies were attempting to pay
their workers under cheaper but inappropriate awards (for example under a plastics and
rubber award rather than under a federal metal and engineering award).
One cause for disagreement that arose according to two agencies was the issue of
transfer fees or release payments by a client, where it took a hired worker onto its own
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staff. It appears that, in particular, the longer the hire engagement the more likely a
client resented making this payment. The reasoning for this according to the agencies
was that the client felt that the agency had been making a profit out of the worker for
some period. In some instances the client as host employer had employed the worker
directly without notice to the agency.
One problem area for agencies was that of bad. debts where a client company became
insolvent. The problem for an agency here is that it is responsible for the payment of
workers' wages, but may not be able to get payment for the wages from the client
company. One agency stated that when its client went into liquidation "we still had a
week's pay we had to give those people, $33,000 pay I remember. You've always got
bad debts, and over a period of time you have to save up enough to cover yourself'.
Four agencies disclosed that they conducted credit reference checks on prospective
clients.
(c) Termination of a worker's services
This issue for an agency as legal employer can be a problem with potential industrial
relations implications. Five agencies referred to difficulties in this area. Termination
here refers to the termination or ending of the particular labour hire assignment or
services of an employee. It is generally specified in the terms of the client/agency
agreement (or understood by the parties) that a client may end a labour hire worker's
services at its discretion, subject to any special agreement.
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The agencies agreed that overall they were governed by and subject to the client's
requirements and assessment of an agency worker. They indicated that it was
emphasised toa worker that continuity of employment was entirely subject to the
client's requirements, with the consequence that employment could be terminated with
minimal notice, which is given formally by the agency. One result of the discretionary
power of a client was, as instanced by one agency, that a client could request the
removal of a worker seeking higher wages.
However there was some concern among the agencies involved that the client should
not act peremptorily and without proper or sufficient notice, and that there should be in
place a process of warning and counselling for a worker, especially for a worker who
has been working apparently satisfactorily for some time at the client's workplace. One
agency put it directly that ongoing labour hire workers should not have their services
terminated for a relatively minor transgression such as occasional lateness without any
prior discussion between agency and client, and that in respect of such workers ''the
client needs to understand that irrespective of the fact they are casual, you need to afford
them fair and equitable practices in terms ofyour moral obligation as an employer".
Apart from having any moral obligation as employers, the agencies were mindful that
any termination of a worker's services should not result in an unfair or wrongful
dismissal at law. They recognised that they were vulnerable here, given that
termination ofa worker's employment was at the initiative ofthe client. Fortunately for
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agencies generally, a labour hire worker could bring dismissal proceedings as a casual
worker at law only in special circumstances (for example twelve months service).
(d) Division of responsibility between an agency and client
Fifteen agencies referred to these types of disputes as an issue of concern for them.
This issue in particular brought out underlying tensions in the labour hire relationship
between an agency and its client.
Because of the tripartite nature of the labour hire relationship, de facto control and
supervision of the worker in practice have to be shared between an agency and a client.
This can lead to problems over responsibility for the worker's safety, and for liability
for the actions of the worker with respect to other persons (vicarious liability).l
It was felt by the agencies that lack of control over a worker, whereby for example a
worker was put into a different position by a client unbeknown to the agency, or the
lack of proper supervision of a worker by a client, had the potential to create legal
liability in one or both parties. In this regard one agency owner mentioned the difficulty
ofobtaining public liability insurance in Australia to cover his workers.
There was a concern expressed by the agencies that an agency could be held culpable
for injury or damage, despite the fact that an agency did not have control over the
performance of its worker on a work site and that management of the worker and
workplace conditions rested with the client organisation.
1 Occupational health and safety issues will be dealt with in greater detail under its own heading.
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Agencies indicated that they sought to reduce the prospects of liability by systematic
monitoring ofwork sites, and by the inclusion of clauses in agreements with the clients
stipulating that the clients were to provide clear job or task instructions, and to provide
direct supervision while duties were being performed.
Some sample clauses were as follows:
To provide clear job/task instructions to - field staff regarding the task/s
undertaken, and to provide direct supervision whilst those duties are being
performed.
From the date of commencement the client is responsible for the proper and
adequate supervision of the Temporary Employee to enable the Temporary
Employee to carry out his or her duties. The Client must provide a safe working
environment relating to the health, safety and welfare ofthe Temporary Employee
and comply at all times with all common law and applicable legislation relating to
employees including without limitation, legislation dealing with occupational
health and safety and anti-discrimination. The client undertakes to ensure that
Temporary Employees only perform work for which they are appropriately
qualified or certified.
It was considered that one way that the employer-employee relationship could be
maintained was through constant visiting (weekly or otherwise), of the work sites by
agency representatives. It was pointed out by some agencies that it was impractical for
an agency properly to monitor work sites, where they numbered in the hundreds or were
widely spread geographically.
There was concern by five agencies about public liability, where damage or injury was
caused to a third party by an agency worker. In this regard views were expressed that
too much responsibility lay with an agency, and that the liability should be shared more
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equally by the client. Some agencies such as a security :firm pointed to the difficulties
of obtaining insurance cover against public liability, which was necessary to protect
against claims that might range from assaults to damage to technology by a computer
programmer.
Two agenCIes indicated that their lack of practical control over workers led to
difficulties and clashes with clients, where clients changed the role of a worker without
notifying the agency. It was noted that this has led to an agency such as the Drake
agency as employer in New South Wales being held liable under workplace health and
safety legislation, notwithstanding that the employee injured had been moved from one
job to another without the agency's knowledge. There was concern that agencies could
be open to liability in this way under workplace safety and workcover legislation, when
there could not be total monitoring of a worker's role and reliance had to be placed on
receiving the required notice from the client.
6.4.4 Nature of disputes between an agency and a worker
The interviews with the agencies revealed that these types ofdisputes usually related to
work conditions and wages and allowances. Five agencies mentioned that work
conditions had led to disputes; eight agencies referred to wages and allowances causing
disputes; and three agencies indicated that unreliability by a worker had created
disharmony between an agency and worker. One agency was of the view that the
younger generation (referred to as the "Generation X") were more aware of, and more
willing to enforce their rights at the workplace.
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The general impression from the agencies that commented was that, where there were
complaints about work conditions, the agencies tried to address the complaints, and
their reaction depended on the nature of the complaint. For instance, where the
complaint was that conditions were unsafe, one agency stated that it would try to
negotiate rectification of the problem with the client. If it could not do that then it
would simply refuse to trade with the client. Where.a worker complained ofworkplace
harassment, a response was to talk to a senior officer in the organisation in an attempt to
work through the problem. Agencies did this as part of their duty to their workers, as
weli as their clients.
A few agencies disclosed that they took a hard line approach to workers' complaints,
and showed little interest in that regard. The view was that, if the agencies catered too
much to workers, they would demand more and more of an agency's time and
involvement, with insufficient attention being paid to how much it was costing the
agency.
With respect to wage and allowances disputes between an agency and a worker, the
main area for dispute was whether the proper wage rate or allowances had been paid to
a worker. A typical scenario adverted to by nine agencies was where an individual was
doing a certain task, and believed that payment for this should be at a higher level,
whether by virtue of an award, collective agreement or market rates. It was pointed out
that in one situation the client had told the agency that the worker was carrying out
certain level work at an airport, and it turned out that the work was significantly higher
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level work. In another situation allowances for travel and living from home allowances
for a worker were not calculated properly.
There was agreement by nine agencies that an employee should be looked after and
paid properly to maintain employee morale. Further there was agency awareness that
short or under payment could lead to problems and claims at law for back payment later
on. One agency mentioned that in one case an employee without any prior notice to the
agency had taken out a claim against the agency in an industrial commission for non
payrilents of a meal allowance of $7.50. As an attempt to guard against legal claims, it
was provided in one agency agreement with a worker that there was to be prior
reference to a peak labour hire body for arbitration over disputed pay rates.
6.4.5 Whether occupational health and safety issues arise in labour hire
The data in the following sections on OHS draws attention to the issue ofthe sharing of
responsibility for labour hire workers between a labour hire agency and client, in this
case in respect of workplace health and safety. It also draws attention to the issue of
organisations seeking to avoid regulatory responsibilities placed on them as employers.
Seventeen of the thirty-four respondent agencies identified the occupational health and
safety (ORS) issue as a somewhat common or major issue.
As discussed in a prior chapter, OHS is the maintenance of health and safety at a
workplace. OHS law is the Federal and State legislation in Australia, which follows a
similar approach to the regulation of workplace health and safety. This approach
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involves the use of general duty provisions, which impose responsibility on parties
including employers and occupiers of workplaces, to prevent injury and disease to
workers and other persons at a workplace. Breach ofthis duty is a criminal offence, and
can also lead to the issue of improvement and prohibition notices to an offending party.
The OHS concern from a labour hire viewpoint is the maintaining of the health and
safety of the labour hire worker and others at the workplace, where the labour hire work
is sent. This is complicated by the fact that de facto control of a labour hire worker is
split 'between the labour hire agency and the client company, and by the reticence of a
labour hire agency to interfere with the day to day running or operation of a client's
business, which necessarily entails the day to day supervision of a labour hire worker
carrying out duties there.
Under the Workplace Health and Safety Act (Qld) both a labour hire agency as
employer and a client as the operator of work premises have statutory obligations and
responsibilities to maintain workplace health and safety. Under Section 6 (2)(d) of the
Industrial Relations Act labour hire agencies are included in the definition of
"employer".
Difficulties apparently can arise when a labour hire worker is shifted to a new location
or job, without notice being given to the labour hire agency. The agency is then
unaware of any potential dangers in the new location, and may be held liable for any
injury to the worker, regardless of its lack ofknowledge.
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The interviews of all agencies reveal that prevention of OHS incidents is attempted
through:
• Contractual demands on a client to give notice to an agency ofany change duties
or relocation for a labour hire worker (15 agencies)
• Training and safety inductions for the worker by the agency and the client, and
not sending workers to potentially dangerous sites (21 agencies)
• Periodic monitoring or site inspections by an agency (25 agencies)
• Requesting a worker to advise ofchanged duties or work hazards (9 agencies)
• Regular contact and liaising with the clients by an agency (8 agencies)
• The ultimate withdrawal ofservices from a client (10 agencies)
Some agencies stressed however, that for geographical and other factors, in some
situations it was just not feasible or practical to conduct site inspections of work
premises. In such cases agencies relied on the worker to give notice of unsafe work
facilities or practices. It could perhaps be argued here whether such a situation is
satisfactory.
Under the Queensland occupational health and safety legislation, the Workplace Health
and Safety Act 1995 (Qld), the client as owner or operator of a workplace, as well as the
agency as employer, is under an obligation to safeguard the well being ofpersons on the
work premises. A problem can arise however where there is an attempt by either party
to shift responsibility for ORS matters onto the other party, either in practice or through
contractual exclusion clauses (such as those excluding an agency from vicarious
liability for the actions of its workers that injure others at the workplace).
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Some agencies perceived that too great an onus was placed on a labour hire agency as
employer, and considered that a greater obligation should be placed on the client as the
operator of the work premises, or even on the person who was the worker. Agencies
however were cognisant of the fact that as employers they could keep workers'
compensation premiums down and stay in business, through the prevention of work
injuries to their labour hire workers.
For certain agencies involved with construction work workplace health and safety was
an i.J:llportant issue, because it was considered by five agencies that there was the
potential for many accidents in that area (unlike the white collar area). There was
concern that too many Workcover claims from their workers could impact on the level
of workers' compensation premiums paid and on their Workcover rating as an
employer. One agency put it that, if an agency did not do site inspections correctly to
see that workers were using the proper tools and wearing protective gear, and did not
notify the client where there were issues to be fixed., these matters would come back to
adversely affect or '~ite" them. One large agency stated that it had a national
workplace health and safety co-ordinator employed just to look after health and safety
issues in its five capital city branches.
A recurring comment from the agencies concerned the lack of control that agencies had
over the fate of their workers at clients' workplaces. Agencies pointed out that they
were putting a person on a site that was not under their direct supervision, and that, in
some circumstances, this could be a very dangerous situation, because they were not
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there on site looking after the employees' interests, such as for example ensuring that
there were no slippery floors or boxes in walkways.
Six agencies indicated that in such a situation they could not know with absolute
certainty what their people were doing, and it may be that unbeknown to them an
engineer or architect has been sent to a dangerous construction site. A protection
adopted by fifteen agencies was a contractual requirement that a client notify an agency
of any change to the agreed duties. Two agencies remarked that this notice was often
overlooked. Other means of protection adopted by agencies included induction and
training to be provided by agency and client; regular audits ofworkplaces by agencies;
and reliance on notification by workers, especially where a site was faraway.
Twenty-six agencies revealed that a standard feature of their operation was the giving
of preliminary induction and training to workers, which included instruction on health
and safety issues. These agencies appeared to believe that the workers would abide by
the instruction. Some agencies took a view that workers paid little attention to this
instruction, because it had become a monotonous procedure. In addition to their own
training nine agencies insisted that the client organisations gave site specific health and
safety instruction.
The seventeen agencies who thought of OHS as a major issue indicated that they placed
importance on site audits or inspections, both before and after placement of their
employees. Fifteen agencies mentioned that before they sent employees to a site, they
would evaluate and would do a risk assessment of the safety level of the client's
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workplace and check for potential hazards, to gauge if it were worthwhile putting an
employee on the site. If it were assessed that the site and jobs were unsafe (for example
if the scaffolding were unsafe), they would not do business with the organisation, unless
the dangers were fixed up. One agency placed great importance on only sending its
employees to safe worksites. The agency confided that it just recently had to deal with
an accident at a worksite, where an employee had lost the top ofhis finger.
As well as the preliminary site audits to ascertain whether there were any risk factors,
eighteen agencies concerned indicated that they conducted ongoing safety audits of
workplaces. Sixteen agencies had a full time officer whose job it was to inspect
worksites. By having regular audits the agencies hoped to spot any potential hazards or
situations (which may involve the client getting the agency's employees to do things
that they were not supposed to be doing) and to raise them with the client organisation.
Even with the safety audits however, the special nature of a labour hire arrangement
brought up a dilemma for a labour hire agency. An agency in practice had to tread a
fine line between insisting on the maintenance of proper safety standards at a client's
work site, and not telling a client how to carry out its operations. As one agency put it:
''However, we can't tell people how to run their own organisation". A contrary view to
this approach would be that an agency should insist on proper standards being kept.
Where agencies thought it was impractical for them to conduct safety inspections or
audits because of geographical limitations, an agency would rely on the employee to
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raise concerns about safety issues. One agency disclosed that, in the case of a worker
sent to Mt Isa in Queensland, it would supply a camera to a worker sent there, so that
the worker could take photographs of the work site. The work conditions would then be
discussed with the worker, in light ofthe photographs.
A similar procedure was adopted by the agency in respect ofemployees sent outside the
country. Where there were geographical and other practical constraints on agency
inspections, agencies endeavoured to cover themselves from liability, by requiring in
their' upfront documentation with employees, that the employees be very conscious of
safety, and to contact the agencies should they see anything that they considered to be
unsafe.
There was a suspicion among agencies in the group that some clients attempted to avoid
or transfer their DRS responsibilities, firstly in their use of labour hire staff (say for
manual handling) so as to avoid safety obligations for the use of normal staff, and
secondly in their approach to labour hire employees. In this regard one agency
remarked: "Some companies do use labour hire to offset their DRS responsibility. There
is no doubt about that at all".
Under the Workplace Health and Safety Act 1995 (Qld) both the agency and client body
have a statutory obligation and responsibility to maintain workplace health and safety.
There was a perception however that clients "passed the buck" or took advantage ofthe
general vagueness as to responsibility in a particular situation, for example
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responsibility for training. One agency noted that "It is difficult when you have two
employers".
Agencies felt that they had more to lose in the case ofwork accidents, because, as well
as the potential for prosecution under the workplace safety legislation, their Workcover
or workers' compensation rating could suffer as a result of the accidents. Accordingly
twenty-three agencies indicated that they pointed out to clients that the clients had a
responsibility under the workplace safety obligation, in addition to a moral obligation,
either through formal documentation(16 agencies) and/or informal means such as
telephone or discussion (14 agencies).
The foregoing concerns expressed by agencies, as to the problems surrounding the
implementation of OHS requirements, are supported by a recent study by Johnstone and
Quinlan (2006: 273-289) on the problems in Australia of enforcing the general OHS
standards in the labour hire (also known as leased labour) sector.
Johnstone and Quinlan pointed to the scope for confusion and blame shifting between
agencies and clients, for matters such as induction and training, and hazard
identification and risk assessment. They also referred to evidence which pointed to the
practical and logistical problems for labour hire operators (especially the numerous
small operators lacking overall resources), in attempting to carry out OHS obligations,
essentially designed for the standard employment situation. These included the
practical difficulties of performing preliminary safety checks on clients' workplaces.
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There were also major logistical challenges for agencies in providing workers ofdiverse
occupations for many different workplaces, while at the same time trying to ensure
adequate risk assessment, induction, training and supervision. These difficulties were
exacerbated where labour hire workers were placed into "environments of elevated
ORS risk", when used as a short term solution to organisational upheavals in
companies. A further bar to ORS regulation of labour hire work was the reluctance of
labour hire workers to raise ORS issues with the "host employer" (the client), given that
the "host employer" could terminate their temporary employment without reason.
The remaining respondent agencies (seventeen out of thirty-four) did not treat OHS as a
major issue on the basis that:
• People in general are becoming more conscious of workplace health and safety
(2 agencies)
• Agencies felt limited or felt resigned as to what they could do (6 agencies)
• There was a limited ORS risk in an office or clerical setting (4 agencies)
• Any potential dangers were of a more minor nature (for example, dirty or
unhygienic work premises) (one agency)
• Agencies relied mainly on their agreement with their clients, inter alia requiring
clients to sign offon a general duty ofcare clause (4 agencies)
• Agencies had what they thought was a good risk management process in place
(11 agencies)
• The agencies worked only with reputable and reliable clients (5 agencies), or
• The agencies did not rely on clients to do any training ofworkers (4 agencies).
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In a setting where the agency acts as an intermediary between the worker and client
company about the general safety concerns ofa worker, one agency felt it was taking on
a ''union type" role, whereby a worker made complaints in confidence to the agency
about general safety matters, and the agency arranged to have them fixed. In this way
the agency felt that it was "stealing the thunder" from the unions, and derogating from
their standing.
The same agency thought that too many safety inductions were counterproductive, .in
that In its view workers became blase about them or caused workers to take less
responsibility for their actions. This agency also queried the rationale behind OHS and
workers' compensation regulations and considered that liability should rest with the
person or persons who are responsible for the worksite.
Agencies in the second group, while not treating OHS as a leading concern, were still
quite aware of the benefits of reducing workers compensation costs, through a low
accident record. With respect to reducing costs, surprise was expressed by an agency
that any labour hire operator would want business to such an extent, that it would agree
(in a "hold harmless" clause) to indemnifying a client against inter alia claims for
ffiJury.
The agencies in the second group expressed a range of reasons why workplace health
and safety was not a major reason for them. In some cases it was because agencies dealt
largely or solely with providing clerical workers. In other cases agencies felt that it was
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not a problem due to their conscientiousness. Another factor raised was endeavouring
to deal with only reputable clients.
As regards clerical work, the view was expressed by agencies dealing with clerical
issues, that unlike the industrial scene OHS was not a significant issue. This Was due to
the nature of the work, in that workers were not using potentially dangerous machinery
or performing potentially dangerous duties, but were performing office duties and using
only items such as printers and fax machines.
On the issue of conscientiousness, agencies in the second group thought that an overall
apprQach or risk management obviated the likelihood of accidents. This approach
involved workplace inspections before placement of staff to ensure people would be
working in a safe environment; general safety and site specific inductions; regular
contact with the worker and client; and dealing with reputable clients.
One agency went so far as to say that all accidents were preventable, and one way of
achieving that was not to place anyone with a client who took chances on safety.
Another agency had in place a risk management strategy, which could be shown to
government authorities as proof it had taken all reasonable steps. This involved getting
worker and client to sign forms requiring the taking of precautions (such as wearing
protective clothing) and identifying risks. The view was expressed that in maintaining
regular contact to make sure everything was working well or satisfactorily, an agency
was providing a union type role in that the workers could speak in confidence with an
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agency to have safety problems rectified, especially where to the surprise of agencies,
workers saw the clients as their employers.
Agencies placed importance on dealing with reputable clients, who were conscious of
the fact that they were still responsible for the health and safety of people on site. In
their view reputable clients accepted their duty of care under OHS legislation to provide
a safe workplace and safe work system, and to provide adequate supervision, induction
and training. They also would be unlikely to relocate workers to new jobs without
notice to an agency. It was thought in any event that it was in the best interests of the
clients to take care ofhire workers, so as to get the best return. on the hourly rate paid on
them.
Similarly it was felt by agencies that it was very much in their interest to maintain high
safety standards. One agency pointed out that one of the best ways of remaining
competitive in the market place was to keep its safety costs under control. In the view
of the agency, workers' compensation costs should be kept low, because it affected the
rates charged to clients. Attention was drawn to the fact that Workcover in Queensland
had an industry rate for workers' compensation insurance premiums, and a higher levy
was charged if a company's rating was worse than the industry average.
Some agencies went to special lengths to maintain high standards. One agency operated
a company not only to provide ongoing safety guidance to the agency, but also to
educate clients as to risks in their workplaces and how to overcome them (for example
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by demonstrating proper forklift operation). Another maintained a special work injury
management team in Queensland, to look after injuries and ORS policies and
procedures.
Despite discounting workplace health and safety as a major problem for themselves,
some agencies had a somewhat resigned attitude towards workplace accidents given
their lack of practical control over a worker on a work site under a labour hire
arrangement. One agency made the point that it could inspect a manufacturing site on
one day and see that everything was fine, and then send a worker there the following
day, when there could be a hazard that was not there the day before.
One agency operator with strong views felt that an agency was limited as to what it
could do as the employer of the worker, ''because we have no control over safety on a
site, so it is all a nonsense". Re went on to say that: "the workplace health and safety
legislation is a just a total shambles, whoever wrote it has never heard of labour hire".
In this regard he drew attention to the Drake agency case in New South Wales, (which
will be discussed in a following chapter), where the agency supplied a person to a
factory, and the person was moved from one machine to another, without the agency's
knowledge. The agency operator particularly was aggrieved that the Drake agency
ended up being fined under ORS legislation, in respect ofan injury to the worker.
The same agency operator made an interesting observation, that the divided ORS
responsibilities under legislation between a labour hire agency and client caused
problems and confusion. In his view these responsibilities had to be on one or the other,
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not both. He considered that the easiest way would be to say they were site
responsibilities, and that the same situation should apply also for payroll tax and
Workcover responsibilities.
6.4.6 Opinion of a peak business body on occupational health and safety and
labour hire
One peak recruiting body on the issue ofworkplace health and safety advanced the view
that, having both the labour hire agency and client company sharing workplace health
and safety obligations, rather than leading to a diffusion of responsibility, would lead to
better safety outcomes, because there would be more parties looking at the issue of
workplace health and safety.
A spokesman for the group was of the opinion that in the future an on-hired or labour
hire employee would be likely to be in a safer situation than a normal employee in a
non-labour hire location, because there were parties (the agency and client) working
together to ensure workplace health and safety. ill his view having two heads rather
than one on the matter was a far more efficient way of dealing with the issue, in that
there were two parties who could work in conjunction to facilitate the ongoing review
and assessment of a workplace to identify risks and hazards, and to come up with new
ideas on promoting safety. He considered that this utilisation of resources was a better
situation than the one where the parties were inclined to leave it to the other to take
action. ill this regard the spokesman commented that one of the problems at the
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moment was that there was a lack of consistency, in the interpretation of who was
responsible in a certain situation.
According to the spokesman the end result ofthe two parties working together would be
a safer workplace not only for the on-hire or labour .hire workforce placed there, but also
for the permanent workforce there, because there are more skilled managers, in-house
and outside, looking at ORS. A consequence would be that the use of labour hire at a
workplace would make it more safe than normally. The contrary view to this position
would be that having two entities responsible for ORS means a lack of application by
the entities, in that each is expecting the other to comply.
6.4.7 Opinions of unions on the impact of labour hire on occupational health
and safety
All but one of the twelve unions interviewed considered ORS to be a major issue with
respect to the use oflabour hire. One union noted in passing that ORS has always been
a contentious area between employers and employees anyway.
Eight out of the twelve unions thought that the use of labour hire posed real safety
problems, in that proper training or lack oftraining for labour hire workers was often an
issue. One union referred to the 'break in the safety link', where other staff have to
work with labour hire workers who are lacking the proper work skills. This was due in
part to labour hire workers often having to keep adjusting to changing workplaces and
workplace conditions.
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A widespread attitude was that the mere nature of labour hire posed special problems as
regards workplace health and safety. It was considered that responsibility for the
training of labour hire workers for the job shifted in practice between the agency and
client, and was a matter for concern. While both parties had a joint obligation under the
workplace safety legislation, their efforts were considered inadequate in different
situations.
As regards the agencies, views were expressed that, apart from the few agencies that
were proactive, agencies commonly would spend the least possible time on safety
training for their employees. This attitude was governed by cost factors, namely that
time spent on training was likely to eat into profit margins. It was felt that some
agencies were lax on safety, and were prepared to take a risk on the chance of injury.
According to the unions one result was that the cost cutting measures of the less ethical
agencies make it difficult for the ethical ones.
There was a similar negative attitude towards safety training by the clients. There was a
feeling expressed that every client organisation was different in the way that it managed
workplace health and safety. Further there was a widespread view that, though they
shared a joint obligation with an agency, clients or host employers seemed to shirk the
responsibility for training hire workers on how to carry out duties safely. While some
of the smaller ones may have lacked the proper infrastructure, it was felt that clients
were unwilling to provide the same training or resources for casuals such as labour hire
staff, as they would for their permanent staff. As one union put it: "I don't think there
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would be the commitment to address OHS issues, if people are only going to be there
for a couple ofweeks".
In addition to uncertain training, it was pointed out that the special nature of labour hire
was likely to cause a negative impact on ORS, because of the irregular work hours .and
changing workplaces for labour hire workers. A result was that an employee might not
be familiar with the surroundings, particularly where little or no attention had been paid
to proper inductions.
Six of the twelve unions believed that labour hire had a detrimental effect on ORS, in
that a sharing of workplace safety responsibility between agency and client might not
happen in practice, because of shirking of responsibilities by either or both parties to
save time and costs. It was thought that this could arise in part because the agency did
not exercise day to day control over its employees, and there was thus a "fractured chain
of command". One union put it "as sending someone in that is your employee to work
under someone else".
One union was particularly vehement about the possibility of the presence of a new
labour hire person on a worksite breaking the link or chain of the safety procedures at
that workplace. The union secretary thought that it could be particularly dangerous
where dangerous goods were involved. It might be that a labour hire person was with
others working with dangerous goods, but did not know how to deal properly with the
dangerous goods.
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Another union considered that the injury risk at a workplace was considerably greater
when agency workers were involved. According to this union whether this increased
risk manifested itself into actual incidents was something on which it did not have
information. There were suggestions from some of the unions that there should be
suitable regulation put in place; that unions could work with agencies to ensure that
workplace health and safety is more regulated; and that there should be better inspection
ofworkplaces by government officers.
One unIon considered that the current workplace health and safety legislation in
Queensland, the Workplace Health and Safety Act 1995 (Qld), was very much about
self-regulation, and was not conducive to labour hire in that it relied on "infrastructure,
consistency and people building up knowledge at a workplace". The system under the
legislation also relied on elected workplace safety representatives who were properly
trained, and on committees that met regularly at the workplace. In the view of this
union, labour hire was not conducive to any of those things. The union also highlighted
the difficulties associated with the transitory nature of labour hire, in that a labour hire
person might come in on a Monday, be involved in an accident and be gone the next
day.
Unions in the latter group of six unions relevantly commented that labour hire workers
because of their precarious work status (and possible lack of awareness of their rights)
were less likely to complain about unsafe workplace practices and were more likely to
feel compelled to work longer and more irregular hours. Labour hire workers were less
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likely to complain because many would think that their job posting was for a short term,
and so were more prepared to put up with shoddy equipment such as a desk or chair.
There was also a common view that the workers were worried about complaining about
the work environment, because of the fear it might cause a negative reaction from the
client.
One union instanced a situation where a labour hire member had complained to the
client or site operator about chemical smoke and the client had then instructed the
agency not to send the person back to the site. The union in question considered that
the impact of labour hire on commercial health and safety was the same as that of
casualisation, and that people with tenuous employment relationships were less likely to
complain abut unfair or dodgy work practices.
The reticence of workers to complain also caused flow on effects with regard to safety.
If there is likely to be compulsion on individual workers to work extended hours (for
example- starting earlier and working through normal breaks), to achieve work targets,
then such working hours could impact on their concentration and work ability, which in
turn could increase the chances ofaccidents.
6.4.8 The views of labour hire workers on the relationship between labour hire
and workplace health and safety
Three labour hire workers expressed some comments on the use of labour hire and
workplace health and safety. Two of the workers (who worked in an industrial area)
expressed concerns that labour hire did have a detrimental effect on workplace health
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and safety because of cost cutting measures in labour hire, and lack of proper training.
The other worker, who was a female in a white collar area, did not express similar
concerns and referred to the regular occurrence of OHS training in her jobs.
The two industrial workers interviewed expressed cynicism generally about the attitude
ofboth labour hire agencies and client bodies towards workplace safety. They felt that
the use of labour hire was having a detrimental effect on workplace safety. Both tended
to the view that agencies were after maximum profit, and usually were reluctant to
provide more than basic or token work and safety training, whether by video or
otherwise. The workers felt that agencies were inclined to leave safety training or
induction to the client or host company, on the assumption it was the host company's
business to provide training to ensure that the worker knew how to do the job.
Both industrial workers felt that, where a vigilant labour hire worker complained that
workplace safety was lacking on a site, the worker would be likely to be pressured to
"quieten down" or lose future work. The result was that labour hire workers were
reluctant to say that something was wrong or did not happen as regards workplace
safety issues, such as noise levels.
By way of contrast the female white collar worker had fairly positive views about the
general and safety training provided to her. She recounted that with respect to a data
entry placement with a bank, she had received fairly extensive training including safety
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training. With respect to another position the same person felt that if anything she had
received disproportionately long training, given the short duration ofthe job placement.
However, the two industrial workers did highlight the serious consequences of having
inadequately trained labour hire employees working at a client's premises, where
potentially dangerous activities are carried on. In particular one such worker instanced
a dramatic incident involving himself, which exemplified the dangers that could arise
when an improperly trained labour hire worker was brought in to work with others on a
site.
The industrial worker referred to a situation where he had been working at a foundry in
a pouring team, where there had been a continual turnover of staff, with some staying
only a matter of days. In addition it was very fast paced work with up to four furnaces
operating at any given time. One short term worker, who had received no induction
from the labour hire or client company, on one occasion put power to the wrong
furnace, with the consequence that the industri.a1 worker suffered severe bums from
exploding molten metal. What was particularly galling to the injured worker was that a
week later the offending worker had left the worksite never to be seen again, without
even leaving an apology. To the injured worker this urevolving door" turnover of staff
was not conducive to workplace safety.
6.4.9 Whether anti-discrimination issues arise in labour hire
The data below focuses attention on a key underlying theme ofthis thesis, that employer
organisations have incentives to utilise less regulated or unregulated labour markets
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such as labour hire, to avoid regulatory responsibilities placed on employers, such as the
anti-discrimination legislative obligations on employers.
The issue here is whether labour hire workers are discriminated against either in the
selection processes for jobs, or while they are working at workplaces, on the basis of
race, gender, sexual preferences, marital status, age or other reason.
In Queensland the relevant legislation applying is the Anti-Discrimination Act 1991
(Qld) .and Federal legislation such as the Racial Discrimination Act 1975 (Cth) and the
Sex Discrimination Act 1984 (Cth). Under these Acts discrimination (and sexual
harassment) in employment and other contexts is prohibited on the basis of criteria such
as race and gender.
Agencies revealed in the interview process situations ranging from direct discrimination
to somewhat subtle attempts at discrimination. A few of the agencies were of the
opinion that the labour hire method of employment was used deliberately by companies
to get around the anti-discrimination laws relating to employment, so they could avoid
engaging people with certain characteristics. In this regard the client companies are
aided by the labour hire process, in that they as non-employers can select or not select
from a short list of candidates submitted by an agency. The agencies concerned thought
that discrimination issues were a big reason or driver for the expansion of labour hire.
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Sometimes agencIes felt that what the client was requesting was not a case of
discrimination, but a case where the client was attempting to ensure that a person was
obtained who could do the job in question. The situation appears more doubtful where
the agency assisted a client in rejecting a potential candidate, on the basis that the
candidate would be incompatible in a particular workforce. Some agencies mentioned
that they now had to take extra care, given the Privacy Act 1988 (Cth) and Guidelines,
as to what they said about employees on their personnel files.
One agency, while having to deal with a few cases of discrimination itself, was strongly
of the view that employers were attracted to labour hire, so they could discriminate
amongst workers.
Of the thirty-four respondent agencies, twenty-four agencies indicated that they had
experienced few cases of discrimination, or did not consider it a major problem. A
range of reasons were advanced for this, from maintaining clear equal opportunity
policies, to being proactive in early investigation of potential problems, to candidly
acknOWledging to seeking the right fit of worker for a particular position. Some
agencies were quite forthright about adopting an equal opportunity policy or stance.
Their attitude was that they could not help a client discriminate against candidates in
any way, and they would employ anyone as long as the person had the appropriate
skills. Under this approach for example they would send to a client resumes for both
males and females, even if the client had requested a person of a particular gender. The
attitude was that the legislation was clear as to what their obligations were.
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Where there was an initial complaint of discrimination, as mentioned agencies would
investigate at an early stage at the client site, in an endeavour to resolve the issue. In
one situation a prompt investigation with the client led to an official warning by the
client to its permanent employees, and a realignment of the workplace to everyone's
satisfaction which enabled the hired worker to stay on in his role. In other situations
where resolution could not be reached, the agency's attitude was that the person was not
sent back to the site.. As one agency noted: "There may be no proofeither way, and you
certainly cannot accuse anybody of doing anything ifyou cannot prove it".
It was pointed out by one agency that not all discrimination was unlawful. The agency
instanced a case where a client had not wanted people with beards, and the agency had
acceded to that request, because it was not unlawfully discriminatory as such. Similarly
it was not discriminatory where lifting loads were imposed on the sexes,in the interests
of safety. By way of contrast it was against the legislation, if proven, to discriminate
against pregnant women. For one agency the bugbear here was maternity leave, and the
guaranteed right to return to work after it.
Another agency advanced the view that at times claims of discrimination were arising
from a sector of the workforce that was becoming disgruntled by the casualisation ofthe
process. Perceptions of discrimination were developing in a workforce unhappy with
their role. According to this particular agency this was going to be a greater issue for
employment organisations.
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As mentioned, agencies were often governed by practical considerations in pre-empting
discrimination claims. A common attitude was that getting the right fit of candidate for
a particular position obviated potential difficulties. While agencies appeared generally
to push the claims of all available candidates, there was a ready realisation that in the
interests of client and candidate it was best to place someone who would be a good
"cultural fit" in the workplace. Otherwise the client was not going to accept the good
worker and the worker would not be comfortable in the environment. As two agencies
put it, it was not in their commercial interests to send somebody out that the client was
going to reject quite openly, or who would be "wasting" the client's time.
One agency in particular referred to cultural fit problems with certain types of workers
(such as Indian accountants) in Australian workplaces. The agency stated that, if it
advertised for accountants in newspapers, it could guarantee that "half of the applicants
would be from the University of New Delhi". The problem for the agency in its
experience was that usually such people did not last more than three months in an
organisation, because of cultural fit and other issues. Thus it appears in practice that at
the expense of employees' interests, agencies regularly attempted to forestall potential
discrimination problems by putting up candidate workers to a client that they believed
would fit into the client's work environment.
On the subject of workplace discrimination generally, one agency made the interesting
observation that "discrimination issues are a big reason for the expansion of labour
hire", in the sense ofnormal employers discriminating against potential candidates, such
as those with off putting features such as body piercing or tattoos. The agency pointed
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out that under anti-discrimination laws nonnal employers as a rule were supposed to
pick the best person for a job, otherwise they could lay themselves open to possible
claims ofdiscrimination.
The special attraction of labour hire for client organisations was that they, as non-
employers, could choose freely from the list of candidates submitted by the agency as
legal employer, without the fear of being accused of discriminating as an employer.
Under labour hire, it was the client and not the agency as legal employer who had the
ultimate discretion on who was placed into the worksite position. Labour hire thus
offered for clients a potential way around the applications of anti-discrimination laws.
The remaining group often agencies (out of thirty-four) opined that discrimination was
or had the potential to be a fairly common occurrence in labour hire, and did occur with
respect to sex or gender, race, and age. A view was expressed that it was not
discrimination where a client or host employer was after someone who was best capable
ofdoing a particularjob, taking into account the fitness requirements of the job.
It may be a more borderline situation, whereas alluded to earlier, an agency indicated
that in helping to select candidates it took into account the 'cultural fit' of a client's
workplace, and whether a candidate would fit into that work environment, particularly
where the candidate's views were not sought on the matter.
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While all ten agencies thought that discrimination was a problem in the labour hire area,
for some agencies it was an issue that arose more frequently or created greater
difficulties. For one agency every type of discrimination had arisen, with the three
dominating being "age, sex and race". Another agency commented that a large number
of candidates had disclosed problems with discrimination on sites in previous
employment.
One agency in this group highlighted how it could be awkward for an agency where a
complaint arose at a workplace. The agency related that it had been caught up in one
situation because it was the legal employer of the complainant, even though it was a
supervisor .ofthe client that had made the offending comment. The agency stated that it,
in addition to the client, had ended up having to pay compensation to the aggrieved
complainant.
Another agency considered that labour hire agencies were prone to discrimination
claims at the appointment stage of employees, because clients as non-employers, while
not being able to advertise along those lines, could suggest subtly to agencies their
preferences for employees, which on the face of it could be discriminatory. In such a
situation it was thought that the agency was ''very susceptible" to claims. These views
were backed up by another agency, that indicated that its clients were very free about
stipulating whether they wanted a male or female for a job. The agency's response was
that it could not discriminate, and whether the best candidate was male or female it
would put that person forward for consideration.
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One interview with a member ofthe second group illustrated how trying a situation it
could be for an agency, when a discrimination claim arose. The situation in question
concerned a welder who had a sex change to become a woman. A consequence was
that the person had to dress as a woman and use female facilities. The person's
placement caused great problems for the agency, because the person was not accepted
by the workforce in different workshops. The person's position could not be resolved
by the agency and in the end, the agency no longer engaged the person.
More generally agencies in the group acknowledged that they had to deal with the issue
of the clash of cultures and values at a workplace. One nursing agency instanced
problems in this regard, for example old ladies or Muslim women not wanting male
nurses at nursing homes; and Vietnam veterans in a mental health setting being upset by
anybody of Asian descent. The agency noted that the discrimination was based on a
culture, the values of the people being nursed. It also observed that the legislation
allowed for some limited exceptions (such as religious grounds) to the prohibitions on
anti-discrimination.
As with the first group (of 24 agencies), agencies in the second group indicated that
they tried to reduce the like.lihood of discrimination claims, by taking into account the
work culture before recommending placements at a work site. Where there was
potential for a clash between a new worker and others on a site, one agency stated that it
would mention this to a candidate, and ask whether the person still wanted the
assignment. Other agencies similarly took into account whether foreigners with
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language difficulties would be compatible in a workforce, or whether older workers
would be able to tolerate a physically hard work environment, or would be comfortable
in a computerised environment. On the latter point, one particular agency was firmly of
the view that age discrimination was rife against people over forty years of age, on the
basis that older workers lacked the ability to change and be re-trained.
There was a general view then that the problem was one of perception, particularly on
the part of clients. For instance, as mentioned in the first group, one agency referred to
a perception among clients that had existed in recent times, that Indian accountants who
were on the increase were not up to standard as regards qualifications and skills,
including language skills. In such a situation, it was felt that an agency was caught in
the middle, but still felt obliged to offer such persons as candidates to reluctant clients,
lest they be considered to be discriminating. This was particularly the case given that
under the new Privacy Act (Cth) applicants could access their files.
6.5 Qualitative Responses
6.5.1 Benefits of labour hire - the Client view
This data draws attention to the key underlying themes of this study, that because of
increasing regulatory obligations and costs employers have had incentives to utilise less
regulated markets such as labour hire, to avoid regulatory obligations such as those
under unfair dismissal legislation. This trend is further encouraged where there are
perceived to be further benefits such as flexibility in the recruitment ofstaff and reduced
labour costs.
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As only agencies and not client organisations (apart from some peak bodies) were
interviewed, the benefits of labour hire from the clients' viewpoint are gauged from
views expressed by clients to the agencies, and from the perception of agencies as to the
benefits for clients arising from continuing interaction with clients.
In summary the following matters, which will be dealt with in order, were advanced as
the benefits of labour hire from the client perspective:
• Flexibility in the staffing of a workforce (31 agencies)
• The convenience factor in recruitment and human relations management (19
agencies)
• The unfair dismissal laws (19 agencies)
• The avoidance of employer responsibilities by companies and the perceived
need to escape from excessive workplace regulation generally (17 agencies)
• The trialling of employees ("try before you buy" approach) for permanent
positions (7 agencies)
• Reduction ofcosts and easing ofcash flow for companies (13 agencies)
• The provision of flexible work patterns for employees (1 agency)
• Handling skill shortages in the workforce (7 agencies)
• Avoiding the training of employees (5 agencies)
• The opportunities for workers to improve their work skills (12 agencies).
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(a) Flexibility in staffing of a workforce and the convenience factor in
recruitment and human relations
All but one of the thirty four labour hire agencies were of the view that clients were
drawn to the flexibility in staffmanagement afforded by the use of labour hire.
The agencies pointed out that labour hire offered flexibility in various ways. One
agency put it succinctly that using labour hire gave clients flexibility by being able to
accommodate fluctuating demands in the market place, through the opportunity of
using a temporary labour force to upsize and downsize their business in short time
frames. To one agency it was the number one reason why labour hire was used. One
large multi-national labour hire agency similarly expressed the view that "basically
labour hire works in that it actually services the peaks and troughs of a person's
business". It was pointed out that this was why labour hire was referred to as
"flexible staffing".
Labour hire in the view of the agencies also afforded convenience in terms of the
need to recruit and interview staff, because those roles are performed by a labour hire
agency. One agency referred to the fact that clients could ring for staff and be
supplied with people straight away, whereas, if they had to go through the process of
finding casuals themselves, it would involve time and effort for them.
The flexibility and convenience of labour hire reduced the strains of human resource
management for clients. As a large local agency noted, a client did not have the
hassle of putting somebody on full time. In this regard one labour hire manager
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opined "I think: the benefit to the client is to be able to take them on, and if they don't
work out, to get rid .ofthem quickly". A client could keep an agency worker only as
long as needed, and a labour hire agency as the legal employer looked after payment
of all the associated costs of an employee, such as superannuation, workers'
compensation premiums and payroll tax.
The administrative convenience factor was echoed by agencies in general. Apart
from the general consensus among agencies of labour hire providing flexibility in the
workforce sense with respect to production requirements, agencies highlighted the
benefit to clients of using people in agencies who have become specialised in
personnel selection and human relations management. Agencies supplied personnel
who were believed to be job ready after screening and interview processes.
According to the agencies they had become skilled at selection processes, because
they were doing it on a daily basis and with ready access to databases.
Some of the labour hire firms adverted to the notion of a core workforce in the
workforce flexibility argument. The benefit to clients here was that they could focus
on working their business, engage minimum permanent staff levels, and let the
agencies as professionals in recruitment deal with supplementary staffing issues.
A large multi-national labour hire firm drew attention to having in this way a more
effective cost base for clients (such as hospitals and nursing homes) to operate by,
because for instance they would be paying for specialist staff needed only for the
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duration of a project. Thus a client could balance "actual head count" to the "actual
needs and workflow demands". In this regard there was a common agency sentiment
that there was a particular attraction to clients in being able to bring in specialists for
particular project skills on a short term basis. As a sidenote to this sentiment, one
agency was advised by clients that specialist and non-specialist workers as temporary
workers were attractive to clients, because they were there to do particular work and
were not distracted by "office politics".
CD) lJnfairdisEnissallavvs
Nineteen of the thirty-four agencies (56%) directly referred to the fear of unfair
dismissal legislation and other employer directed legislation as being a reason for the
use of labour hire by client organisations.
The 19 agencies made reference to the advantage in that labour hire workers could be
dispensed with relatively easily, in comparison to permanent employees who may be
able to access the provisions of the unfair dismissal legislation, if dismissed. Under
the Federal and Queensland legislation an employee is permitted to pursue a claim,
where the termination of employment is "harsh, unjust or unreasonable" or for an
invalid reason (such as trade union membership). As one agency remarked, a client
can say "don't send him back, I have got no work", and in so doing there was no
confrontation, no risk of laying somebody off and there was no risk of unfair
dismissal.
200
Chapter Six
Research
Comments were also expressed by agencies that, based on the reactions from clients,
the unfair dismissal legislation was a leading aspect of the industrial legislation in
general (such as the laws covering workers compensation, occupational health and
safety, and superannuation), which was acting as a driver towards a greater use of
labour hire. One agency for the liquor industry noted that, because of the unfair
dismissal and other legislation, there was a strong incentive for businesses not to
carry the burden or responsibility of being an employer, and to have all their staff
organised by the labour hire industry.
One agency owner in particular was more forthright than others about the effect of
legislation, such as the unfair dismissal legislation on employer attitudes to the
engagement of staff. The owner stated that "the (labour hire) industry largely exists
because of the excessive regulation in the permanent workforce. We are a creature
entirely ofthe legislation".
The owner went on to comment further: "That section of the market has grown
dramatically; the response of labour hire is really an extension of the same thing that
is driving the casualisation market. The whole thing is driven in Australia by
excessive regulation, which makes it uneconomic to employ people. So we are
fundamentally creatures of excessive silly government regulation. It is contradicted
by the American experience which is a deregulated market place, and labour hire is
huge over there. I think the growth over there is probably generated by different
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reasons to what it is here". The agency owner concluded by saying that "the unfair
dismissal laws, the more they strengthen them, the busier labour hire will get".
Other agencies varied somewhat in their views on the impact of legislation such as
the unfair dismissal legislation. One agency respondent was of the view that the
unfair dismissal legislation was a factor in the choice of labour hire by companies,
but that its effect was hard to quantify along with a whole series of factors that some
companies took very seriously. For some companies there was not a particular
concern about employment law aspects. On the other hand the sentiments expressed
to a number of agencies by clients was that clients thought that there was a big
benefit in the flexibility afforded by labour hire, in that they could hire and could get
rid of people without the fear of unfair dismissal claims. According to one agency,
many companies had revealed that they were scared of employing and being able to
dismiss people, especially those who had been "burnt" in the past by industrial
relations issues.
As regards claims for unfair dismissal, one agency singled out 1995 as a particularly
bad year for companies.2 The agency owner stated Hin 1995 there was an incredible
increase in unfair dismissal claims as a result of that, and it seemed every man and
his dog was making a claim. I think it frightened a lot of employers in the small
business sector and probably some of the other sectors, with regard to ease of
employing staff. So I think people generally look for more flexible arrangements".
2 The fonner ALP-introduced federal unfair dismissal laws had been in place for a full year by then.
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(c) Trialling of employees for permanent positions
Six labour hire agencies specifically referred to the fact that client companies will
use labour hire with a view to "trialling" a labour hire worker to ascertain whether
that worker would be a suitable permanent employee ofthe workplace.
A common response from the agencIes was that labour hire enabled business
organisations to "try before you buy". ill other words a lot ofclients used labour hire
to look at and try out people, before they took them on as employees on a full time
basis. One respondent agency pointed out that client companies will often take on
technically competent people for temporary roles, for an opportunity to assess them
and for them to assess the organisation, with a view to hiring them permanently at
the end of the trial period.
One agency in particular pointed to the advantages of this arrangement, by pointing
out that a prospective employer obtained a double probationary period in respect of a
prospective employee. The selling point to companies was that they in effect had the
workers under probation while the workers were the employees of the agency, and
then had the workers under a three month probationary period with the companies.
Thus the companies were getting an extended probationary try out of the workers.
An added bonus referred to by agencies was that during the trial process an agency
carried the overall obligation or risk that a labour hire worker was a good fit in the
work environment. Where there was not a match of the correct candidate for the job
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description, the client always had the option of sending the worker back or in
extreme cases not paying the agency's account.
From what the respondent agencIes indicated both orally and from their
documentation, labour hire workers went on a set trial period according to the
agreement of say three months, and if the labour hire worker was taken on
permanently by the client company, there was invariably a placement or conversion
fee charged by the agency to the client company.
(d) Reducing costs and easing of cash flow for organisations
Nine of the thirty~four labour hire agencies directly referred to the cost benefits
associated with using labour hire workers for clients. Notwithstanding that a client
company has to pay a 23% ~ 25% loading on the permanent rate for the hire of a
labour hire worker, a number .ofagencies were of the view that there were clear cost
benefits in the utilisation of labour hire rather than permanent staff.
In their view the cost benefits for clients lay in not having to bear short term and long
term costs associated with having permanent workers on staff, such as those for
superannuation, annual and long service leave, sick leave, payroll tax, and workers'
compensation. Under the labour hire arrangements the only relevant subsidiary costs
(superannuation, payroll tax and workers compensation) were taken care of by the
labour hire agency. As one agency pointed out, a cost advantage of labour hire for a
client was that a client knew up front and could factor in what a labour hire worker
would cost, which was the charge out rate of an agency.
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Added to those perceived cost savings from the clients' perspective, there were also
reductions in the general administrative and operational costs involved in the
administration of staff. Even mundane matters such as the supplying of uniforms
could be obviated. One agency mentioned that in servicing several clients it used
economies of scale to keep human resource costs down for clients. It mentioned by
way of example that ''we have two girls in payroll handling 1200 odd employees.
Now normally, if you employ twenty-five people, you would have a girl on full time
five days a week looking after payroll and associated matters". Given that the labour
hire industry was very competitive, there was an agency view that the service fees or
margins for these administrative services could be quite low, particularly where
agencies were relying on volume ofturnover.
Three of the nine agencies specifically.referred to the special cash flow advantages
obtained by clients through the extension to them ofcredit payments by the agencies.
r
The standard situation in labour hire is that the agency pays the worker up front and
then recoups that cost from the client company. In many situations the client
company is then given a certain period oftime in which to pay the account.
The widespread practice of providing credit to clients was mentioned in the
interviews as a great benefit to clients, because it reduced cash flow problems for
them. One agency commented "it (labour hire) releases a lot of cash flow, because
we have to pay the people, then we invoice them and they have got time for payment.
It might be 30 days, 7 days, 14 days and that is how clients keep their cash flow
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going. So that is one of the biggest benefits". It thus appears then that through the
provision of credit under labour hire, client bodies can delay the payment of
employment costs. Further under such an arrangement an agency can carry the risk
of bad debts, such as where client companies go into liquidation. An agency noted
that there could be trouble ''where with a company in liquidation the liquidator tries
to recover money paid to the agency within six months ofliquidation".
(e) Handling skills shortages in workplaces
Agencies supplying niche market made reference to the special use of labour hire in
handling skills shortages in workplaces. In particular reference was made to the use
of labour hire for work on special or specific projects. It was pointed out by those
agencies generally that labour hire supplied workers with special skills that were
lacking or deficient in the normal workplace team of employees. This occurred in
numerous areas such as engineering, drafting, financial services and architecture.
There was a general feeling among the agencies that labour hire was suited
particularly to project work that clients such as engineering and drafting companies
engaged in. Firstly a project (such as designing a bridge or building a machine)
usually had a limited life cycle, so as one agency put it, "it suits the clients that they
are able to ramp up quickly by engaging a whole series of contract staff, and when
the job is finished shedding them all out of the door on virtually no notice, until such
time as they pick up another project".
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From the clients' viewpoint, agencies offered quickly trained and quite technically
able people, who could be used for the short or medium term and then shed when the
project concluded. Further, as one agency noted, under the legal relationship of
labour hire, the specialist staff engaged for the duration of the project never became
the legal responsibility of the client companies, but remained that of the agencies
(unless they were operating as independent contractors). As regards project work
then, the view of another agency was that "having them on as permanent staffjust is
not a practical way to go". The same agency explained that, even with the filling of
government positions, it was very much easier for a government department to get
approval for a labour hire worker to come in, than for the filling of a permanent
position.
Labour hire is used to deal with skills shortages. Some mention was made by
agencies as to the reasons for workplace skills shortages. One observation was made
that skilled shortages resulted from mobility in the workforce today:
So there is a lot more mobility in the workforce, and this is also heading to skilled
shortages in the workplace. If you took a medium and long term view we are
going to have continuous skill shortages globally, for example in information
technology.
Another opinion was to the effect that skilled shortages resulted from continual
restructuring by companies, and employees were being out-structured by companies
at age 55, because they were more expensive. Companies then found that skills were
being lost, and needed to be replaced. In this regard, one labour hire agency set up
by a union for professional workers indicated that there had been a demand to bring
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back displaced workers as labour hire employees for example on a six months
contract, to participate in a programme to mentor and pass on skills to younger
employees.
One agency owner even referred to a special labour hire arrangement whereby her
agency undertook to train airport workers from the beginning for a three to six month
period, after which they were moved across to permanent vacancies with an airline
company. Another special arrangement to fill skills shortages was where another
labour hire agency offered a very specialised .service, in that it was a government
backed corporation which specialised in the supply of technical apprentices on a
labour hire type basis to businesses, that were not prepared to put on apprentices and
trainees where they could not predict their future needs. Such schemes, called group
training schemes, have been set up to help small businesses employ apprentices in
areas ofneed.
(1) Employee training
Only a very small group (three) indicated that labour hire was used by client
companies to avoid having to train employees. One agency put it in this fashion:
They (the clients) haven't got the time or resources to find staff, train staff and
put them in, so they utilise labour hire, it is a quick fix. In a nutshell, that's
basically it.
One agency said that the expectation from clients was that, upon ringing for an
agency worker, they would be supplied with a person with up to date skills, who
would require very little training and be fully ready to start. An agency in the
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security industry concurred with this approach, in that it believed its role was to train
its hired out workers so that they were "up to speed" before being placed out.
One specialist body involved with the hiring out of industry apprentices along labour
hire lines, placed a strong emphasis on bringing in unskilled people, and then
developing the skills of those people during the course of their apprenticeship,
through careful monitoring.
6.5.2 Benefits of labour hire- the Worker view
As was the case with the client view, the benefits of labour hire from the worker
viewpoint are ascertained from views and impressions given by workers to agencies,
and from the direct views of some sample labour hire workers. The benefits to a worker
will be explored from those two perspectives below.
6.5.2.1 Worker view according to the agencies
Overall there were a number of benefits associated with working in labour hire.
These included flexibility and variety in employment opportunities; access to
employment opportunities; and access to higher wages and to improving work skills.
These benefits will be explored in detail below.
(a) More flexible work patterns for employees
A high proportion of agencies (29 out of 34) cited this heading as a reason why
people wanted to work in labour hire. Those agencies were under the
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impression from various workers that the workers enjoyed the benefits of
variety and flexibility that labour hire provided.
A common impression conveyed byworkers was that workers were attracted to
working in labour hire, because it gave them the independence and flexibility
to work as and when they desired and to move around and work for different
organisations. Some female workers in particular appeared to appreciate the
flexibility to be able to adjust their working times to fit in with family needs.
One agency commented briefly that "people like to work in labour hire
organisations because of the flexibility. They can work when they want, leave
when they want". Other agencies said that some workers were attracted by the
flexible lifestyle associated with labour hire. One agency stated that "some
people love it.. ..it is a means to an end. The single mums or whatever, the
single dads and the other people that just follow those projects for instance,
they do nothing else". Another agency noted in passing that ''we have had
people on our books for years, who we send from one client to another, and
they are more than happy with that lifestyle".
One agency, which specialised in labour hire employment for professionals,
indicated that the flexibility of labour hire was an attractive proposition for its
workers -- "a lot of contractors (labour hire workers), the engineers and
draftsmen, prefer the flexibility, they like to work on high profile projects.
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They go where the work is provided, they get their hourly rate, and financially
the good guys do better on contract than they do on staff'.
By way of contrast two agencies specifically cautioned against pushing the
benefit of flexibility too far. One agency operator thought that fundamentally
"everyone wants job security and in labour hire no one has job security". The
other agency observed that the lifestyle ofworking in labour hire might not suit
everyone or most people. It was of the opinion "that most people like to be
anchored to a particular job. I think you and I probably recognise that not
everybody can.....go around and do different jobs all the time. That is why
agency nursing does not suit everybody all the time....it is a fairly high
turnover".
(b) Access to employment opportunities
There was a general feeling that labour hire agency was regarded as beneficial
by workers, because it gave them an avenue to employment where it might
otherwise be unavailable. The response tended to refer to fundamental matters
such as getting a start in employment, employment choices or options to
improvement in work skills. Twenty-four (out of 34) agencies considered that
people were working in labour hire not through choice, but because they could
not get permanent work because of the job market or personal failings. One
basic comment was "the advantage of working for labour hire is getting your
foot in the door with an employer".
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A cross section of agencies pointed to various reasons why people were finding
it hard to get a permanent job. Agencies highlighted the position that
unskilled workers particularly found it difficult to obtain permanent work. One
agency noted relevantly:
A lot of those people in lower socio-economic areas, the males particularly,
are labour hire employees and they do it all the time because this is where
they pick up work. They can't get that permanent job. Basically they are
unskilled labourers. Employers generally will use labour hire organisations
for that unskilled workforce.
This position was.corroborated by another agency that stated that ~~in some
cases people would prefer to have a permanent job, but because of their skill
level, they are having difficulty getting permanent work. They find it easier to
get into temporary and of course in some cases temporary goes to permanent".
Interestingly enough one labour hire operator had had first hand experience of
the difficulty in obtaining permanent work, and of the opening to employment
that labour hire offered. He stated:
Why I started in labour hire, I can tell you that, is because at the time people
were not employing and it was the only way you could get a bit of work,
and it led to the case where I am sitting here today.
Notwithstanding the difficulty in obtaining permanent work, one agency owner
was firmly of the view that labour hire workers should be encouraged to keep
trying for a permanent job, either with the client or elsewhere, because "you
cannot make a career out ofworking for a labour hire company". The attitude
should be that a worker should treat every start as an opportunity to work
towards a permanent position.. In the experience ofthe particular agency, about
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one in ten people had started with a client, and subsequently had been offered
full time positions.
It was pointed out by agencies that the tightening of the labour market was due
in part to the downsizing and redundancies occurring in companies. In this
regard one agency pointed out:
There has been a lot of redundancies around lately. It is a self-evident fact,
the CEO never goes, but someone around middle management does. It is a
fairly large overhead, as well as relatively easy I guess to do without in a
certain way. Where they were doing a good job and had the respect of co-
workers, their self-esteem is shot.
Because of the downsizing going on, one agency took an original view on job
security that some labour hire workers in effect may have as much work tenure
as their so-called permanent counterparts. The agency commented:
Some people are professional temps; they are probably more secure in their
working habits than people who have a permanent job. Who knows when
your company is going wheels up or they are going to downsize. Ansett,
HllI, banks are just downsizing hugely, they have been putting on large
numbers of temp staff and it is amazing. I am always bemused when people
jump up and down about job security, because the average tenure of
employment at the moment is around about two years, either plus or minus a
couple of months. People want a job for life, but they don't want to stay
there anyway.
Other agencies referred to labour hire being a benefit to workers with personal
failings (perceived or otherwise), by at least offering the opportunity of some
work. In some cases these workers might have been rejected by permanent
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employers because they were considered old or overweight. For other workers
the problem might lie with their work performance. One agency noted that:
The bad side I guess is people can't hold down a permanent job, because
they are just rovers or they can't maintain a job for too long through
whatever reason, concentration or they are just unreliable and they're put
off.
One particular group of workers, considered to be benefiting by the access to
employment provided by labour hire, were those after short term or transitional
work. Eight agencies felt that labour hire fitted the needs of people who were
travelling or were transients, or who were in the process of relocation or work
transition. One agency commented that:
A lot of contractors (labour hire workers) out there are in between
permanent jobs, that is to say, they are actively looking for permanent
jobs and do contracting while they do that search.
A more succinct comment by an agency was that "a lot of them do it just
between permanent jobs, so they fill in til they find a permanent job that they
like". The person added that "I would say there are more people doing that
than doing it as a lifestyle choice".
As to those relocating, labour hire offered the opportunity "to test the waters"
ofthe new employment environment. In this regard, one agency stated:
People who relocate here from Sydney or Melbourne, who have no idea
about the employment market here, decide to go temping to see who is
doing what, who is hiring, what the cultures are like in the firms, who are
the good employers, who are the bad ones.
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A final group, that benefited from labour hire in the view of agencies, were
those persons who benefited through the acceleration of their careers or an
extension of their working skills. The comment was made that "some people
fast track their careers through agency work, because they get to go to different
jobs at different levels and to different projects and their resume expands
faster". Another comment in a similar vein was that "it gives them the
opportunity to improve their skills by being offered differing assignments".
(c) The potential for higher wages and greater rewards for skills
Twelve agencies cited the potential or likelihood ofhigher returns for workers,
particularly for those with special skills,as one of the attractions of labour hire
for workers. Some agencies considered that workers were attracted by the
prospect of getting more cash in hand or upfront at pay time, by virtue of the
casual loading on top of the normal wage rate (about twenty-three percent),
that was given to the labour hire workers for forgoing entitlements such as
holiday leave, long service leave and sick leave. In other situations it was
pointed out that labour hire workers gained through being rewarded for their
special skills, or through being able to work longer hours. There were random
comments from the agencies that "remuneration is the big point" and "money
is a big motivator".
Six agencies referred to situations where pay rates were high for labour hire
workers, who were specialists or who had skills in short supply. The agencies
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agreed that professionals and tradespersons, whose skills were in high demand,
could command high wages by virtue ofsupply and demand forces.
One agency referred to the situation for highly skilled labour hire workers in
these terms:
We don't actually have award rates. We have market rates, so we have
people from $15 an hour up to $60 an hour who are engineers. The market
really sets it. If you are a specialised person, you could probably ask what
you like.
Another agency cited the example of maintenance workers in engineering
industries who were very well paid for doing intensive agency work, while
machinery was shut down. While the work was for short periods of time and
on an as needs basis, wages were a lot more than the permanent rate.
As indicated the common sentiment was that the demand for specialist services
was market driven, and that market rates could be substantially higher than
award rates. One representative comment was as follows:
I think the good ones have a capacity to make better money, which a lot are
motivated by. For example, for a drafter the award is $13-$14 an hour; the
average hourly rate would be $35 an hour. With the technical people, the
engineers and drafters, it is market forces, there is not a standard.
One agency in particular highlighted the potential for workers to obtain more
hours of work through labour hire. This agency started that it had specialised
in supplying people as independent contractors under labour hire arrangements,
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until the change to Queensland legislation (Section 275 of the Industrial
Relations Act 1999) whereby independent contractors could be deemed to be
employees. The agency went on to say that after that it was using Australian
Workplace Agreements (AWAs) to engage labour hire workers, under which
there was a flat rate of pay, no penalty rates or overtime and the same rate
twenty-four hours a day seven days a week. The agency claimed that most of
its workers were on those arrangements and that those that were obtained more
hours ofwork.
Despite the apparent monetary benefits to some labour hire workers, one labour
hire manager sounded a note of warning to people who may be attracted
initially by the prospects ofhigher wages in labour hire. In his view, workers
in society could pay a heavy price for the giving up ofjob security, which was
inherent in labour hire.
He acknowledged that sometimes "the pay is better", but then went on to make
the following comment:
I don't know if socially we are doing it right. Realistically I don't know
because I think everyone wants job security and in labour hire no-one has
job security. So in the long term, I don't know. For the whole world and
the whole country to turn this way, I think it would be destructive.
A lot of people can't handle first-day jitters and having first-day jitters
everyday, going from employer to employer, the majority could not handle
it. When we go to a client we like to work on the rule of thumb of twenty-
five percent of their workforce should be casual.
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6.5.2.2 Direct views of labour hire workers on the benefits of labour hire
Discreet enquiries with unions had indicated that labour hire workers were generally
reluctant to be interviewed on labour hire issues, notwithstanding the conditions of
anonymity. However, three labour hire workers agreed to be interviewed
individually at some length, on inter alia whether they saw benefits in working in
labour hire. The three workers expressed opinions ranging from statements that "you
can get the best ofboth worlds" to "the positives were very few". The worker from a
white collar area saw some distinct advantages in working in labour hire, .and could
see that labour hire work could appeal to people wanting flexibility or an interim job.
In contrast, the remaining two workers who were from an industrial setting were
quite critical and saw few benefits.
6.5.2.3 Views of white collar worker
(a) Flexible work experiences
In the opinion of the female white collar worker the major benefit or positive aspect
of labour hire was the flexibility of work hours that it offered. She commented as
follows:
The main benefit of labour hire is the flexibility it gives you. If you were lucky
enough, as I have been, to find an employer who will take you on for a long term
assignment and at the same time be flexible with your hours, you can get the best
ofboth worlds.
The female white collar worker went on to add that in her view, labour hire "is not
suited to those workers seeking reliability, but definitely suited for workers who are
still deciding what type of work they would like to do, or who have a lifestyle that
requires flexible employment."
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She felt too that other positive aspects of labour hire were the interesting
employment experiences that it could provide, through getting an insight into
different types of work and in meeting different people. This was particularly the
case where the agency involved was supportive. The worker felt that her most
rewarding labour hire experience had been in lending work with a bank, where the
agency had been obliging and had checked regularly on her situation, and had
arranged meetings for her with the other labour hire workers. In her estimation, if
she were to work in labour hire again, she would definitely go through that agency
agam.
(b) Insecure nature of the labour hire relationship
In the view of the worker however, there was a downside to working in labour hire
because ofthe nature of the relationship. She commented generally:
However labour hire is not the most rewarding mode of employment. You can
sometimes feel inferior because you don't have the benefit of guaranteed pay,
holiday leave or sick pay, even though the hourly rate is meant to cover for these
things.
Because of the nature of labour hire too, the worker felt that she did not have much
loyalty to an employer, in light of the fact as a labour hire worker she could be
dismissed at short notice. The uncertainty of employment was reciprocated by a lack
of loyalty in the worker. She stated that "the fact that my employer could dismiss me
with 48 hours notice also meant I did not feel a huge amount of loyalty to them".
Added to this at times was a feeling that management gave priority to permanent
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employees, and that her rate ofpay did not seem to equate with the amount of work
done compared to others.
More subsidiary drawbacks to labour hire, that did arise, according to the white
collar worker, were a lack of variety or boredom experienced in job roles and a lack
of rapport with permanent employees. The worker thought that the lack of variety
was probably due to monetary reasons in that if the situation were otherwise, the
holders of position would have to be paid different rates and it was easier to keep
everyone affected within the same kind of role. This could be alleviated, as one
agency did, by rotation of staff through different roles to cover loss or absence of
staff.
As to the lack of rapport that could exist with permanent employees, the worker
sensed that this was due to the number of hours that she worked and because
permanents thought that, as there was a high turnover of labour hire workers, it was a
waste of time to get to know them. She also noticed that some pennanent workers
held the opinion that labour hire workers were taking their work and found them to
be a threat.
6.5.2.4 Views of industrial workers
In comparison with the white collar worker, the two industrial workers thought there
were few benefits associated with working in labour hire. They were overall
sceptical and considered that labour hire created an environment of fear, little
loyalty, financial instability and anomalies in practice, such as the client company as
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the non-employer determining the start and end of the labour hire employment
relationship.
(a) Financial rewards for specialist workers
As to the positive aspects, they were that labour hire was an avenue to work and that
it could be financially rewarding for professional workers and those prepared to work
long hours. One ofthe workers commented generally:
The positives are very few. The positives are that there is always some work
there - there are so many agencies. All you need to do to get a job is to make x
amount ofphone calls.
The same worker also observed that "when I am. working I can turn a reasonable
dollar. I can chase 80-100 hours a week when it is on".
It was also conceded that "it would suit professionals. Some people are quite happy
for sure in legitimate casual work".
(b) Insecure nature of the labour hire relationship
The two industrial workers however saw a number of negative aspects to working in
labour hire. First of all, they both were strongly of the view that labour hire was a
stressful work environment to be in. One of them put it that "physically, mentally
and financially labour hire is too stressful for workers". The other worker
commented that most of the people he knew wanted to get out of labour hire,
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whether they happened to be in manufacturing, the motel industry or construction
work.
Both workers highlighted the lack of employment security associated with labour
hire, due to the inherently temporary nature of the industry. One ofthe workers, who
had worked in many labour hire jobs thought that the work offered by labour hire
could be oftoo casual a nature. He expressed the following opinion:
.You live from day to day, week to week, hour to hour. The concern I have is that
you live like a gypsy and there is no continuity of work unless you get yourself
into an organisation with labour hire and you stay there for a couple of months
and they are very few and far between.
It was pointed out by the two workers that, even where labour hire work was
obtained, many still experienced a lack of financial security due to receiving lower
wages and to the difficulty in obtaining loans from financial institutions. One of the
workers involved in boilermaking stated that "my wages have dropped dramatically
under labour hire. What labour hire is doing is driving down wages in other firms. It
is a race to the bottom". As to disparities in wages, the other worker instanced a
personal situation where there were five different labour hire suppliers on a work
site, all providing different pay rates and allowances for the same work.
The same worker further stated that he had talked to his peers and their concern was
about a basic difficulty to obtain finance to buy things. This difficulty was
corroborated by the other industrial worker, who considered that there were real
problems as a labour hire or casual worker in obtaining loans at reasonable rates
from banks and other fmancial institutions. As a personal example, the worker
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confided that, despite working in labour hire for several years, he could not afford a
car or a mortgage on a house. When he last tried for a bank loan eight years
previously, he had been told that as a casual worker he did not qualify. He added
that, even if he were able to obtain a loan, he would not be confident about making
the repayments.
Apart from the possibility of financial insecurity, it was the view of the two workers
that people suffered personal insecurity while working in labour hire positions.
People were reluctant to complain about things that appeared wrong, because they
feared losing their jobs if they did so. This position was exacerbated by labour hire
selection processes, which did not send the right people to the right jobs.
One result of the preceding factors according to the two workers is that there was
little loyalty by labour hire workers to their host employers and vice versa. Amongst
other things the shortness of a placement might preclude getting to know the culture
of a particular company.
One of the industrial workers was alert to an apparent legal anomaly posed by the
labour hire situation. He noted that it was the client or "host employer", that was the
effective decision maker as to the commencement ofemployment. He remarked:
There was a particular job With an agency. I said 'when does the job start?' They
said 'we don't know'. So all they are doing is collecting names and then the host
employer, which is strange, makes the decision of who actually starts that
particular job, not the labour hire company. They just collect the names and then
the host company makes that decision.
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So the concern I have is that the company you are going to work for is really
dealing with the application.
Finally, both workers offered a prognosis of a bleak future for many people, if the
trend to labour hire were to increase. One commented that "and if they keep on
going down the road of labour hire, there will be less people with security and
spending money. So the concern I have is where does it all end?"
The other gave a similar pessimistic assessment that "it is the ugliest social tool I
have ever seen. It is breaking down our working conditions and our standard of
living. It is ruining people".
6.5.3 Reasons for the expansion of labour hire
This issue evoked a wide range of responses from the agencies interviewed and from
unions and individual workers. A range ofreasons were cited by the parties, with some
of the reasons or factors raised overlapping or intertwined. The reasons ranged from
ease of entry into the labour hire industry, to perceived over regulation of employment
matters, to moves to greater workplace flexibility. As to the future there was some
comment that there may be a need for legislative intervention in the labour hire
industry. There was also a common sentiment that the labour hire industry would
continue to expand in Australia and internationally.
The reasons or factors advanced for the expansion of labour hire can be split into those
of a positive nature, and those of a problematic nature which have consequences as to
how labour hire is carried out.
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6.5.3.1 Positive factors in the expansion of labour hire
These factors are of a general nature and are conducive to employers' adopting more
flexible labour market practices, and more specifically embracing the active use of
labour hire.
(a) General economic trends
Twelve of the agencies interviewed pointed to general economic factors, such as
economic upturns and downturns and globalisation, as a reason for the rise and
expansion of labour hire. It was pointed out that a cause or result of globalisation
was that in money terms "most companies are more bottom line focused these days".
Reference was made to the spurt to casual employment overseas in Europe, because
of the doing away of laws that banned casual employment or the use of employment
agencies. With respect to Australia, one agency referred to a definite change
occurnng with the deregulatory labour market policies of the Federal Labor
Government of the 1980s and 1990s which were intended to create a flexible, mobile
workforce in general.
The agencies concerned were of the view that general overseas and local economic
trends had impacted on the way that companies now carried on business.
Particularly since the 1989 economic crash, in light of changes in the economy, there
had been economic pressures on companies to tighten up, to carry a lean staff and
only get people in when they needed them.
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Employers according to agencies were now more mindful of the fact that, if they take
someone on as a permanent employee and their business started to go down, then
they would have to dismiss that person. As a result people were working longer
hours because of the economic times. At the same time organisations were
becoming more globalised, which gave them more room to expand and more
resources, while at the same time facing the challenge to remain profitable and
commercial in the face of increased competition. All the preceding factors then have
been conducive to the use of labour hire by companies.
One agency comment illustrated the economic trends going on, and their effect on
the increase in labour hire overseas:
I think: most companies are more bottom line focused these days and that is a
cause or result of globalisation and I think. that the area of recruitment and labour
management is an area where companies can streamline and get some cost
efficiencies, so that is going to be where they will look to improve performance,
so it impacts on their bottom line. The call centre industry is a burgeoning
industry for banks.
The (labour hire) industry at the moment world wide is a $160 billion industry. In
three years they are saying the US will be a $130 billion industry for labour hire.
Adecco would be the world's largest as a combination of Adia, Centrecom and
Ecco.
(b) Managerial moves towards greater workplace flexibility and efficiency
A large proportion ofagencies (twenty-six out of thirty-four) specifically commented
on distinct management moves towards greater workplace flexibility and efficiency,
which has favoured the greater use of labour hire. Eleven out of twelve unions
quizzed considered that such managerial moves were an important reason for the
continuing trend towards labour hire.
226
Chapter Six
Research
There was overall agreement among the agencies and unions that companies in
general liked the flexibility or ability to put on or off staff (the ease of hiring or
firing) according to their business needs. This has fitted in with the rationalising and
centralising of businesses that has been occurring. The approach was also
compatible with conservative government thinking that, if people could be more
easily dismissed, the labour market would be more flexible and employers would
hire more people.
As noted by agencies (and by two labour hire workers interviewed), the use of
casual and labour hire staff fitted in with the peaks and lulls in business cycles. The
point of labour hire was to employ people more economically. The idea was to hire
people when there was an upturn, and to let them go when business fell off. As
noted by one agency, in effect the ''just in time" system, that had applied to the
supply of materials for business to save costs and reduce overheads, was now being
applied to the supply of employees.
Given the nature of labour hire moreover, its use according to agencies has fitted into
the climate ofdownsizing that has occurred in Australia, due in part to a desire to get
shareholders a greater return on their investment. Labour hire also was attractive to
management because its precarious nature was conducive to increased management
power over employees. One agency put it as follows:
I suppose one of the ways a lot ofthe employers have gone over the last ten years
is that they have downsized considerably, and labour hire has given them the
flexibility to put people on at peak times. So run with the skeleton staff when
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they need it, and put people on at peak times. That is the flexible arrangement,
and you are seeing it across a whole range oforganisations. So people don't want
people who are not working to capacity, or who they don't have the capacity to
utilise at anyone time.
This flexibility was described by one agency as changing ''what has persistently
always been .a fixed overhead into a variable overhead". In this regard, reference
was made to a large number of US companies who, because their way of reporting
for the stock market was driven very much by head count of employees, appeared
more profitable for their accounting requirements the lesser the head count they had.
An added bonus of labour hire in this context, as pointed out by one agency, is that it
provided an employer with a substantially greater capacity to increase or decrease
staffing numbers, but without any direct employment relationship and obligations. It
gave employers the flexibility option to have employees so to speak, without any
employment relationship. Support for this was provided by another agency as
follows:
I think that is the biggest thing that drives it, in that they don't have to put on a
permanent or permanent part-time employee, or in fact engage them as a casual
themselves. It is just a glitch.in their books for a period oftime and then normally
they get rid of the labour hire, so there are no real industrial issues they have to
worry about.
This desire by employers to rid themselves of their human resources obligations and
to give them to someone else was echoed in another agency comment:
A lot of companies do not want to deal with the industrial relations implications
of their having their own employees. It is a way of avoiding permanent
employers so if you have a downturn in industry, you do not have to worry about
redundancies. It is just bring them in, use them and put them out again. It is a
good way of trying out people.
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Weight to this comment was added by an agency view that "there has been a huge
increase ofworkers' complaints over the last 15,20 years"
Essentially though there was a constant sentiment that, in present times, businesses
preferred the flexibility and .convenience offered by labour hire, to easily fill gaps in
the workforce with people who were not permanent employees, particularly where
business was volatile and there was pressure on company budgets. The flexibility
potential that labour hire had was appealing to businesses "as they are looking for
the most amount of flexibility they can get in an employee".
Labour hire was seen as a "quick fix" by the parties to changing production and
employment requirements. One union noted that "it seems to work where they have
peaks and lulls in the business. When there is a peak, they bring in labour hire
instead of employing people on a long term basis". One agency referred to the
inherent flexibility of labour hire, when it stated that "they can go and grab five
blokes from a labour hire company in peak times for as many days as they want -
one day to a couple ofweeks or whatever".
Two large agencies concurred that labour hire was particularly suited to flexible
management practices. One of the agencies noted its usefulness in particular for
project work, when it stated "they have a core staff, then when they get their big
projects, they get them in for four months, then they get rid ofall those people. It is
big in engineering, because of the project nature of engineering". Another agency
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did warn however, that usmg labour hire for project work meant that some
companies found that they continued to lack core competencies, for example in
engineering, when persons brought in finished a project.
The other agency gave an expansive view on the attractiveness in the flexibility of
labour hire to management. It commented:
All the big companies are now heavily into labour hire, also the banks, local
government and so on. When people are busy they have got their labour there,
and when it drops offwell obviously they can reduce their numbers without the
worries of unfair dismissals or redundancy payments. It is really quite
simplistic the reasons we are using them.
I think it will just get bigger and bigger. I mean some clients are quite happy -
virtually they would have everybody under labour hire excepting themselves.
Sure, I mean it is a cruel world and that is a fact. I mean, if a machine breaks
down they have that flexibility again - 'sorry, we have to pay the first four
hours, but we will let you know when the machine is up again' - so no
downtime.
One large employer group saw a long tenn future for labour hire, because of the
flexibility it offered to employers: "but I think the time has come to start seeing that
the industry is not going to disappear, it provides a whole host of flexibilities which
are demanded, not only desired, but demanded by employers".
In keeping with modem management ideas of efficiency, it was pointed out by both
agencies and unions that labour hire offered quick and easy methods of recruitment
for business. There has been a conscious management style to use the precarious
nature of labour hire employment to get suitable staff. Rather than going through
extensive and time consuming selection processes to find the right staff, businesses
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used labour hire firms to do that for them, by setting the parameters and then letting
the firms come up with suitable employees.
This ease of recruitment according to the parties cut back and streamlined the level
ofhuman resources involvement for a business, so that usually a business only had to
deal with a short list of people for a position, prepared by an agency. Furthermore,
after people were engaged, there was not the need to have to go through a structured
process of review and performance management .of those employees. Even where
the right choice was not made, the worker could be dismissed quickly. Not only in
the private sector but also increasingly in the public sector, labour hire firms were
being used to carry out the selection processes for positions.
As to the calibre of labour hire employees recruited, one agency interestingly
observed that in America "the American market's view is that labour hire people are
superior performers to permanent people, so if a person comes from an agency, they
are revered as specialists".
There was a feeling in some corporate quarters that recruitment of staff, along with
issues such as warehousing and equipment maintenance, was not part of core
business, and was best dealt with by somebody who specialised in that area.
Businesses were trying to focus on their core business and outsource the recruitment
function. One agency felt that "this is the big driver I think". Such an attitude drew
a response from a union that some companies could not manage their business, and
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rather than deal with management as an issue within their business, they handed it
over to an outside service provider to deal with. The union was of the view that
managers in a company needed to learn how to plan properly for a company, and to
understand the business cycle.
(c) Desire by workers for more flexible work arrangements
Six of the agencies interviewed referred to this factor as a reason for the growth of
labour hire. Mention was made that some people in this day and age were attracted
to the temporary lifestyle, and wanted flexibility as to how they worked. This was
tied in to the more transient nature ofpeople and the workforce today. In this regard
it was thought that more skilled workers were likely to be more mobile in the job
market and to have "loyalty for the work as against loyalty to the organisation".
To a lesser extent unions interviewed thought that some workers wanted more
flexible work patterns for themselves in view of their particular circumstances. On
the other hand some unions expressed the view that changing and tightening labour
markets for workers were forcing workers to take labour hire jobs.
On the issue of a more flexible lifestyle, there was agreement between agencies and
unions that the makeup of the workforce was changing, and some people were
looking for employment opportunities that fitted in with their lifestyles. Whether
there was both or only one parent working in some families, those people felt a need
for flexibility with their family and life and so were looking for more options. In the
view of one agency these people went to agencies because they wanted the
temporary lifestyle, and because they "don't want to work 9 - 5 Monday to Friday".
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Another agency opined that "there will always be a ready market of people who
want a flexible lifestyle". This mobility by employees now was aided by portable
superannuation provisions.
One union had an original viewpoint on the flexibility sought by some labour hire
workers and considered that what they were really after was a form of short term
flexibility. It commented:
I mean most of the people we speak to in labour hire, they are often saying to us
'yes, we do want flexibility', but often it is a short tenn flexibility that they want.
Their own, whether it be financial or social or family, circumstances change and
eventually they want to work, move into something more pennanent. What you
can do is you maintain your skill base, so you have the skill base there.
In addition to the desire for greater flexibility, there was an agency view that people
discernibly were becoming more transient or mobile in their style of living and
employment choices.
One comment summarised the trend as follows:
I think it is the way of the market, the way ofthe world, the transient population is
happening. I just think that the transient nature of people today is one of the key
factors.
It was pointed out that persons with high skills or wishing to improve their skills and
marketability were being mobile to fast track their careers, and were likely to reject a
work environment or culture that did not suit them. One comment captured the
attitude in the following terms:
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With an educated workforce which we now have, people are saying "I don't want
to work for the same employer all my life like my father did'. The career
aspirations now for graduates is that they are going to have four or five careers in
their working life. The world is trying to find the commodity ofa person with the
skills in the right place at the right time.
6.5.3.2 Negative factors in the expansion of labour hire
There are other factors in the expansion of labour hire that perhaps could be viewed
in a negative light, or at least viewed as giving rise to problems for the industry.
They are:
(a) the ease of entry into the labour hire industry and the non-regulation of the
industry;
(b) the perceived over regulation of the standard employment relationship and the
subsequent desire by employers to shed their responsibilities; and
(c) the general trend towards cost cutting by private employers and governments.
The data on these factors unequivocally supports the hypothesis developed by the
writer, that the impacts of the regulation of the standard employment relationship has
been responsible for employers seeking less regulated labour markets such as labour
hire.
The factors will be dealt with in turn.
(a) Ease of entry into the industry and non-regulation of the industry
Four agencies specifically referred to the fact that in Queensland (like the rest of
Australia) there were no statutory requirements for a person or body to set up and
operate in business as a labour hire agency. Registration was only required (in
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Queensland under the Employment Agencies Act 1983 (Qld), where agencies wished
to operate in addition as strict recruitment or direct placement service providers for
organisations (which quite a large number apparently did in practice), or under the
Security Providers Act 1993 (Qld), if agencies wished to work in the security
industry. Labour hire operators were regulated only incidentally by virtue of being
general employers. One agency noted that "a labour hire company does not have to
have a licence, you only have to have a licence ifyou are a recruitment company".
Because of the ease of entry into the industry, it appears from responses front
agencies and unions that because of the large numbers of agencies operating the
industry is a very competitive market, and possibly overcrowded. Also the non-
existent qualifications for operating gave rise to doubts about the technical and
ethical calibre of some of the operators in the industry. These preceding
circumstances have implications for the operation of the labour hire industry
generally.
The agencies concerned all remarked on the ease with which people could enter the
industry, and thought that clearly this could create problems with respect to quality
of service, over supply and excessive competition in the industry, and abuses such as
the undercutting ofrivals and "fly by night" operators.
One agency made this direct comment on the ease of entry into the industry and its
attendant consequences:
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And this is the problem with labour hire, it has been terrified for many years
because it has been abused in the past.
There are no education requirements. There is no governing body to say this is
how you have to do it, so I could open up a shop tomorrow and pretend to do
labour hire and do it very badly.
Despite the proliferation of operators due to the lack ofbarriers into the industry and
the lack of surveillance by government, one agency offered some consolation that the
law of supply and demand naturally helped to curb abuses in the industry, because
those not operating a quality service would be culled out. It commented:
It gets back to the supply and demand theory. There was demand so they just
sprung up everywhere. You and I ten years ago, we could have just gone down
the road and started one. There was not a basic requirement of entry level
requirement, so I guess a lot of them spawned up, that made it look like a growth
industry. But the ones that could not provide a quality product have either gone or
found themselves in trouble, maybe through over capitalisation, over estimating
the market size. A couple ofthem as well, they are rationalising.
At least .in part because of the non entry requirements, according to the agencies the
labour hire industry has become a very competitive industry in the last ten years with
a high burnout and turnover rate of staff that work in agencies. The operator
remarked about the competition that "It is fierce. It is absolutely cut throat". This
situation created disadvantages for those operating or working in the industry, as it
led to problems such as undercutting of competitors and dubious practices by
operators.
Undercutting of rivals usually affected the labour hire workers because it meant
paying below award or collective agreement rates, or ignoring classification
structures. Dubious practices included labour hire consultants attempting to steal
236
Chapter Six
Research
their previous agency's clientele, or adopting a new identity after previous failed
operations in the industry.
In part, because ofthe lack ofany government monitoring, one agency noted:
They come and go. You see what happens is, they change their names. So
someone will be company XYZ and will be ABC next week. So it is hard to tell
whether it is new players coming and going or whether it is people reinventing
themselves, getting a different image or whatever.
(b) Perceived over regulation of the standard employment relationship
Nineteen of the agencies interviewed considered that this was a key or important
factor in the rise of labour hire. Because of the perception that there were increasing
regulatory burdens, such as unfair dismissal, anti-discrimination and occupational
health and safety laws, in addition to workers' compensation, holiday and long
service leave, payroll tax, superannuation and award requirements, it was the opinion
of agencies that employers were much more willing and eager to shed their normal
employer responsibilities. In particular, they thought that there was an employer fear
of the unfair dismissal laws. This view was backed up by two of three labour hire
workers interviewed, who thought strongly that there was an employer preference
towards labour hire, because employers wished to evade or did not want to take
responsibility for employment issues. This assessment was supported by ten of
twelve unions interviewed.
There was a general feeling amongst the agencies that the industrial relations
environment had precipitated the rise in labour hire. As the rights of employees and
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the obligations of employers had increased, many employers (including
governments) had become frightened to take on permanent staff. Labour bjre was
increasing, because it was seen to be taking a lot of responsibilities and worries, for
example with respect to unfair dismissal laws, away from an employer and placing
them with a labour hire agency. In this regard one labour hire worker stated that
''they want to use labour hire companies as employers to absolve themselves of
responsibility".
AB an illustration of this general viewpoint, comments of different agencies were as
follows:
Unfair dismissal. I think that this is one of the major areas why labour hire has
taken offso big.
One of the biggest growing industries in Australia, well because it has taken a lot
of the responsibility and worries away from the client. I guess the unfair
dismissal laws are one less worry for them - that is our worry.
Well, they do say they are worried about the unfair dismissal laws and that is why
a lot of them tend to use labour hire.
It really took off when they introduced the unfair dismissal laws. It really is a
way around that. It is still going, it is still growing, as opposed to staying in a
level percentage. Ten years ago, labour hire might have been three, four, five
percent, I have no idea of figures, but I would say that it has doubled or tripled
that, and that one ofthe main catalysts for that is unfair dismissal laws.
Trying to grapple with the unfair dismissal laws is the main source of concern.
We are in the business ofmarketing services so we know what the hot buttons are.
It is not so much what actually happens, it is the perception of what they think is
going to happen. They do not know whether they are going to get sued and taken
to court over unfair dismissal, so the best thing is not to employ in the first place.
On the effect of the unfair dismissal laws, one female agency owner stated that
employers definitely were put off by publicised unfair dismissal decisions, especially
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those that appeared perverse, such as where an employee had been accused of
wrongdoing and yet awarded compensation. Her thoughts were as follows:
Can I be naughty and I say I think it is because of the unfair dismissal laws.
Employers are more likely to try before they buy. In white collar, they will put a
person on as a temp until they are happy to do otherwise. But I think particularly
in the industrial .area once a company has been burnt through an unfair dismissal
or they have heard of a mate who has had an experience, they will go with the try
before you buy. If you keep that phrase in mind that explains a heck ofa lot of
your labour hire, and the economic flows of a business.
By way of contrast, one union queried the impact of the unfair dismissal legislation
and considered that there was an unreasonable fear of the legislation. In his
knowledge only half of one percent of applicants were reinstated and in countries
such as Britain, Europe and New Zealand the availability of the remedy had not
created any major problems.
In the view of a peak employers' body the special nature of labour hire militated
against the institution of unfair dismissal claims in general because when a labour
hire employee's services were terminated at one client's workplace, that employee
then might be relocated almost immediately to another job with another client.
Alternatively the body thought that it could be argued that a labour hire worker's job
at a particular client's location was just an assignment for a :fixed period.
The peak body expounded on this advantage oflabour hire:
The beauty of labour hire is that even though they may be terminated at that
particular site, they can then be relocated at another job. Who actually did effect
the termination? It could be argued that it was just an assignment. The only extent
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they (the clients) should be getting involved is one to tell the labour hire company
when it is getting to the point or even close to the point they need to issue a
warning before they actually terminate their employment.
Overall according to the agencies there was the perception that employment law was
now a lot more complex, and as a result a large number of firms and governments in
Australia did not want to deal with it. One large agency owner was firmly of the
view that over regulation of industrial relations in Australia was a primary driver of
labour hire, and that more regulation ofworkplaces would only generate more work
f9r operators such as himself. In his view, "it is purely driven by the regulation and
legislation in respect of industrial relations in Australia". The result then was that
employment management became too hard to handle internally, so it was
"outsourced" to labour hire agencies.
A problematic byproduct of the move by employers to shed their responsibilities by
using labour hire is that they might develop a mindset of avoiding workplace
responsibilities in general towards hired workers. As one agency noted, legislation
for occupational health and safety has been tightened in recent years and a company
director or manager could be held responsible where someone is injured on their site.
This could occur where there is confusion over division of responsibility at the
workplace.
(c) General trend to cost cutting in business
Fifteen agencies mentioned this heading directly as a reason for the expansion of
labour hire. This factor is related to the previous factor ofperceived over regulation
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of employment matters, which provided an incentive to avoid employer
responsibilities.
Eleven of 12 unions interviewed referred to the desire to cut labour costs, as a basic
reason for the trend towards labour hire. Some noted the big trend towards
rewarding CEOs and executives for decreasing staff These unions felt that labour
hire was used by clients because it was considered cheaper than standard
employment, notwithstanding the casual loading (about 23 percent) that was applied
to labour hire wages. One matter of interest was that two of the unions, like a couple
of agencies, queried the cost effectiveness for client organisations using labour hire
over the long haul. There was also concern by one union that labour hire could
contribute to producing a bumt out workforce with underdeveloped skills.
The agencies made the general observation that "labour costs are expensive" and that
companies "shed staff first to cut costs". There was also union sentiment that various
employers were after high flexibility as to wages paid, in line with American models,
so that for example a security guard could be obtained from $2 to $20 an hour. By
virtue of the flexible and non-regulated nature of labour hire, labour hire appeared a
cost effective way of engaging employees, particularly where agencies allowed
credit. Labour hire fitted in with economic rationalist views of reducing staff to
minimum levels and flexible strategic planning by companies.
Some agency comments backing up the preceding approach were as follows:
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Definitely, well because they have not got to maintain a big staff base, they only
pay for what is used really, so that definitely saves them money in the long term.
I think organisations are really trying to cut their workforce to the bare bon~s.
It is just more effective for an employer to use a labour hire agency. We do all the
organising, co-ordinating, recruitment, selection, follow-up, OHS, EEO - we take
the hassle out ofthe work.
Convenience, plus if I am paying your employees you are not tying up your own
cash flow each week. If you are a company and you can put your wages bill off
for a month, it is big. If you have got ten or twelve people working for you, it
might be $30,000 or $40,000 cash you are not paying each week.
With respect to the cost of hiring labour hire workers, one labour hire worker
mentioned in passing that one way that the unions were attempting to counter the
trend towards labour hire was through moves to increase rates for casual workers
(which included labour hire workers)in awards and collective agreements. In this
way labour hire would become a more expensive and less attractive option for
organisations.
A problem referred to by the agencies and unions, that was associated with using
labour hire to reduce labour costs and work conditions, was that unscrupulous or
unethical labour hire operators cut labour costs (and undercut other operators), by
paying below the relevant award or enterprise bargaining agreement rates. This
might be on the basis that there was some argument or doubt as to the applicable
standard. It seemed that smaller labour hire agencies were prone to being undercut
and forced out by larger or multi-national companies, who then established their own
rates. In addition, it was also indicated that government clients through engaging
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labour hire staff paid substantially lower rates than nonnal, by being able to avoid
public sector award conditions. In this way they could reduce financial press,ures.
A resultant concern for labour hire agencies was that the drive to cut costs could
create an unlevel playing field. Ethical labour hire operators could and have been
undercut by unethical ones. A union described the situation this way:
But there is more than one labour hire company in there, so they are tendering all
the time to get that particular contract. So they are trying to cut back, cut back,
cut back, and where they cut back is with the conditions ofthe employees. That is
how they win their contracts.
Another union made a cynical comment on the use of labour hire to cut costs:
The analogy I always think of is that water will find the lowest point it can find.
That is what it is. It is a vehicle to try to find a cheaper way of employing. I
suppose why many of the companies are using labour hire is because of that costs
benefit. But we need to remember that the margin of $2-$3 employees are getting
paid less is the whole reason for the labour hire company. They exist because
there is a profit to be made.
There was also union feeling that improper cost cutting could reduce morale amongst
labour hire workers. Underpayment could add to feelings of precariousness and
instability experienced by some labour hire workers.
There was some particular concern by unions as to the effect ofcost cutting measures
on workplace health and safety. A fear was expressed by one union that especially
with construction jobs, labour hire and other workers could die if the controlling
parties did not spend on adequate safety measures. Another union was worried that
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labour hire offered to companies an escape from mounting workers' compensation
premiums, for a bad safety record. It stated that "we have heard of companies in
Western Australia that had such a bad health and safety record, their Workcover
premiums were going through the roof and to get rid ofthat they just used labour hire
workers".
Chapter Seven reviews the thesis and discusses the implications ofthe research analysis,
in the context of the theoretical contentions or themes regarding the nature and growth
of labour hire.
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Chapter Seven
CONCLUSIONS
This thesis concludes with a review of the content, identification of significant
contributions, and implications/recoIl1.D1endations for the future oflabour hire.
7.1 Review
A major theme is that because of its unique tripartite nature, labour hire runs counter to
or is antithetical to the common law employment principles which are used to govern it,
and that tensions exist between the concept of labour hire and the present legal
principles. It is argued that the nature of the labour hire relationship creates problems
with allocation ofrisk and legal responsibility, which are not satisfactorily recognised or
resolved by the law. Difficulties arise because there are two parties, the labour hire
agency and client, and both assume or split the traditional functions of an employer.
The area of labour hire employment however is not specifically regulated, but is
subsumed under common law contract ofemployment principles.
The second major theme is that the growth of labour hire is a reaction to the impact of
regulation of the standard employment relationship. This regulation of direct
employment, with its obligations and costs, has had the effect of greatly increasing
incentives for organisations to utilise less regulated or largely unregulated labour
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markets such as labour hire. Labour hire enables businesses to devolve the obligations
and costs connected with direct employment, such as unfair dismissal obligations,
vicarious liability and workers' compensation.
Examination of the key research findings of the extensive exploratory field work of this
thesis support and validate the two theoretical propositions or expectations.
Considerable support is found for the expectations about the problematic nature of
labour hire, and the relationship between regulatory impact and the growth of labour
hire is confirmed. The results are thus consistent with theoretical expectations.
Firstly there are key research findings about the tensions between labour hire and
present legal principles as to employer responsibilities. Nearly half of aU agencies
interviewed considered that the sharing of control and responsibility for a worker,
between the agency and the client, posed problems with respect to worker safety,
liability for the actions of a worker, and termination of a worker's services. In
particular half of the agencies (and all unions interviewed) though that OHS was a
major issue in the engagement of labour hire workers. A smaller number of agencies
saw termination of a worker's services as a problem with potential industrial relations
implications. The research also disclosed fairly regular attempts between clients and
agencies to disclaim liability through contractual documentation. The disclosed
problems about allocation of legal responsibilities is supported by the examination of
selected Australian cases undertaken, which reveals scope for confusion about the
operation oflabour hire responsibilities.
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Secondly there are key research findings about the link between the growth of labour
hire and the increase of regulatory employment mandates. Over half of the agencies
interviewed (and almost all the unions) considered that the perception of increasing
regulatory burdens on an employer was a key factor in the rise oflabour hire. Because
of this perception employing organisations were much more willing and eager to shed
their normal responsibilities. In particular over halfof the agencies referred directly to a
fear of unfair dismissal legislation, as a reason for the use of labour hire by client
organisations. Overall the feeling from the agencies was that labour hire was increasing
because it was seen to be taking a lot of responsibilities away from an employer, and
placing them with a labour hire agency. The response by over half the agencies (and
almost all unions) as to the cost cutting attractions of labour hire, through not having to
bear the mandated costs of employment, only further reinforces the perception about
regulatory burdens.
These research findings as to the link between the effect of regulatory burdens and the
rise in labour hire is supported by the American literature cited, which points to a clear
trend by employing organisations to use less regulated forms of employment, and in
particular labour hire.
The research also unearths a clear finding that a large proportion of agencies (and
unions) interviewed identified (apart from general economic trends) managerial trends
towards greater workplace flexibility and efficiency, as a distinct reason for the greater
use of labour hire. This is considered not to be really contradictory or inconsistent with
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the key findings already cited. In this context the ease of hiring and removal of staff
was frequently cited. This ties in with the notion that labour hire provides employing
organisations with the capacity to increase or decrease staffing numbers, without any
direct employment relationship and obligations. Thus this managerial flexibility factor
cited is compatible with the trend to labour hire, as a means of avoiding regulatory
responsibility.
7.2 Contributions
This thesis provides at least seven significant contributions. First, the empirical studies
in this thesis are significant because no similar Australian study has been published. Up
till now little infonnation has been available on how labour hire agencies actually
operate in Australia, and in particular Queensland. This work provides infonnation on
how labour hire agencies actually operate in practice, involving extensive in-depth
interviews of labour hire agencies and other bodies.
Second, in the study a theoretical assessment is made of the suitability of applying
traditional employment principles to a labour hire situation. It is argued that the labour
hire situation runs counter to the notions contained in common law employment
principles. It is shown that the application of principles to labour hire is problematic in
a number of areas such as unfair dismissal of a worker, vicarious liability and anti-
discrimination legislation.
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Third the research fieldwork conducted backs up American and Australian theories and
evidence, that a prime factor in the expansion of labour hire is the increasing regulatory
impact on standard employers.
Fourth, the preceding findings show that common assumptions about the expansion of
labour hire are incomplete. Labour hire is not just a creature of economic and
managerial concerns. It has been argued for instance that labour hire's great attraction
for employers in particular lies in the flexibility that it provides in staffing levels for
employers. This work goes beyond the common assumptions about the rise in labour
hire to demonstrate that regulatory impact of standard employers has had a major effect
on shifts to work patterns such as labour hire.
The work supports the American studies (such as Houseman, 2001:162-166) which
contend that a major reason for the use of flexible (labour hire) staffing is to reduce
labour costs, and that as (Rabin-Margalith, 2003:311-344 argues) employers are turning
to contingent labour to avoid mandated costs associated with standard labour. The
results of this work therefore make an important contribution to the growing literature
on the concept of labour hire.
Fifth, this work promotes greater recognition of the possible unintended consequences
of regulation of employment. The imposition of perceived increasing regulatory
burdens has had the effect of forcing employing organisations into less onerous
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alternative labour markets such as labour hire, where an increasing number of workers
enjoy less security oftenure.
Sixth, the writer has drawn attention to and advocates the need for consideration ofand
allowance for the special nature of labour hire. The writer's claim is that labour hire is a
distinct work form with unique characteristics, unlike those of standard employment.
Accordingly labour hire should be analysed more in terms of its special tripartite
arrangement, which involves the splitting of responsibilities between an agency and
client. Little attempt has been made by policymakers and courts overall in this
direction.
Seventh, some suggestions are proposed by the writer as to how labour hire should be
dealt with in the future in the following section.
7.3 Limitations and future research
The thesis uses a theoretical and empirical approach, .and is based on the regulatory
impact on the standard employment relationship. This approach emphasises the
perceived burdens on employers by regulation, which causes them to be attracted to less
regulated labour areas, such as labour hire. A converse situation would be where
regulation of standard employment is in fact reduced where the attractiveness of labour
hire possibly would be less enhanced.
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The thesis is subject to particular limitations. First, one limitation concerns the
geographical scope of the study. The thesis is principally limited to labour hire
agencies in Queensland (in particular South-East Queensland), though a number of the
agencies operated Australia-wide. On the other hand there was a high response rate by
agencies to the study.
Second, the thesis is essentially exploratory and concentrates on general themes. Its aim
is to ascertain, canvass and draw attention to important issues pertaining to the area of
labour hire.
Third, the thesis is subject to possible subjective perceptions of the researcher towards
the participants of the study and their information.
Fourth, there may be a self-selection bias in that selection ofparticipants may have been
influenced by factors ofgeographical convenience, and the likelihood of availability.
Fifth, allowance may have to be made for the potential effects and impacts of the
interview process on the interviewees. An interviewee may have provided responses
perceived to be desired by the interviewer, or with a view to having changes made to the
industry.
The Commonwealth government by its recently passed Workplace Relations
Amendment (Work Choices) Act 2005 has sought to fundamentally change workplace
relations in Australia, by setting up a national system ofworkplace relations through the
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use of the corporations power under section 51(xx) of the Australian Constitution,
which is designed to override the States' systems. A clear aim of the Act, through its
rationalisation of the award and collective bargaining system, is a general deregulation
of industrial relations and a move to furtherindividualise work relationships. One
feature of the legislation of note is that unfair dismissal claims will be limited to
employees engaged by employers having more than 100 employees. Another
significant feature is that restrictions on labour hire in awards and agreements will be
non-allowable matters.
The Work Choices Act is in its early stages of implementation and its major effects are
yet to be felt. If however the overall result is that regulatory burdens are lifted on
standard employers, then alternative workforms such as labour hire may lose some of
their attraction for business organisations. Future research is required on these
developments.
7.4 Implications/Conclusions
First, greater consideration and emphasis should be given generally to viewing labour
hire as a discreet and distinct part of employment law, with features that cannot be
comfortably dealt with under traditional common law employment principles. Ai; the
thesis demonstrates the labour hire arrangement is more complex than has been
previously theorised. As the thesis indicates conventional traditional remedies are
inappropriate means in addressing the essentially structural issues of labour hire.
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Consideration needs to be given to new judicial and legislative approaches to labour
hire which acknowledge its unique tripartite nature.
Second, consideration should also be given by policymakers to the consequences of
"over-regulation" of the standard employment relationship, in the sense that core
workers continue to be more privileged, at the expense of an increasing sub-class of
worker.
1'11iTd, the findings of the study raise the issue of whether some direct regulation of the
labour hire market would be appropriate, with a view to lessening the likelihood of
operators entering the labour hire industry, who are attracted largely by immediate
financial returns, at the expense of safety and other issues. The case law and empirical
evidence suggests that, because of the division of responsibility between agency and
client, labour hire only can work satisfactorily and safely ifboth parties adopt a diligent
approach to their respective roles.
Consideration should be given to at least a basic registration system of labour hire
agencies, that would screen out the unethical and unconscientious operators, who are
likely to create unfair competition for bona fide operators through dubious cost cutting
and safety skimping measures. Such a registration system would help maintain higher
standards in the industry. On the subject of regulation despite globalisation and other
factors, it would still appear to be a political choice for governments, whether or not to
go down the deregulated labour market path or not.
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Fourth, consideration should also be given by policymakers and the courts to the
implementation in certain circumstances of the concept ofjoint employment, whe.reby a
labour hire employee could be permitted to take action against either a labour hire :firm
or host company or both. Such an action could be apt in actions for unfair dismissal,
where a client has instigated the inappropriate termination of an employee's services.
Similar to the situation of piercing the "corporate veil" in corporate law, an employee
should be allowed to pierce the "employment veil" protecting a client. In Morgan &
Kittochside Nominees Pty Ltd (2002) 117 IR. 152 a Full Bench of the Australian
Industrial Relations Commission was of the opinion that there was no reason why
Australian law could not follow the U.S. courts in recognising the concept of joint
employment, where two parties each exercise significant control over the worker.
The concept of joint responsibility in labour hire is already entrenched in occupational
health and safety regulation, where both agency and host company are liable to
prosecution if they fail in their respective duties. The Stevens Report 2002 also made a
specific recommendation that a labour hire employee ought to be able to take action in
an Industrial court or commission against a labour hire agency, host company or both,
for unfair dismissal or underpayment of wages. The issue is a matter of policy but
questions of fairness would seem to raise at least a consideration of the application of
the doctrine.
Labour hire appears likely to continue as a work form for the indefinite future, because
of the continuing drive to reduce labour costs and obligations. The challenge for
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legislators and judges is to ensure that the legal rules affecting its operation accurately
reflect the actual realities of a labour hire arrangement. Recognition of the special
nature of labour hire is essential in meeting this challenge.
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